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ABSTRACT  
   
I present in this dissertation a theory of moral disillusion. In chapter 1 I 
explain moral innocence and its loss. I show that becoming morally responsible 
requires shattering the illusion that one is not an appropriate candidate for the 
reactive attitudes. The morally responsible individual must understand that she 
can be an agent of wrongdoing. In chapter 2 I explore the nature of the 
understanding that accompanies the different phases of disillusion. I show that 
moral disillusion is an ability, not to follow moral principles, but to question 
them. In chapter 3 I argue that another phase of disillusion involves an 
acquaintance with evil. One shatters the illusion that only malicious individuals 
can be evildoers. Morally good people can also bring about evil. I conclude that 
evil is the exploitation of the extremely vulnerable. In chapters 4 and 5, I analyze 
more complex phases of moral disillusion. These stages are characterized by an 
understanding that one can be an agent of unchosen evil, that one might bring 
about evil even when pursuing the morally best course of action, and that one can 
be morally responsible for doing so. In order to understand unchosen evil and the 
tragedy of inescapable moral wrongdoing, the individual sees that moral 
responsibility ought to track what we care about, rather than what we believe. In 
chapter 6 I show that Kierkegaard's conception of the self is a philosophy of 
moral disillusion. I argue that his prescription that we shatter moral illusions is 
congruent with Harry Frankfurt's prescription that we ought to care about some 
things and not others. From this discussion emerges the explicit distinction 
between moral disillusion and moral goodness. Moreover, I conclude that the 
  ii 
morally disillusioned are morally accountable for more than those still harboring 
moral illusions. Although moral disillusion does not entail becoming morally 
good, by acquiring the ability to raise questions about moral principles and to 
affect the content of one's cares, one acquires the ability to take responsibility for, 
and potentially minimize, evil. To have and understand these abilities, but not to 
care about them, increases one’s moral accountability.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an interesting historical fact that some of the greatest evils have been 
committed in the name of the most ambitious and inflexible ethical norms. The 
history of Christianity, Communism, and Nazism supply sufficient evidence of 
this fact.  I take it that many of the followers of these doctrines who committed 
horrible atrocities truly believed that they were doing the morally right thing. But 
clearly, they acted under an illusion. Thus, it is evident that holding fast to moral 
illusions can have dreadful consequences. However, it is not only morally corrupt 
ideologies, like Nazism or Communism, that generate illusions. Legitimate moral 
theories can also engender illusions. Holding moral illusions keeps one from 
taking responsibility for the evil one brings about.  
Because perpetrators of evil have often been motivated by an illusory 
morality rather than no morality at all, it is important to provide a theory of moral 
disillusion, which I do in the following chapters. By “disillusion” I mean the 
shattering of moral illusions, not becoming morally good. I do not provide here a 
theory of moral goodness. It would be simplistic to claim that moral disillusion 
entails moral goodness. The negative act of shattering illusions does not 
necessarily include the positive act of forming and maintaining a positive and 
non-illusory ethics. One might replace one set of moral illusions for another. But 
moral disillusion allows at least for the possibility of taking responsibility for 
one’s actions. Part of moral disillusion is recognizing the inadequacy of many 
moral principles and moral directives to account for the evil we bring about. One 
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sees this inadequacy by examining the locus of our responsibility to others, how 
our lives are vulnerable to evil that we cause, and how wrongdoing can be 
unavoidable. It is impossible to address the evil we cause if we remain ignorant of 
how it comes about. But once made aware of evil’s nature and genesis, we can 
take responsibility for its occurrence.  
Taking responsibility is important because it allows one to respond 
appropriately to the harm one has, either directly or indirectly, caused. Sometimes 
the appropriate response to a harm is to ensure that one does not repeat it in the 
future. For example, when an individual recognizes that her lies hurt others, she 
may resolve not to lie in the future. But sometimes the harm we do to others is 
unchosen and inescapable. Due to such features of the harm, the individual cannot 
ensure that she will not bring it about in the future. In these cases, the appropriate 
response is regret, remorse, confession, contrition, apology, restitution, or 
reparation. Whichever of these attitudes fits the specific circumstances, the 
individual takes responsibility for her actions. In order to take responsibility, one 
must shatter illusions of moral purity.   
Moral disillusion is a process, not a status. It involves various phases of 
coming to situate wrongdoing and evil in terms of one’s own agency. To do so 
one must shatter the illusions promulgated by many ethical theories that it is 
possible to cultivate for oneself a state of moral purity. Such theories maintain 
that it is possible, although admittedly unlikely, to avoid all wrongdoing as long 
as one follows certain universal moral principles. Judeo-Christian morality, 
Kantian ethics, and utilitarianism clearly fall into this category. It is an essential 
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element of these theories that wrongdoing is avoidable. But to claim that moral 
purity is a possibility is to ignore certain facts about the moral landscape. It is to 
ignore the complexity of moral life; it is to harbor a moral illusion. One can 
shatter such illusions by raising questions about moral principles that purport to 
establish moral purity.  
The disillusions I consider most important and will analyze in the present 
work include understanding the following: one’s capacity for wrongdoing, the 
nature of evil, unchosen evil, inescapable wrongdoing, and the importance of self-
reflection and what we care about.  
I begin my analysis with the disillusion that characterizes becoming a 
morally responsible agent. At this phase we shatter the illusion that our actions do 
not matter, and we realize that we are appropriate candidates of the reactive 
attitudes. This understanding allows us entry into the moral community. But 
becoming morally responsible is only one phase in a larger process of disillusion. 
We may, and probably do, still harbor other moral illusions. We might believe 
that we need only follow God’s laws, or the categorical imperative, or the greatest 
happiness principle. But rule-following proves to be inadequate for a world rife 
with evil.  
Evil can be brought about unchosenly. Moral disillusion involves realizing 
that one can be held morally responsible for bringing about unchosen evil. 
Furthermore, one might be faced with a situation in which wrongdoing and 
evildoing are inescapable. Even by choosing the morally best course of action, the 
agent may transgress a moral value. Thus, it is not the case that following the ten 
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commandments, or bringing about an optimific state of affairs, or respecting 
another’s autonomy, sufficiently describe moral obligation in every set of 
circumstances. Our characters and relationships are complex enough to give rise 
to moral obligations that preclude the possibility of moral purity.  
Understanding our characters and relationships involves understanding 
what we care about. Cares help structure the will and as such are powerful 
motivators of action. They are powerful enough that if what we care about 
conflicts with what we believe, then they sometimes motivate us to act despite our 
beliefs. Because much of our acts have moral import, and our acts are often 
motivated by what we care about, then it follows that what we care about has 
moral import as well. Although the content of our cares is not entirely within our 
control, the understanding that one acquires through the various stages of moral 
disillusion can affect what one cares about.  Thus, the morally disillusioned 
understanding is a kind of ability, or abilities. It is an ability to participate more 
fully in the moral community through an awareness of the nuances of one’s moral 
interaction with others, an ability to question the adequacy of moral principles and 
directives, and an ability to care about the evil one brings about. This kind of 
ability allows one to take responsibility for, and even potentially minimize, the 
evil one causes.   
But understanding the evil one brings about does not make a person 
morally good. Moral disillusion does not entail moral goodness.  As one acquires 
a more developed understanding of moral life, one might care about bringing 
about more evil, or one might understand, but not care at all about the evil one 
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causes. Therefore, I do not claim that shattering moral illusions entails becoming 
morally good. At each phase of disillusion the agent becomes, not (necessarily) 
morally good, but critical. Since people can do evil by following moral directives, 
it is often more important to raise questions about moral behavior than to follow 
moral directives.  
 Although moral disillusion does not entail moral goodness, I do think that 
it brings with it an enhanced moral responsibility. The person who understands 
how unchosen evil occurs, that situations of inescapable wrongdoing arise, that 
moral responsibility should track our cares rather than our beliefs, and yet does 
not care about taking responsibility for, and potentially minimizing, evil is more 
morally responsible for the evil she causes than a person who lacks an 
understanding of these features of moral life. Those devoid of moral illusions are 
to be held morally accountable for much more than those who retain them. The 
reason for this is not because they ought to know better, but because they do know 
better, and do not care.   
 I will argue for these conclusions by presenting a theory of moral 
disillusion. In chapter 1 I explain moral innocence and its loss. This is the first 
stage of the process of moral disillusion. I show that becoming morally 
responsible requires shattering the illusion that one is not an appropriate candidate 
for the reactive attitudes. The morally responsible individual must understand that 
she can be an agent of wrongdoing. In chapter 2 I explore the nature of the 
understanding that accompanies the different phases of disillusion. Following 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of understanding as an ability to go on, I show that moral 
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disillusion is an ability, not to follow moral principles, but to question them. In 
chapter 3 I argue that another phase of disillusion involves an acquaintance with 
evil. One shatters the illusion that only malicious individuals can be evildoers. 
Morally good people can also bring about evil. By examining particular examples 
of evil as well as theories of evil, I conclude that evil is the exploitation of the 
extremely vulnerable that results in irreparable life-wrecking harm. In chapters 4 
and 5, I analyze more complex phases of moral disillusion. These stages are 
characterized by an understanding that one can be an agent of unchosen evil, that 
one might bring about evil even when pursuing the morally best course of action, 
and that one can be morally responsible for doing so. In order to understand 
unchosen evil and the tragedy of inescapable moral wrongdoing, the individual 
sees that moral responsibility ought to track what we care about, rather than what 
we believe. In chapter 6 I show that Kierkegaard’s conception of the self is a 
philosophy of moral disillusion. His philosophy shows that the ability to question 
moral principles is essential to taking responsibility for what one does. Further, I 
argue that his prescription that we shatter moral illusions is congruent with Harry 
Frankfurt’s prescription that we ought to care about some things and not others. 
From this discussion emerges the explicit distinction between moral disillusion 
and moral goodness. Moreover, I conclude that the morally disillusioned are 
morally accountable for more than those still harboring moral illusions. Although 
shattering moral illusions does not entail becoming morally good, by giving one 
the ability to raise questions about moral principles and to affect the content of 
one’s cares, one acquires the ability to take responsibility for, and potentially 
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minimize, the evil one causes. To have and understand these abilities, but not to 
care about them, makes one more morally accountable. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SHATTERING THE ILLUSIONS OF MORAL INNOCENCE 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the shattering of moral illusions that comprise 
moral innocence. Moral innocence characterizes those who cannot be held 
morally responsible. In Responsibility and Control, Fischer and Ravizza explain 
that in order to enter the moral community, the morally innocent must recognize 
that their actions have an upshot in the world and that they are appropriate 
candidates for the reactive attitudes. This recognition requires shattering the 
innocent notion that one is immune from blame. In his essay “Losing Innocence 
for the Sake of Responsibility,” Peter French argues that the morally innocent 
must be acquainted with evil in order to shatter the illusions that comprise moral 
innocence and enter the moral community. Like Fischer and Ravizza, I think that 
an acquaintance with something milder than evil is required for entry into the 
moral community. The morally innocent must understand wrongdoing in terms of 
their own agency and develop the reactive attitudes; they do not necessarily need 
to become acquainted with evil. But French’s argument is significant for two 
reasons. First, he provides a phenomenological description of the shattering of 
innocent moral illusions necessary for moral responsibility. Second, although I 
disagree with his definition of evil, he reminds us that moral life is far richer than 
barely being the appropriate target of the reactive attitudes. Harm to others cannot 
be completely understood by examining wrongdoing. There is also evil in the 
world. Moreover, this evil is sometimes brought about by our actions. Hence, the 
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illusions that must be shattered in order to provide entry into the moral 
community are not the only moral illusions we harbor. By juxtaposing Fischer 
and Ravizza’s argument for the necessary conditions of moral responsibility with 
French’s account of the loss of innocence via the acquaintance with evil, I begin 
to show that fully understanding moral life requires different shatterings of 
various moral illusions. In this chapter I focus on one phase of moral disillusion: 
recognizing the ability to do wrong. I contrast moral innocence with simple 
ignorance of moral concepts to show that moral innocence is an inability: an 
inability to participate in the moral community. Finally, I argue throughout the 
chapter that the illusions that comprise moral innocence are not the only moral 
illusions we may have. I begin to show in this chapter, and give a full description 
in chapter 3, that an acquaintance with our ability to do or be complicit in the 
occurrence of evil is also a significant phase of moral disillusion.  
2. Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness 
In Responsibility and Control Fischer and Ravizza provide the structure of 
the functional properties of moral responsibility.
1
 Structurally, moral 
responsibility has two necessary elements. An agent is morally responsible for an 
action when the action issues from the agent’s own moderate reasons-responsive 
mechanism; that is, it is necessary that the mechanism is the agent’s own and that 
it is moderate reasons-responsive. What it means for an agent’s mechanism to be 
moderate reasons-responsive is that the mechanism is reasons-receptive in a 
strong way and at least reasons-reactive in a weak way. The mechanism is 
                                                 
1
 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).  
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receptive in a strong way when it is regularly receptive to reasons.  The agent 
must be able to respond in a regular fashion to reasons so that her responses and 
actions create a pattern or seem logical. She need not always act on these reasons 
but it must be possible that she do so. The mechanism is reactive in weak way 
when it can react to a sufficient reason to do otherwise. It need not actually react 
to a sufficient reason, but if there is a possible world where it does, then it is weak 
reasons-reactive. For example, it is conceivable that a car thief reacts to a moral 
reason to which she is receptive not to steal the car, and yet she steals the car. 
Then she is morally responsible for the car theft even if it is only a remotely 
conceivable possibility that she would react appropriately to the moral reason she 
recognizes, or is receptive to, as sufficient for not stealing the car by not stealing 
it. Combining strong reasons-receptivity with this weak reasons-reactivity forms 
moderate reasons-responsiveness.  
 However, moderate reasons-responsiveness is not alone sufficient for 
moral responsibility. The agent’s mechanism could be subject to responsibility-
undermining conditions. Therefore, Fischer and Ravizza introduce the second 
necessary element of moral responsibility: the action-issuing mechanism must be 
the agent’s own. “Taking responsibility” is a necessary condition of the action-
issuing mechanism becoming one’s own. Taking responsibility has three 
necessary elements: the agent recognizes that her actions have some “upshot” in 
the world; the agent recognizes that she is an appropriate candidate for the 
reactive attitudes; and these two beliefs must be based on appropriate evidence. 
This last element serves to rule out freedom-undermining conditions such as 
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brainwashing, behavioral engineering and the like. Since this aspect of their 
argument, viz. the metaphysics of free will, is not my present concern, I will 
concentrate on the first two components of taking responsibility.  
 Fischer and Ravizza explain that a child comes to realize that her actions 
have some upshot in the world through her moral education. When a young boy 
tears open a present belonging to the birthday girl, his parents might send him to 
his room.
2
 This punishment serves two purposes. First, it helps teach the boy that 
the present did not open on its own. Rather, it opened due to an exercise of his 
agency. He starts to learn that his agency has certain upshots in the world; that he 
is the source of certain events and that these events are not caused by accidents or 
other agents. Second, the punishment shows the boy that others feel indignation 
toward him in these circumstances. He starts to learn that he can be fairly praised 
or blamed for his behavior. He sees that he is an appropriate candidate for the 
reactive attitudes.  
 These two elements of moral responsibility, moderate reasons-
responsiveness and taking responsibility for the agent’s own action-issuing 
mechanism, give us the structure of what is required for an agent to be held 
morally responsible for her actions. As we can see with the example of the boy 
with the presents, in order for a person to acquire the capacities necessary for 
moral responsibility, certain illusions must be shattered. One shatters the illusions 
that one’s actions have no upshot in the world and that one cannot be blamed for 
one’s actions.   
                                                 
2
 Fischer and Ravizza, 208.  
  12 
 The way in which we come to shatter innocent illusions is described by 
Peter French in his essay, “Losing Innocence for the Sake of Responsibility.” His 
account provides us with a more developed understanding of the 
phenomenological content of “taking responsibility” of which Fischer and 
Ravizza supply merely the structure. French argues that one must become 
acquainted with evil in order to enter the moral community. He defines evil as 
undeserved harm. Understood in this way, the acquaintance with evil is indeed 
necessary to enter the moral community. But understood in this way, evil is not 
distinct from wrongdoing. The boy who opens the birthday girl’s presents causes 
her undeserved harm. Part of realizing that one’s actions have upshot in the world, 
and that one is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes is to recognize 
that one can do wrong. But recognizing one’s ability to do wrong does not 
sufficiently account for the all of the degrees of badness one can bring about. In 
chapter 3, I argue that evil is distinct from wrongdoing and that recognizing one’s 
capacity to do or be complicit in the occurrence of evil, is a significant moral 
disillusion. Nevertheless, French’s essay has a twofold significance for my 
discussion. First, he provides us with a phenomenological account of the 
shattering of the illusions necessary for entry into the moral community. Second, 
he reminds us that evil, not just wrongdoing, exists in the world.  
3. Innocence and its Loss 
 Before giving my account of moral innocence it would be helpful for me 
to clarify what I do not mean by the term “innocence”. Certain authors equate 
moral innocence either with the status of moral purity or with not being morally 
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blameworthy for a particular act in specific circumstances. For example, Peter 
Johnson claims that “innocence as moral purity implies an inability to inflict 
harm.”3 The innocent are those who do not have the ability to do wrong. Elizabeth 
Wolgast argues against those who claim that innocence as moral purity is 
something to be valued.
4
  Nevertheless, she still defines innocence as a state of 
moral purity. In legal scenarios “innocent” means not guilty for a particular act. 
To be found innocent of a crime does not mean that one is morally pure, but 
simply that one did not commit, or is not culpable for committing, a particular act.  
 But both of these approaches are misleading when it comes to 
understanding moral innocence. The legal definition of innocence is appropriate 
for legal cases but not for understanding moral innocence. By moral innocence we 
mean a certain status, rather than being not guilty for committing a particular act. 
Thinking of moral innocence as moral purity also misses the mark. It does not 
capture what we mean when we think of moral innocence. French notes that 
“[m]oral purity, if there is such a thing, is determined by evaluating someone 
from the perspective of or against the standards set by moral rules and 
principles….Moral virginity is the condition or state of not being a proper subject 
of those standards.”5 He defines moral innocence, not as moral purity, but as 
moral virginity.
6
 It is not that the innocent are morally pure, but morally virginal. 
                                                 
3
 Peter Johnson, Politics, Innocence and the Limits of Goodness (New York & London: 
Routledge, 1988). 
4
 Elizabeth Wolgast, “Innocence.” Philosophy 68, no. 265 (Jul., 1993): 297-307 
5
 French Responsibility Matters, 30.  
6
 We might also construe “moral purity” as moral sainthood.  See J.O. Urmson “Saints and 
Heroes” in  Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1958) and Susan Wolf “Moral Saints” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).  
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An innocent has not yet acquired the cognitive and volitional structures necessary 
to be morally responsible. I will not argue here for or against the value of moral 
virginity; rather, I will describe it and explain why understanding it is helpful to 
understanding moral disillusion.  
According to French, being innocent is characterized by lacking a 
descriptive framework rich with the vocabulary of responsibility. He rejects the 
view that Adam and Eve lost their innocence by being made aware of their own 
freedom through an act of disobedience. French rightly points out that children 
can be disobedient and still maintain their innocence. Therefore, disobedience is 
not necessary to a loss of innocence. What must occur when innocence is lost is a 
conceptual shift that promotes describing familiar things in a new way, a way 
laden with the language of responsibility. The illusions of innocent description, 
description of the moral world that does not cohere to reality, must be shattered. 
This conceptual shift occurs after confronting evil and the recognizing that one 
can both do and be done evil.
7
 I argue in section 5 of this chapter, and in chapter 
2, that this conceptual shift is not merely cognitive. It is volitional as well, and it 
also gives the agent a certain ability to participate in the moral community. 
 This acquisition of the requisite descriptive framework can be seen by 
examining the difference between seeing and seeing that.
8
  An innocent sees 
something without always seeing that. For example, one can see a child being led 
into a van without seeing that the child is being kidnapped. Seeing that involves a 
                                                 
7
 Throughout my presentation of French’s argument, I follow his use of the word “evil”. However, 
I think that an acquaintance with wrongdoing is sufficient for moral responsibility. Nevertheless, 
the acquaintance with evil is an important moral disillusion that I will discuss more in chapter 3.  
8
 I examine this distinction in detail in chapter 2.  
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conceptual understanding or insight into the significance of an event or state of 
affairs. Innocence means not having the training to use moral conceptual 
descriptions with insight. Loss of innocence means acquiring this insight and the 
ability to describe moral and immoral persons and actions. 
 Not only must the loss of innocence have a certain content, but it also 
must occur in a certain way. French relies on Russell’s distinction between 
knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance to argue that 
descriptions of morality will not always be sufficient to promote entry into the 
moral community. What is required is an acquaintance, specifically an 
acquaintance with evil.  
Acquiring knowledge of good and evil…relevant to the loss of 
innocence must be different from the acquisition of what we call 
purely objective knowledge, like knowledge of geometry, which is 
merely a matter of learning the rules and the angles. Suppose 
innocents were taught Kant’s categorical imperative, all three 
formulations, and then Bentham’s utility calculus. Would that 
transform them into mature members of the moral community? It 
might bore them to tears, but they would not be crying for the loss 
of innocence….The learning has to be about oneself and it has to 
be, in some sense, active. The illusions that are shattered must be 
your own…9 
We can clearly imagine how ineffectual it would be to teach moral responsibility 
simply by describing various ethical theories to someone unfamiliar with the 
importance of moral action. In fact, one reason someone may take interest in 
studying an ethical theory in the first place is that the person already has some 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 39-40.  
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acquaintance with evil and thereby acknowledges the importance of ethical 
behavior both on her own part as well as others. Before this acquaintance takes 
place, it is not just that attention to the intricacies of Kantian ethics or 
Utilitarianism would fall on deaf ears, rather the student would not grasp the 
significance of moral vocabulary at all. The student cannot go on in the 
conversation. The innocent must recognize through acquaintance with evil that 
acts often have moral significance. More importantly she must realize that her 
acts often have moral significance. There is no specific standard of evil or 
threshold of acquaintance that can be set in advance for the innocent to transcend. 
Rather innocence is a scalar notion, and one person’s push into the moral 
community might not work for another. What is necessary though is that the 
innocent’s illusions concerning the moral order are shattered.  
Moral disillusion is a process. It is a scalar process that has many phases. 
The phase of disillusion necessary for moral responsibility is the recognition that 
one’s actions have upshot in the world and that one is an appropriate candidate for 
the reactive attitudes. But one can shatter the illusions of moral innocence and still 
retain other moral illusions. It follows then that moral responsibility is not 
coextensive with complete moral disillusion. I agree with Fischer and Ravizza 
that the process of becoming a morally responsible agent is scalar, and I will show 
in the following chapters that there are significant phases of disillusion beyond 
that required for moral responsibility.  
 To see that becoming a morally responsible agent is only one phase on a 
scale of moral disillusion, let’s define the pertinent terms. In most discussions of 
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moral responsibility, moral agency is defined in terms of the capacity to be held 
morally responsible for one’s actions.  An agent is considered a moral agent 
insofar as she may be held responsible for what her agency brings about. A moral 
agent is “one who qualifies generally as an agent open to responsibility 
ascriptions.”10 Based on this view, a moral agent simply is an agent who can be 
held morally responsible for her actions. It is, however, possible to distinguish 
moral agency from moral responsibility if we distinguish between attributability 
and accountability.
11
 We can attribute an action to an agent even if we do not hold 
the agent accountable for it. If the action has a moral quality or moral upshot, then 
we can attribute a moral action to the agent. Attributing a moral action to an agent 
does not entail finding the agent accountable for the action. Children and the 
mentally handicapped are capable of performing actions with moral qualities or 
moral upshot. Therefore, we can attribute moral actions to them as agents. 
However, if a certain lack of guidance control or lack of understanding 
accompanies the actions of children or the mentally handicapped, then we usually 
do not find them morally accountable. In this sense, someone can be a moral 
agent, but not be an appropriate candidate for ascriptions of moral responsibility. 
Hence, moral agency can be distinguished from moral responsibility.  
 One might reply that this kind of agency is not moral agency as we 
ordinarily understand it. When we say that someone is a moral agent we mean 
that she is an agent whose actions are open to responsibility ascriptions. Either 
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approach is consistent with my present account. Whichever way we define the 
connection between moral agency and moral responsibility, they do not comprise 
full moral disillusion. Even after becoming a morally responsible agent, one 
might still hold fast to certain moral illusions. 
 Whether moral agency is defined in terms of moral responsibility or 
considered distinct, the necessary and sufficient conditions of moral agency and 
of moral responsibility (whether the same or not) constitute only one phase of 
moral disillusion. Moral agency is defined either as capable of bringing about 
actions that have a moral quality, or one who qualifies generally as an agent open 
to responsibility ascriptions. Moral responsibility is defined as being an 
appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes and being moderate-reasons 
responsive. I will argue in chapter 3 that a significant moral disillusion is 
understanding that one can do and be done evil. But the acquaintance with evil is 
not necessary for becoming a moral agent or morally responsible; it is necessary 
for losing a certain moral illusion. Hence, one can be a moral agent and morally 
responsible and still retain some moral illusions.  
 In the example of the boy opening the birthday girl’s presents, Fischer and 
Ravizza do not treat the boy as a responsible moral agent, but as one who has an 
opportunity to begin the process of becoming a responsible moral agent by being 
the target of very mild reactive attitudes. He gets acquainted with the notions of 
right and wrong and the fact that behaving wrongly raises the reactive attitudes in 
others. The boy probably does not apply any reactive attitudes to himself. He may 
not really feel guilty or even grasp what feeling guilty involves. His primary 
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concern is most likely not to raise such reactions in his parents again. He may also 
gain a sense of ownership of his actions when they are appraised by others. The 
reactions from the parents serve heuristically to teach the boy about moral agency. 
This example indicates that the process of becoming morally responsible is 
precisely that: a process. Similarly, the process of moral disillusion is also scalar, 
one of the phases of which is becoming morally responsible. The boy need not be 
acquainted with evil to be held morally responsible. Moreover, despite being held 
morally responsible he may still retain some moral illusions.  
The boy with the presents might at some stage, however, understand that 
not only is it wrong for him to do what he did because it spoils another child's 
birthday party, but that he has the capacity or ability to do such things and that 
they could be done to him. Further, he might eventually express indignation at 
those who act towards others as he did to the birthday girl. As he matures he may 
grasp that he can do more than open another’s presents to destroy the happiness of 
another. In other words, he may understand his broader capacities to do wrong, 
and eventually, evil. This scalar process is one comprised of the shattering of 
different illusions. These shatterings will occur at different times for different 
people and it is best left to child psychologists to inform us when they usually 
occur. What I present here is an analysis of the kind of moral understanding that 
accompanies the various shatterings of moral illusions. The loss of moral 
innocence is a significant, but only one of several, disillusions. One needs to 
recognize one’s capacity for wrongdoing to be held morally responsible. This 
recognition is one phase of moral disillusion. But I think that moral life is richer 
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than merely being an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. One shatters 
a different moral illusion by recognizing one’s capacity to bring about evil.  
Another phase of moral disillusion is the recognition that one can bring about or 
be complicit in the occurrence of evil. I shall return to the notion of evil in chapter 
3.  
The shattering of moral illusions need not be sudden or dramatic (although 
it makes for good literature when it is); it need only motivate the innocent’s grasp 
of her own ability to do something wrong. French points out that oftentimes the 
innocent individual needs a push from adult members of the moral community 
who have already lost their innocence. Thus we might say that what is required is 
a teleological suspension of innocence in order to enter into the moral 
community.
12
  
What is important to note at this juncture is the significance of the notion 
of moral illusions. As we have seen, French shows why the illusions of the 
innocent must be shattered to enter the moral community. I have already 
mentioned and will later show that the stable sense of morality that replaces the 
moral illusions of the innocent is also often riddled with illusions.
13
 After 
realizing that one can be an agent of wrongdoing, one might think that following 
the categorical imperative or the principle of utility will allow one to avoid doing 
wrong, and that one can live a life of moral purity. These theories suppose that 
becoming a moral saint is possible as long as one follows the correct moral 
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principle. For example, Kant argues that human nature is fundamentally good and 
one need only make choices under the maxim of the categorical imperative to lead 
a morally pure life. Evil is the corruption of our primarily good nature and thus 
can be avoided.
14
   
The human being (even the worst) does not repudiate the moral 
law, whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (by revoking 
obedience to it). The law rather imposes itself on him irresistibly, 
because of his moral predisposition; and if no other incentive were 
at work against it…he would be morally good.15 
This idea that an agent can be perfectly good, or already is so by virtue of human 
nature, is an example of the kind of moral principle that replaces the moral 
illusions of the innocent. By endorsing these sorts of moral principles, one already 
understands that evil occurs and even that it can occur because of one’s own 
actions. However, one still retains the idea that evil can be avoided, human nature 
is fundamentally good, and that evil is a corruption of that which is good. But I 
will later show that this idea is also a moral illusion.
16
 Through the acquaintance 
with moral tragedy and unchosen evil one learns that the natural order is 
indifferent to moral categories, there is no fundamentally good (or evil) human 
nature, and evil cannot always be avoided. Recognizing these facts of moral life 
constitute shatterings of other moral illusions. But more of this later on. First, we 
must be clear on what we mean by “innocence” and its loss.  
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In his essay “Loss of Innocence and the Things that Remain”17 Michael 
McKenna raises questions regarding French’s theory of the loss of innocence. 
First, McKenna points out that the loss of innocence does not guarantee the 
acquisition of the knowledge of one’s capacity for wrongdoing that is necessary 
for entry into the moral community. One can confront wrongdoing without 
subsequently gaining the knowledge that one is capable of wrongdoing. In such a 
case, the individual loses her illusory understanding of the moral universe but 
does not replace it with a more realistic one. 
The loss of innocence is not, at least not clearly, a guarantor of 
entry into the class of morally responsible agents. This is because 
what is lost need not be accompanied by the conceptual gains that 
French finds necessary for becoming a moral agent. A young 
person might lose the option of seriously using the illusion of 
innocent description, and yet not be able to supplant it with a stable 
understanding of good and evil, of morality.
18
 
McKenna is correct that one’s understanding can be shattered without a new one 
taking its place. We can imagine the case of a molested child who, by living 
through the trauma of the abuse, realizes that her previous conception of morality 
was naïve.  Nevertheless she does not take the further step of establishing a more 
nuanced understanding of moral action, nor internalizes the wrong act in a non-
traumatic manner such that she sees herself as a potential agent of wrongdoing.  
 McKenna’s point is well-taken and raises the question of what it means for 
someone not to enter the moral community. As we have described it thus far, 
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losing moral innocence is a necessary condition for entry into the moral 
community. What we mean when we say that an agent is a member of the moral 
community is that she can be held morally responsible for what she does and that 
she is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. By looking at Strawson’s 
description of the moral community and why certain people are excluded from 
membership, we will gain insight into the different kinds of moral illusions that 
agents have. We will then also see why some agents might have their moral 
illusions shattered, but still not become members of the moral community.  
 Strawson notes the great importance we place on the attitudes and 
intentions of others toward us. Our personal feelings and reactions depend on our 
beliefs about these feelings and intentions of others. It matters a great deal to us 
whether another person’s actions reflect attitudes toward us of goodwill, affection, 
or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other. 
As he puts it: 
If someone treads on my hand accidentally, while trying to help 
me, the pain may be no less acute than if he treads on it in 
contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a malevolent wish 
to injure me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a kind 
and degree of resentment that I shall not feel in the first. If 
someone’s actions help me to some benefit I desire, then I am 
benefited in any case; but if he intended them so to benefit me 
because of his general goodwill towards me, I shall reasonably feel 
a gratitude which I should not feel at all if the benefit was an 
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incidental consequence, unintended or even regretted by him, of 
some plan of action with a different aim.
19
 
The manner in which I react to another’s actions, or the feeling I have toward 
them, depends on the attitude I attribute to the other agent. The range and 
intensity of our reactive attitudes is quite wide, from resentment to gratitude and 
in between, and varies due to how we understand the attitudes and intentions of 
those with whom we interact. To experience these attitudes is both natural and 
essential to human interaction.  
 Strawson points out that there might be occasions on which we suspend a 
reactive attitude. There are situations in which I feel resentment toward another. 
Then there are mitigating circumstances which might motivate suspending my 
resentment. Taking a clue from J.L. Austin’s A Plea for Excuses, Strawson notes 
that when an agent proffers excuses such as “I didn’t mean to,” “There was no 
other way,” “I was pushed,” etc., the feeling of resentment is mollified or 
removed altogether. But even when an excuse mollifies resentment after an 
injury, it does not indicate that reactive attitudes are in any way inappropriate 
when applied to the agent generally. The agent is still a fully morally responsible 
agent. She just happens not to be responsible for this particular injury at this time. 
Therefore, I forswear my feeling of resentment toward her for this particular act, 
but not the application of the reactive attitudes more generally. This agent is still 
an appropriate object of demands of goodwill and the injury she caused is not 
inconsistent with this more general demand. He adds,  
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[t]he offering of such pleas by the agent and their acceptance by 
the sufferer is something in no way opposed to, or outside the 
context of, ordinary inter personal relationships and the 
manifestation of ordinary reactive attitudes. Since things go wrong 
and situations are complicated, it is an essential and integral 
element in the transactions which are the life of these 
relationships.
20
 
 Then there are those suspensions of the reactive attitudes that are due to 
the agent’s general incapacity to live up to the demand of goodwill. Strawson 
includes children, schizophrenics, and individuals acting under hypnosis in this 
category. In these cases we suspend our reactive attitudes towards the agent at all 
times. We should not feel resentment towards these agents when they cause 
injury. We adopt an objective attitude toward such individuals treating them 
differently than others from whom we expect just actions. In other words, we do 
not hold them morally responsible for their actions. Therefore, being an 
appropriate target for the reactive attitudes indicates that the agent is a member of 
the moral community; that is, she can be held morally responsible for her actions.  
 Strawson distinguishes three kinds of reactive attitudes all of which are 
necessary for moral agency and moral responsibility. These attitudes are the ones 
that after losing moral innocence an agent adopts towards others, adopts towards 
oneself, and that others adopt towards the agent. First, we hold reactive attitudes 
towards others’ intentions towards us. We expect others to have goodwill, or at 
least not active ill will, towards us. These are personal reactive attitudes. We also 
have expectations about others’ wills towards others. When one person treats 
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another poorly without justification, then we feel not resentment, but indignation 
or moral disapproval. These are vicarious reactive attitudes. Just as there are 
personal reactive attitudes associated with the demands on others for oneself and 
vicarious reactive attitudes associated with the demands on others for others, so 
too are there self-reactive attitudes associated with demands on oneself for others. 
“And here we have to mention such phenomena as feeling bound or obliged (the 
‘sense of obligation’); feeling compunction; feeling guilty or remorseful or at 
least responsible; and the more complicated phenomenon of shame.”21 If being 
held morally responsible requires understanding oneself as capable of 
wrongdoing, and someone becomes acquainted with wrongdoing without gaining 
this understanding, then she cannot be held morally responsible for her actions. In 
this case, this individual would lack the participant reactive attitudes, especially 
the self-reactive attitudes. If she does not see that she can do wrong in the world, 
then she would not understand why others resent her for some of her actions. 
Thus this individual would not feel obliged to act appropriately toward others, and 
would not feel guilt and shame when she failed to do so. Or, if an individual 
experienced the personal and self-reflective, but not the vicarious reactive 
attitudes, she would be, as Strawson points out, a moral solipsist. 
One who manifested the personal reactive attitudes in a high 
degree but showed no inclination at all to their vicarious analogues 
would appear as an abnormal case of moral egocentricity, as a kind 
of moral solipsist. Let him be supposed fully to acknowledge the 
claims to regard that others had on him, to be susceptible of the 
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whole range of self-reactive attitudes. He would then see himself 
as unique both as one (the one) who had a general claim on human 
regard and as one (the one) on whom human beings in general had 
such a claim. This would be a kind of moral solipsism.
22
 
This individual has not lost (for reasons biological, psychological, or otherwise) 
the illusion that what happens to others has nothing morally to do with her. Part of 
moral disillusion is to see not only that I am morally obligated to others and they 
to me, but that our moral responsibility extends beyond responsibility for our own 
actions to responsibility for seeing that the appropriate moral resentment of others 
is seconded by our own indignation. I shatter the illusion that the only actions of 
moral import are those I do or those done to me. But without this recognition, the 
individual retains illusions about moral behavior that exclude her entry into the 
moral community.  
By distinguishing three different kinds of reactive attitudes, Strawson has 
helped delineate three different ways in which an individual might be excluded 
from the moral community. That is, failure to be an appropriate candidate for any 
of the three categories of reactive attitudes may be sufficient not to hold a person 
morally responsible for what they do. These three ways of failing could be due to 
a shattering of moral illusions without the illusions being replaced by a stable 
moral structure, or due to a failure to shatter moral illusions altogether. The 
individual might grasp that others have moral obligations to her, but not that she 
has any to others. Or, she might understand that other people make moral 
demands on others, but not on her. Or, she might think that the only morally 
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important actions are those that involve her.  Whatever the deficiency in moral 
understanding, this schema also shows us that it is not always true that those 
individuals excluded from the moral community, and specifically of interest here 
the innocent, lack all moral understanding whatsoever. Rather, they lack sufficient 
moral understanding.  Moreover, we can see that acquiring the reactive attitudes is 
not an all or nothing affair. An individual might slowly come to realize her 
obligation to others, their obligation to her, and the obligation of others to others. 
Perhaps, the agent first feels resentment that another has shown her ill will, then 
feels shame when she shows another ill will, and eventually feels indignation 
when another shows another ill will. The loss of innocence is a scalar process. 
Hence, there can be an incipient morality for the morally innocent.  
 McKenna explores the kind of morality that functions for innocents. One 
might incorrectly suppose that a moral innocent has no understanding of morality 
at all. Their innocence is simply a lack of awareness of moral action and 
appraisability, and they cannot parse actions or people into good or bad. But this 
is simply not true. Innocents are very aware of a moral order, however theirs is a 
simplistic one where “the superhero is always pure, strong, physically superior, 
handsome or beautiful, and the villain always tainted, physically enfeebled, ugly, 
and so on.”23 The moral order in which innocents operate is one where the 
categories of good and evil are clear to discern. More disillusioned members of 
the moral community have grasped that actions are not always so morally black 
and white. In fact, one might come to the conclusion that there are no good and 
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evil people as such, but only good and evil actions. This realization could be 
based on the observation that even good people can do evil things. But this latter 
notion is lacking in the moral understanding of the innocent. It follows then that 
one way to describe innocence is that it is a certain kind of ignorance. But 
ignorance is not equivalent to innocence.  
4. Ignorance 
 When we think of who in the actual world is morally innocent we tend to 
think of children. Children are of course morally innocent. However, being 
morally innocent does not belong exclusively to children. Adults could also be 
morally innocent. Although it is possible for adults to be morally innocent, it is 
more likely that an adult is ignorant about the moral nature of a particular kind of 
act. Thus, we need to be careful not to conflate innocence with ignorance. Recall 
that moral innocence is a status. Moral innocence is a general status that an agent 
has, whereas ignorance can be both general and particular.   
 Norvin Richards
24
 distinguishes innocence into two kinds: first, an  agent 
could do something wrong but not know the act fits under a category we 
ordinarily consider wrong, and second, one could be incapable of conceiving of a 
certain kind of (wrong) act as possible. Richards thinks that both kinds of 
innocence appear in children and adults. I agree that it is possible for both kinds 
of innocence to appear in children and adults, but I think that when it appears in 
adults it is usually ignorance, not innocence. For example, Richards asks us to 
imagine a little girl who likes telling stories when she is asked questions. All she 
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knows is that it is fun to imagine events and tell others that they actually took 
place. She does not know that she is lying; that is, even if she knows what lying 
is, she does not realize that she is lying by telling her stories. She does not realize 
that her act fits into a category of acts one ordinarily considers wrong. In this case 
she is doing something wrong, but does not recognize it as wrong.
25
 She does not 
place her action under the category of lying. To illustrate the second kind of 
innocence, Richards asks us to imagine a boy who enjoys looking at pictures of 
other children. He enjoys it, not for any sexual reason, but because he finds it 
fascinating that other children can appear in so many different ways. Although we 
know that some people do look at pictures of children as sexual objects, the boy 
does not. He does not know that such an act is even possible. He completely lacks 
the conception of this kind of act. Here we have two examples of children who are 
generally innocent, but who manifest their innocence in different ways. The girl 
shows her innocence in this case by doing something wrong, but not knowing that 
it fits a certain kind of wrongdoing, and the boy shows his by being incapable of 
even conceiving of a certain kind of wrongdoing. Both kinds of innocence are due 
to their being generally innocent.  
 It is possible, though unlikely, that these different kinds of innocence, viz. 
not knowing that what ones does is wrong and not conceiving of a kind of act as 
possible, can also belong to adults. However in the case of adults, I believe that 
usually one is not innocent, but ignorant. Richards argues that adults in the 
following examples are innocent because they do not comprehend that a particular 
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action is morally wrong. However, if moral innocence is a general status, one 
cannot be morally innocent of a particular act; rather one can be (culpably or 
inculpably) ignorant that a particular act is wrong or has a moral component. For 
example, a rapacious inside trader sees nothing wrong with what he considers 
brilliant steps in a competitive game. He is doing something wrong, but he does 
not, for whatever reason, recognize it as wrong. Perhaps he has rationalized the 
act as simply the only possible way to win in the game of capitalism, or perhaps 
he thinks that if it is a “victimless crime,” then an act cannot be classified as 
wrongdoing. Whatever the reason, he does not understand his wrongdoing as 
wrong. In this way he is similar to the girl who tells stories. But he differs from 
the girl in that he might be familiar with the idea that what he is doing could be 
wrong, but he rejects it.  His familiarity with moral notions, and his ability to 
understand that he is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes, entail that 
he does not have the general status of “morally innocent.” For the girl the idea 
that telling stories is wrong is something entirely new because she is morally 
innocent. Although Richards calls the inside trader innocent, he is really 
ignorant.
26
  
Consider next a woman working as bookkeeper in a company. She is new 
to the company and notices a discrepancy while pouring over the company’s 
records. She recalculates the numbers multiple times, but cannot get them to come 
out right. She brings her report to the boss who is an alumnus from the college she 
attended and a pillar in the local Lutheran church. He says he will take care of it. 
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Later talking to her friends on the phone she is astonished that they think the boss 
is embezzling money. She cannot understand how that would be possible. He 
went to the same college, he is an upstanding member of the local Lutheran 
church, and such people do not do such things.  She cannot even conceive of the 
possibility, just as the little boy could not conceive of the possibility of looking at 
children as sexual objects. She differs from the boy in that the boy lacks 
understanding of the whole dimension of sexuality (or sexual perversion) because 
he is morally innocent; she lacks more specific understanding that “embezzler” 
can belong to the same list as “pillar of the local Lutheran church,” not because 
she is innocent, but because she is ignorant. Because she is a member of the moral 
community she has already lost her moral innocence, however she retains certain 
moral illusions. These cases of the two adults illustrate that losing moral 
innocence does not entail that the agent cannot be ignorant of moral truths. In fact, 
it is precisely because members of the moral community retain some illusions that 
there are different phases of moral disillusion. Each advanced stage of moral 
disillusion involves a shattering of ignorant illusions.  
 Although the adults in the above examples are ignorant without being 
innocent, the children’s innocence is characterized by a specific kind of 
ignorance. As we have discussed so far, what the innocent lack is knowledge by 
acquaintance with wrongdoing; that is, they are ignorant that their actions have 
upshot in the world and that they are appropriate candidates of the reactive 
attitudes. We have also discussed that this lack of acquaintance explains an absent 
cognitive ability either to conceive of their act as wrong or even to conceive of the 
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possibility of the act at all. This ignorance is experiential as well as cognitive. The 
innocent have not yet had the requisite experiences nor adopted the requisite 
concepts or descriptive vocabulary to comprehend the nature of wrongdoing or of 
evil. More importantly, an innocent has not yet comprehended that she is capable 
of wrongdoing or evil, and therefore lacks the ability to participate in the moral 
community. Her innocence is intimately tied up with her ignorance. But the 
ignorance of the innocent is not just ignorance of the concepts of good and bad, as 
Aristotle argues. Rather, it is ignorance that the agent herself is capable of 
wrongdoing or evil. It is an inability to see that one’s acts have moral 
significance. It follows that the loss of moral innocence is not just a gain in 
conceptual knowledge, but the acquisition of an ability—an ability to participate 
in the moral community. I present the structure of this ability in the next two 
sections and then examine it in detail in the next chapter. First, I contrast the 
ignorance of the morally innocent with Aristotle’s definition of ignorance. This 
contrast will help motivate the interpretation of moral understanding as an ability.  
 In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between two 
kinds of ignorance. It is important that Aristotle define ignorance and distinguish 
it into its different kinds because “every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought 
to do and what he ought to abstain from.”27 Therefore, understanding the nature of 
virtue and becoming virtuous includes an understanding of ignorance. According 
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to Aristotle an action can be done in ignorance or caused by ignorance.
28
  An 
agent who does an action in ignorance does it without knowledge of the universal. 
One does not have general knowledge of good and bad, and therefore of what one 
ought to do. One experiences no pain or regret due to one’s ignorance of this 
general knowledge. This kind of ignorance is inexcusable because one should 
have this knowledge of the universal. In Strawson’s terminology, we would not 
suspend the reactive attitudes towards this individual.
29
  
One could also be ignorant of particular circumstances. The agent knows 
what is good and bad, but is kept ignorant of the badness of her action until after 
its occurrence. Once the individual realizes what she has done, she experiences 
pain and regret. This kind of ignorance mitigates responsibility as long as the 
agent was not responsible for her state of ignorance by a prior act. Unless 
someone’s ignorance about what she should do is itself culpable, then she is not 
morally blameworthy for her act. Given this kind of ignorance, we suspend the 
reactive attitudes toward the agent for this particular wrong act.  
This distinction of kinds of ignorance shows that it is morally permissible 
to be ignorant of facts, but not about moral principles. Aristotle believes that the 
first kind of ignorance is sometimes exculpatory and the latter kind never 
exculpatory because actions based on the first kind of ignorance are involuntary 
and actions based on the second kind are not involuntary. 
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Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is non-voluntary; it 
is only what produces pain and regret that is involuntary. For the 
man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the 
least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did 
not know what he was doing, or yet involuntarily, since he is not 
pained.
30
  
According to Aristotle the two kinds of ignorance line up with involuntary or non-
voluntary action. Although involuntary action is sometimes not morally 
blameworthy, non-voluntary action is blameworthy. Although the agent did not 
know what she was doing, she should have known and she is further morally 
blameworthy for not knowing. Given Aristotle’s schema, the innocent person 
would be the one who is inculpably ignorant of the universal. However, I think 
that defining moral innocence simply as ignorance of the universal is incomplete. 
Exposing what is missing in Aristotle will help to illuminate what is significant 
about the present account.  
It is not entirely correct that the innocent are ignorant of the universal. As 
I discussed above, the innocent often recognize a naïve moral system where good 
and bad are clearly defined. But even if Aristotle were correct that the innocent 
person is ignorant of general knowledge of good and bad, she is not culpable for 
her ignorance. Ignorance of the universal is blameworthy for those capable of 
grasping it, but the ignorance that characterizes the innocent is not. The innocent 
are not the kind of individuals who should have knowledge of the universal. Even 
so, losing the kind of ignorance that Aristotle thinks constitutes innocence is not 
sufficient for the loss of moral innocence.  
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 For the loss of moral innocence, it is not sufficient merely to acquire 
general knowledge of good and bad. As French notes: 
Knowledge of good or what one morally ought to do, however, is 
probably not as important as knowledge of evil or rather, of one’s 
capacity to do and be done evil…Experiencing evil in the loss of 
innocence is grasping for the first time the possibility that things 
might have gone differently, and so seeing what would have been 
good in the situation, and so seeing oneself as capable of evil.
31
 
One must not only acquire general knowledge of good and bad, one must also see 
oneself as the potential source of wrongdoing or evil. The individual must make 
the connection between the occurrence of evil, and her ability to produce it. In 
other words, one must locate evil in terms of one’s own agency. As Fischer and 
Ravizza put it, the agent must be aware that her actions have some upshot in the 
world. I added to their account by saying that she must also be aware that her 
actions could have a moral upshot in the world. What we will continue to see at 
each stage of moral disillusion is the significance of comprehending, not just what 
is good and bad or right and wrong in the form of moral principles, but that the 
good and bad or right and wrong action comes from oneself.
32
  In the next chapter 
I examine this kind of understanding in more detail and argue that it is not merely 
conceptual because it is a kind of ability—an ability to participate in the moral 
community and to exercise the moral imagination. In the following section, I 
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begin to lay the foundation for the argument in chapter 2 by arguing that the 
condition necessary for being held morally responsible, namely guidance control, 
is an ability.  
5. The Ability to Guide 
 In section 2 of this chapter, I explained that to be held morally responsible 
for one’s actions the agent must be moderate reasons-responsive. Fischer and 
Ravizza argue persuasively that the agent’s mechanism must be strong reasons-
receptive and at least weak reasons-reactive. What it means to be moderate 
reasons-responsive is to have “guidance control.” Inspired by Frankfurt-type 
cases, Fischer and Ravizza distinguish two different kinds of control, only one of 
which is necessary for moral responsibility. Regulative control is the kind of 
control where the agent has alternative possibilities. In such situations, the agent 
can do one action or another. Frankfurt shows that there may be situations where 
an agent does not have alternative possibilities open to her and yet is still held 
morally responsible for what she does. For example, Jones shoots Smith while 
Black stands waiting to interfere and ensure that Jones decides to shoot Smith 
should Jones decide not to shoot Smith. Because Black is a counterfactual 
intervener, Jones lacks an alternate possibility to deciding to shoot Smith. Yet, he 
shoots Smith without any coercion or intervention by Black, and we hold him 
morally responsible for it.  The example illustrates that an agent may be held 
morally responsible even if she lacks any alternative possibilities. 
Because Jones goes through with the action on his own and without Black 
actually intervening, he is morally responsible for what he does. The intervention 
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occurs in the alternate scenario, not the actual one. Therefore, having open 
alternative possibilities, or regulative control, is not necessary for ascriptions of 
moral responsibility.  
 However, it does not follow from this discovery that no control at all is 
required for moral responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza explain that although the 
morally responsible agent in Frankfurt-style cases does not have regulative 
control, that is, does not have open alternative possibilities, she does have 
guidance control. “Guidance control of an action involves an agent’s freely 
performing that action. Regulative control involves a dual power: for example, 
the power freely to do some act A, and the power freely to do something else 
instead.”33 In a situation where an agent has guidance control, she freely does 
whatever she does although she could not have done otherwise. It does not matter 
whether she could have freely done something in an alternative sequence.
34
 
Fischer and Ravizza ask us to imagine a case where the driver of a car, Sally, 
turns the car to the right. However, this car is a driver instruction automobile with 
dual controls for the driver instructor. If Sally had not turned or guided the car to 
the right, the instructor was ready to engage his controls to ensure the car turned 
to the right. Sally does not have regulative control because she could not have 
done otherwise than turn the car to the right. However, she does exercise guidance 
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control. She freely turned the car to the right. This unusual case points out 
something significant regarding action and control. One can have a certain sort of 
control without having the sort of control that involves alternative possibilities.  
 What both the Frankfurt-type cases and Fischer and Ravizza point out is 
that the traditional association of moral responsibility with control is correct. But 
the relevant sort of control does not involve alternative possibilities. The sort of 
control associated with moral responsibility is guidance control. But what does 
guidance control mean specifically? In what way does Sally freely guide the car 
such that she can be considered morally responsible for turning the car to the 
right? Fischer and Ravizza have already shown that she need not have any 
alternative possibilities open to her. Rather, what is required is that her actual 
action-issuing mechanism be reasons-responsive. Although the agent could not 
have done otherwise, her actual action-issuing mechanism was reasons-
responsive. She could receive sufficient reasons to do otherwise, and there is 
some possible world where she acts on one of those reasons. Furthermore, the 
mechanism that operates in Sally’s brain is her own. Thus, Fischer and Ravizza 
define guidance control as action performed by an agent’s reasons-responsive 
mechanism that is also her own. The agent is able to receive and possibly react to 
sufficient reasons to do otherwise.  
But guidance control need not be entirely cognitive. The agent’s ability to 
receive and possibly react to reasons and then to guide one’s actions in a certain 
direction can have a volitional component as well. Reasons can move an 
individual to act given what the agent is willing to bring herself to do. That is, one 
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might receive a reason based on purely cognitive grounds, but she may only react 
to those reasons, or react to those reasons in a possible world, volitionally. One 
can decide based on reasons that one course of action is best. But one might still 
be incapable of bringing oneself to act on those reasons.
35
 In Harry Frankfurt’s 
words, “one runs up against the limits of his will.”36  
For Frankfurt, an agent’s will is the desire by which she is motivated in 
some action or the desire by which she will be motivated when or if she acts. “An 
agent’s will, then, is identical with one or more of his first-order desires.”37 Thus, 
the notion of will as Frankfurt uses it is the notion of an effective desire. Not only 
does A have certain desires, but she also desires to desire in a certain way and 
wants those desires to move her effectively to act.  In other words, A wants her 
will to be a certain way. When A wants a certain desire to be her will, then she has 
a second-order volition. Second-order volitions are often motivated by what one 
cares about. Those desires that a person wants to have and wants to be effective 
are those which comprise her will and her identity, and which move her act. We 
may not always choose which desires move us to act, but we reflect upon the 
desires we have and have a second-order volition that they be effective in our 
action. Therefore, guiding ourselves is not simply a cognitive endeavor. It is also 
a volitional ability.  
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Both Frankfurt and Fischer and Ravizza allow us to see that being a 
morally responsible agent demands the ability to guide one’s actions. Being 
moderate reasons-responsive and having guidance control require a certain kind 
of understanding. In order to be receptive to the kinds of reasons that are germane 
to moral acts, one must see that certain actions have moral import. Moreover, in 
order to react to a sufficient reason to act one must be able to guide one’s actions 
in a particular direction. Thus, the loss of moral innocence is not merely an 
acquisition of moral concepts; it is the acquisition of an ability to see that one’s 
actions have moral significance and to be able to guide one’s actions accordingly. 
In this section, I have only begun to indicate that the moral understanding that 
accompanies the loss of moral innocence is an ability. In the next chapter I 
examine this ability in more detail.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I analyzed the shattering of moral illusions that 
characterizes the loss of moral innocence. In order to be held morally responsible 
one must recognize one’s capacity to do wrong and be an appropriate candidate of 
the reactive attitudes. One loses moral innocence, but gains the ability to 
participate in the moral community. However, the moral disillusion that 
characterizes entry into the moral community does not rid us of all of our moral 
illusions. I will continue to examine the more complex phases of moral disillusion 
in the subsequent chapters. I distinguished innocence from ignorance by showing 
that although innocence includes ignorance of moral concepts, ignorance does not 
necessarily include innocence. That is, one can be culpably ignorant. Finally, I 
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have begun to show that what one gains from losing innocence is an 
understanding seen as an ability to participate in the moral conversation and the 
moral community. If being a member of the moral community requires that one 
has guidance control, then not being eligible for the moral community means that 
one lacks this ability. Therefore, moral innocence is characterized not only by a 
lack of moral concepts, but an inability to practice guidance control. One cannot 
practice guidance control if one is not moderate reasons-responsive. Becoming 
moderate reasons-responsive, i.e. being able to receive and possibly react to 
sufficient moral reasons to do otherwise, requires an ability to discern sufficient 
moral reasons. This discerning ability is the ability to understand that one’s action 
has moral significance. Thus, the understanding that accompanies the loss of 
moral innocence is not merely a conceptual comprehension; rather, it is 
understanding in the sense of an ability to participate in the moral conversation. In 
chapter 2 I examine this ability in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNDERSTANDING, SEEING THAT, AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION 
1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I analyzed the loss of moral innocence. I explained 
how the loss entails a gain; one gains enough moral understanding to be held 
morally responsible for one’s actions. At the end of the chapter I explained that 
impersonal conceptual knowledge of good and evil is not sufficient for the loss of 
innocence. One must also see oneself as a potential source of wrongdoing. That is, 
the individual must understand wrongdoing in terms of her own agency. In this 
chapter I shall say more about this sort of understanding that accompanies this 
phase of moral disillusion. Based on Wittgenstein’s distinction between knowing 
and understanding, I argue that knowing good and evil does not entail 
understanding good and evil.  However, both knowing and understanding involve 
a transition from “seeing” to “seeing that.” I argue that we can “see that” actions 
have moral significance in different ways. One of these ways involves imagining 
different ethical consequences, or what another person might do in my situation, 
or what another way of life is like. The moral imagination allows the agent both to 
explore future possibilities as well as to play out what one should have done in the 
past. It is more than a recognition that one’s actions have moral upshot in the 
world and that one is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. By 
imaging hypothetical ethical scenarios, one has the ability to raise questions about 
moral principles.  
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Before I continue, I need to clarify a possible confusion; one might 
conflate moral disillusion with moral goodness, but it is important to distinguish 
losing moral illusions from being morally good. Losing moral illusions does not 
entail becoming morally good, however being morally good requires the loss of 
certain moral illusions. We can easily see this by noticing that one could use their 
knowledge of good and evil to do evil deeds, but one cannot do good deeds until 
one recognizes her capacity to do good and evil.  
 Moral disillusions are necessary but not sufficient for becoming a morally 
good person. Losing moral innocence is required for participation in the moral 
community and being held morally responsible for what one does. But clearly, 
one need not be morally good to be a member of the moral community. One 
might think that after losing moral innocence one replaces the shattered illusions 
with a stable moral system like Aristotle’s universals, or the categorical 
imperative, or the greatest happiness principle, or any other moral directive. This 
may indeed occur. However, such knowledge characterizes (perhaps) the morally 
good person. What is distinctive about losing moral illusions, although it also 
allows for the possibility of grasping moral directives, is the ability to raise ethical 
questions, not (always) to answer them. The morally good person can recite and 
follow moral directives. The person who has shattered moral illusions can raise 
questions as to the inadequacy of those moral directives. As we examine the 
different phases of moral disillusion we will see that this ability develops such 
that the agent can raise ever more difficult questions, especially those that cannot 
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be easily answered.
38
 Thus, the inability to answer difficult ethical questions may 
not be an indication of an inability or a lack of understanding (although it could 
be), but rather a distinguishing feature of an understanding that grasps the 
complexity of moral life.
39
 In what follows, I unpack the kind of understanding 
that accompanies the various phases of moral disillusion and show that raising 
ethical questions is one of its defining characteristics.   
2. Adam and Eve 
There is of course a famous myth in our culture concerning the loss of 
moral innocence. It is the story of Adam and Eve. God commands Adam and Eve 
not to eat from (or even touch!) the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But 
God does not merely tell the two not to eat from the tree. He includes a threat for 
noncompliance as well. He tells them that they will die if they eat from the tree. 
“And the Lord God commanded the man, ‘You may freely eat of every tree of the 
garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in 
the day that you eat of it you shall die.’”40  Now immediately the reader might be 
confused. Knowing the end of the story one might ask why God would tell them 
they will die, when He knows that they will not die. Also, why did God place this 
tree in the middle of the Garden of Eden (along with the tree of life) if he did not 
want them to eat from the tree? Perhaps it is because God did not want humans to 
have knowledge of evil. But if God did not want them to eat from the tree so that 
they would never know evil, did he also not want them to know good? After all it 
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is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, not just evil. Quite a lot of ink has 
been spilled on biblical exegesis to interpret this story as a myth that explains free 
will, the origin of sin, etc., but outside of a religious context God’s actions seem 
quite peculiar. In any event, in the story the serpent tells Eve that she and Adam 
will not die, and God only forbade eating from the tree so that humans would not 
become like him. Later, God admits as much.  
Then the Lord God said, ‘See, the man has become like one of us, 
knowing good and evil; and now, he might reach out his hand and 
take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever’—therefore 
the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden…41 
After God discovers that they ate the fruit, He casts Adam and Eve out of the 
Garden of Eden. He does so not only to punish them for disobedience, but also 
because they have already gained knowledge of good and evil, and if they added 
immortality to the mix by eating from the tree of life, they would be gods like 
him.
42
  
The narrator of the story tells us that after eating the fruit “the eyes of both 
were opened.”43 Where they had previously seen each other naked, they now saw 
that they were naked. In other words, they acquired a certain kind of knowledge 
that allowed them to see the significance of a certain state of affairs. Losing moral 
innocence can be described as an acquisition of knowledge such that one sees that 
where before one could only see. Adam and Eve now have knowledge of good 
and evil. In other words they know the difference between good and evil.  
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 And yet, it seems a stretch to claim that they understand the difference 
between good and evil. Their “knowledge” in the story seems to indicate 
“awareness of” or “becoming acquainted with.” But awareness or becoming 
acquainted are not understanding. I am aware, i.e. I know, that when I spill coffee 
on my desk, the liquid pools on top of the hard surface and does not drip through 
it. But unless I have a conception of the kinetic energy of molecules and how this 
energy differs between solids and liquids, I do not understand this state of affairs. 
Similarly, Adam and Eve know good and evil, but they do not yet understand 
good and evil. Nevertheless, it would not be infelicitous to utter “I see that…” in 
contexts of understanding as well. This indicates that we can utter “I see that…” 
in contexts of both knowing and understanding, even though there is also 
sometimes a distinction between knowing and understanding. What is the 
difference between knowing and understanding good and evil? The difference, as 
we will come to see in this chapter, is one of moral disillusion. 
3. Wittgenstein on Knowing and Understanding 
 In Philosophical Investigations
44
 (hereafter PI 
45
). Wittgenstein puzzles 
over this difference between knowing and understanding. There are some 
passages in PI, where it seems as though Wittgenstein distinguishes between 
knowing and understanding, and there are other passages where it seems he uses 
them interchangeably. Similarly, in ordinary language we sometimes distinguish 
between them and we sometimes use them interchangeably. But where does the 
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distinction lie and what does the distinction tell us about moral disillusion? I will 
present Wittgenstein’s description of “to understand” and “to know” first to 
establish that they are both abilities rather than mental states. Understanding them 
both as abilities is crucial to arriving at what I mean by moral disillusion.  Then I 
ask whether he distinguishes between the two abilities. I answer this question in 
the affirmative and then show how we can get clear on the distinction by looking 
at an analogous distinction between reading and being literate. What we learn 
from Wittgenstein is that although there is indeed a distinction between knowing 
and understanding, neither one is a mental state. Rather, they are each an ability.  
In a moral context, they are each an ability to interact, or “go on,” in the moral 
conversation. I will show that although each is an ability to go on, there is a 
difference in what we can go on to do. Knowledge of good and evil gives us the 
ability to experience, and be an appropriate candidate for, the reactive attitudes. 
Understanding good and evil gives the ability to raise nuanced ethical questions.  
 First, it is important to be clear about what Wittgenstein says concerning 
“understanding” and “knowing.” In presenting his general approach to 
understanding, I will initially gloss over differences between “understands” and 
“knows” in order to establish that they are abilities rather than mental states. After 
we are generally clear concerning what he wants to say about “understanding” 
and “knowing” as abilities, I will return to passages where he indicates how they 
might be distinct.  
Wittgenstein discusses with an interlocutor what it means to know or to 
understand. The discussion is couched in a discussion about applying a rule. The 
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interlocutor argues that one’s ability to go on is the application of the 
understanding but not the understanding itself. By analyzing how one applies a 
rule and solves a problem Wittgenstein and the interlocutor approach the question 
of how one understands. The interlocutor represents the approach standard in the 
history of philosophy. He wants to define the essence of the thing. Wittgenstein 
wants to move away from looking for essences to looking at how words are used.  
When philosophers use a word—“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, 
“I”, “proposition”, “name”—and try to grasp the essence of the 
thing, one must ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this 
way in the language-game which is its original home?—What we 
do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday 
use.
46
  
The interlocutor, as the representative of the view coming out of the history of 
philosophy, is that the understanding is a mental state that is the source of one’s 
ability to go on and use rules and language correctly. That is its essence. Under 
this theory, when a person hears and understands a word a certain thought appears 
in the mind. This thought then logically compels a certain application of a rule, 
which in turn allows the person to go on. Hence, the interlocutor thinks, there is a 
strong connection between what occurs in the mind when someone understands a 
word and how that person makes use of this understanding. The discussion moves 
to an example of a teacher teaching a student to complete a numerical series. The 
question is how the teacher knows that the student has understood the series. 
Again, the interlocutor wants to defend the position of traditional philosophy, 
which argues that the essence of the understanding is that it is a mental state.  
                                                 
46
 Ibid., 116. 
  50 
Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to 
understand it) can’t consist in continuing the series up to this or 
that number: that is only applying one’s understanding. The 
understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct 
use.
47
 
The interlocutor concludes that the understanding is a mental state lying behind 
the correct use of a rule. How the student correctly and repeatedly completes the 
numerical series is by applying to the series the rule generated or grasped by the 
understanding. Wittgenstein resists this conclusion. He points out that we do not 
use the word “understands” to refer to the process of a mental state applying a 
rule. Rather, we say the student understands when he completes the series; that is, 
when he is able to go on. Understanding simply is the ability to go on.  
 Consistent with the main goal of PI, Wittgenstein tells us that we need to 
look to the grammar of “understand” in order to know what we mean when we 
use the term. 
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must 
take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, 
not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the 
workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us 
recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand 
them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but 
by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language.
48
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 The grammatical investigation will show that our concept of understanding 
functions very differently from the philosophical picture painted by the history of 
philosophy.
49
 Wittgenstein’s analysis will then shed light upon what we mean by 
an agent acquiring moral understanding and how this understanding differs from 
moral knowledge.   
 Wittgenstein objects to the idea that something in the mind compels a 
person to use a word in a particular way.  He does this by asking us to imagine a 
cube. It is perfectly possible that on being told to imagine a cube, one person 
pictures a cube and another person a triangle.  There is nothing in the drawing of a 
cube that forces a particular use on us. In terms of the example with the student 
and the numerical series, Wittgenstein freely admits that it may be a criterion of 
the student understanding the series that the formula comes to the student’s mind. 
But if this is so, then it is only because the formula is used in a certain way and 
not because it is the source of the understanding. As with the example with the 
cube, there are circumstances where the formula comes to the student’s mind but 
we would not say that she understands the series. Thus, Wittgenstein quickly 
rejects the notion that there is some relation of logical compulsion between the 
understanding and the use of a word or application of a rule. 
 It is at this point in his discussion with the interlocutor, that Wittgenstein 
turns to look more closely at the grammar of understanding. Again, his main goal 
is to resist the notion that the understanding is a mental state. It is only by failing 
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to attend to grammatical distinctions among our use of words that we end up 
positing misleading philosophical theories which obfuscate rather than elucidate. 
This grammatical investigation will also allow us to understand “moral 
understanding” as an ability to go on, rather than as a mental state that applies 
moral principles to specific situations. In terms of the loss of innocence, the 
ability to go on is the ability to participate as a moral agent in the moral 
community. We can understand this participation as an ability to go on in the 
moral conversation.  
 One grammatical distinction between mental states and understanding is 
exposed by noticing that when we speak of mental states temporal concepts like 
duration and continuity make sense. However, such concepts do not make sense 
when we try to apply them to understanding.  
“Understanding a word”: a state. But a mental state?—Depression, 
excitement, pain, are all called mental states. Carry out a 
grammatical investigation as follows: we say 
“He was depressed the whole day”. 
“He was in great excitement the whole day”. 
“He has been in continuous pain since yesterday”.— 
We also say “Since yesterday I have understood this word”: 
“Continuously”, though?—To be sure, one can speak of an 
interruption in understanding. But in what cases?  Compare: 
“When did your pains get less?” and “When did you stop 
understanding that word?”50                                                                                                            
When we try to apply the same notions of temporality and continuance to 
understanding, we end up with strange questions like at the end of the passage. 
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When a theory results in nonsense, then the theory itself might be nonsense! The 
above passage shows that even if understanding is some kind of a state, it is 
grammatically distinct from mental states. Wittgenstein wants to show that the 
concept of understanding is linked not to mental states, but instead to ability. The 
example of the student and the numerical series helps show that when we use 
“understand,” we do not include any notion of some internal mechanism distinct 
from what the understanding does. What it does is allow the person to go on. But 
what does it mean to go on? 
 Going on is a practice. Practices are steeped in a person’s (persons’) form 
of life. The context within which “understanding” gets its sense (i.e. its use) is the 
form of life revealed in the way the people in question speak and act. This form of 
life includes their past history as well as their future ways of acting. Thus, to 
understand “understanding” we have to look at practices and performances of 
understanding.  
If there has to be anything “behind the utterance of the formula” it 
is particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on 
– when the formula occurs to me.51 
This passage indicates that there are various contexts in which we would say that 
someone understands. There is no single definition of “understanding” abstracted 
from the particular contexts and uses of “I understand” or “she understands.” The 
example of the student with the numerical series shows us that there are a number 
of situations where the student might have the formula, but we would still not 
conclude that she understands. Wittgenstein acknowledges that the meaning of 
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“understand” is quite complicated. However, he also shows that the standard 
philosophical picture of the understanding further complicates matters. The 
grammatical investigation of “understanding” helps to bring its meaning to light 
even if it remains somewhat in the dark. What we can know is that the 
understanding is not a mental state. We have to look to the particular 
circumstances in which we use the words “Now I understand” or “Now I can go 
on” to elucidate what we mean by “understand.” Thus, my use of these words 
connects with a form of life in which I have been acculturated and that reveals 
itself through past performances. Words have their significance only in this form 
of life. Consequently, “understanding” is not something that can be understood by 
looking at an isolated event. Understanding requires a context (i.e. form of life) as 
a backdrop to have any significance and communicative force. A form of life is a 
necessary condition for successful understanding. When we consider the moral 
community, or even better the moral conversation, as a form of life, we can think 
of “knowing” and “understanding” as each an ability; the former to experience the 
reactive attitudes, and the latter the ability to raise ethical questions about one’s 
own and others’ actions. These are two different ways that one can go on. As we 
will see, the first relates to knowing and the second to understanding.  
 Now that we have established that both knowing and understanding are 
abilities, I turn to see how they differ.  This difference will explain different 
phases of moral disillusion. In the following passage we are told more explicitly 
that understanding is the ability to go on.  
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The grammar of the word “knows” is evidently closely related to 
that of “can”, “is able to”. But also closely related to that of 
“understands”. (‘Mastery’ of a technique,)52  
There are two important parts of this quotation to notice. The first is that he is 
relating “to know” and “to understand” to “can” or “is able to.”53 This relation 
shows how knowing/understanding is an ability: the ability to go on. The second 
important part of this quotation is that Wittgenstein here explicitly distinguishes 
between knowing and understanding. He states that “knows” is closely related to 
“can” and “is able to” and is also closely related to “understands.” Thus as far as 
this passage indicates, he does not consider “knows” and “understands” to be 
indistinguishable. As we will see the distinction between knowing and 
understanding in a moral sense is a distinction between two different kinds of 
ability and two kinds of moral disillusion.  
 Before I go on to show that Wittgenstein sometimes distinguishes between 
“know” and “understand,” I want to look at how we use the these two terms in 
ordinary language. Because Wittgenstein is an ordinary language philosopher it is 
important that his explanation of these two words matches our use of them in 
ordinary language.  
 Clearly there are some important distinctions between “to know” and “to 
understand” in ordinary language. Above we said that although Adam and Eve 
know good and evil they do not understand good and evil. Similarly, I can say “I 
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know you” in the sense of being familiar with who you are, but nevertheless say 
“I don’t understand you” in the sense of not comprehending your motivations or a 
statement you have uttered.  In both cases understanding is more robust than 
knowing.  
For a more detailed example let’s take the Czech sentence “Moje kočka je 
černá.”54 Now even if I do not speak Czech I can still state that I know what this 
sentence says. It says “Moje kočka je černá.” However, if I do not speak Czech, 
then I certainly cannot truthfully assert that I understand what this sentence says. 
This distinction seems to be correct on the surface. However, Wittgenstein might 
say that even if I do not speak Czech I might understand the sentence depending 
on the context. Imagine the following situation: I am in an apartment in Prague 
and a black cat walks into the room. A Czech speaker says the above sentence to 
me. It is reasonable to suppose that given the right conditions, I might understand 
what she is trying to communicate. But as Wittgenstein also points out in other 
places in PI, there is no necessary connection between the words and the object. 
The circumstances of the situation would have to be such that I understand how 
the sentence is being used to communicate that someone’s cat is black.  
This example is helpful in showing us that Wittgenstein does not want to 
say that the meanings of “understands” or “knows” are always clear and easily 
definable. In fact, that they are not is what is wrong with the traditional 
philosophical approach. The philosophical approach tries to determine the 
essences of both “understanding” and “knowing.” That is, it seeks clear and 
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distinct definitions. However, meaning is use and use depends on context and a 
form of life. Therefore, we can conclude that the meanings of “understands” and 
“knows” vary depending on the relevant context and specific language game. This 
variance means that there may be contexts where “I know” and “I understand” 
can be used interchangeably. So, we have to look to the specific context.  
In the context of the moral conversation, we use “knows” as an ability to 
experience the reactive attitudes and thus to morally interact with others. “She 
knows the right thing to do” can only be uttered in reference to an individual who 
has knowledge of good and evil (or right and wrong). “She doesn’t know any 
better” is uttered in reference to a moral innocent. For more morally disillusioned 
agents, we might use “understands” to indicate a deeper comprehension of good 
and evil. I contend that this comprehension is the ability to raise ethical questions. 
“She understands evil” can only be uttered in reference to an individual who has 
the ability to raise questions concerning evil. That is, part of her understanding is 
recognizing the complexities of a moral term like “evil.” Because it is complex, 
she raises questions about it. What is the nature of evil? How might it differ from 
wrongdoing? How can it be that good people do dreadful things?  Posing such 
questions requires understanding. I show later that this understanding involves the 
use of the moral imagination. I now turn to the passages in PI where Wittgenstein 
is also pondering the connection between “understands” and “knows” to further 
elucidate this distinction.  
 We already saw that in passage 150 it seems as though Wittgenstein 
distinguishes between “to know” and “to understand.” He seems to claim that 
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they are related, but not identical. However, in the following passage he seems to 
contradict himself. He states,  
But there is also this use of the word “to know”: we say “Now I 
know!”—and similarly “Now I can do it!” and “Now I 
understand!”55 
At first glance it may seem as though Wittgenstein is contradicting what he wrote 
in 150. However, such a contradiction may not be accidental on Wittgenstein’s 
part. By emphasizing the word “this” he is (possibly) explicitly acknowledging 
that there is more than one meaning (i.e. use) of “knows” or “understands.” After 
he states in 150 that there is a relation between “knows” and “understands” 
implying that they are distinct, he states in 151 there is also a usage whereby we 
equate the two words. There are two important lessons to gather from this 
passage. The first is that we sometimes mean the same thing with “knows” and 
“understands”. The second is that what we mean is “Now I can do it” or “Now I 
have the ability to go on.”  
 In the remainder of 151 he describes the student with the numerical series 
who is able to complete the series and then yells “Now I can go on!” and “Now I 
know the series!” Perhaps Wittgenstein has tested and discarded the idea in 150 
that “knows” and “understands” are distinct and we can conclude that they are 
used in the same manner. However, in the next passage (152), Wittgenstein asks 
the question, “But are the processes I have described here understanding?” He 
immediately questions the conclusions of the previous passage. The motivation 
for this questioning is that there are situations we can imagine where someone 
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completes a numerical series, feels that they can go on, but yet we would not say 
that they understand.  At this juncture in the discussion, he has both given us 
examples when we use “knows” and “understands” interchangeably, and also 
examples where we distinguish between the two. I think the reader is meant to 
feel confused at this point. As he states in 153, “I am in a muddle.” 
 This feeling of being in a muddle might only be a result of wanting to 
define “knows” and “understands” clearly and distinctly, that is, philosophically 
rather than grammatically. What Wittgenstein does in these passages is show that 
it is simply empirically true that we sometimes use “knows” and “understands” 
interchangeably and we also sometimes distinguish between them. Yet, he still 
claims that both mean the ability to go on. The question now arises how it is that 
they can be used differently and yet both be used to communicate “Now I can go 
on.” At 156, Wittgenstein writes that “This will become clearer if we interpolate 
the consideration of another word, namely ‘reading.’”56 This consideration will 
draw an analogy between reading and being literate on the one hand and knowing 
and understanding on the other. In passage 156, Wittgenstein remarks that when 
he considers “reading” he is not considering the understanding of what is read as 
part of “reading.” By “reading” he simply means the rendering out loud of what is 
written or printed. This remark is key to distinguishing between reading and being 
literate and will shed some light on the distinction between “to know” and “to 
understand.” 
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 As Wittgenstein points out we can distinguish between reading and 
reading with understanding. (For the purposes of our present discussion, I am 
going to call reading with understanding “being literate.”) The first question to 
ask is why this discussion of reading shows up in the section of PI on knowing 
and understanding. It does not, however, merely show up.  Wittgenstein explicitly 
uses the discussion of reading to help clarify the meaning of “knowing” and 
“understanding.” He does so because reading is clear example of being able to go 
on. When one reads, one literally goes on to the next word or sentence in the 
series. Thus, Wittgenstein can help clarify what he means by “being able to go 
on” by analyzing reading. In the context or language game of reading, one cannot 
go on to the next word or even pronounce a single isolated word without having 
mastered the skill of reading, i.e. rendering out loud what is written or printed. As 
we saw in passage 150 understanding, knowing, and being able to go on are all 
connected to mastery. For example, mastering chess entails having mastered the 
rules of the game. Once you have mastered the rules of the game you no longer 
need to consult the rules to be able to go on.
57
 Being able to read entails having 
mastered the rules of the game of reading. One no longer needs to consult the 
rules of pronunciation (i.e. sounding out) to render the printed word aloud. Now 
we can better see the connection between reading and understanding, knowing, 
and being able to go on. Yet, a question remains: why does Wittgenstein make 
sure to distinguish between reading and reading with understanding (i.e. being 
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literate)? This is curious given that he states that reading is being able to go on, 
understanding is also being able to go on, but that reading does not entail 
understanding what is read.  
 Let’s return to my previous example of the Czech sentence. In this 
example, we said that I know what “Moje kočka je černá” says. It says “Moje 
kočka je černá.” However, I do not understand what it says (assuming I am not in 
a context that makes it clear to me how it is being used). If we take 
“understanding” and “knowing” to be related to each other in this way, then there 
is an analogy with reading and being literate. I know what the sentence says 
simply by identifying the words present in the sentence. I read the sentence aloud 
simply by pronouncing the sounds. In neither case would we say that I understand 
the sentence. However, when I understand the Czech sentence I understand what 
the speaker is communicating and how she is using the sentence. I can then reply 
to her or raise a question about what she just said. Similarly, when I am literate I 
read the sentence and also understand what is being communicated to me as the 
reader. Thus, it seems we have an analogy between knowing/understanding and 
reading/being literate. Perhaps we are out of the muddle! 
 Now we are in a position to see how knowing and understanding are both 
an ability to go on, but in different ways. Reading and being literate both involve 
mastery and the ability to go on. However, they do so in different ways. These 
different ways correspond to different phases of moral disillusion and is the key to 
the distinction (we sometimes make) between “knowing” and “understanding.” 
On the one hand, it is correct to say that both knowing and understanding can be 
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used to communicate the ability to go on. On the other hand, this ability is not 
always the same. The circumstances of our use of these terms expose differences 
in their meaning(s). Sometimes certain circumstances dictate that we use “to 
know” and “to understand” differently from one another as we saw in some of our 
examples above. Other circumstances might show their usage to be similar or 
even the same. For example, we can imagine a situation where these two 
sentences are equivalent: “I know what you mean” and “I understand what you 
mean.” This variance is what Wittgenstein tries to illustrate through his own 
confusion and discussion with the interlocutor about “to know” and “to 
understand.”  Various circumstances result in various uses and, therefore, 
meaning of terms. He states,  
Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew how to go 
on, when he understood the principle, then possibly he had a 
special experience—and if he asked: “What was it? What took 
place when you finally grasped the principle?” perhaps he will 
describe it as much as we described it above—but for us it is the 
circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify 
him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows 
how to go on.
58
 
Wittgenstein seems very much aware that the meaning of “knows” or 
“understands” is confusing. Much of this confusion arises because we want to 
define them as mental states or clearly and distinctly. If, however, we recognize 
that differing circumstances result in different ways in which one can go on, then 
we have understood “knows” and “understands.” They are both the ability to go 
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on, but how we use the words depends on specific circumstances in a form of 
life.
59
 They are both the ability to go on but sometimes in different ways.  
One of the different ways shows up in the context of the moral 
conversation. Adam and Eve know good and evil, but they do not understand 
good and evil. They can go on in one way but not another. They can go on as 
appropriate candidates of, and individuals who experience, the reactive attitudes, 
or as agents who are receptive and reactive to reasons. When God punishes them 
they have the ability to feel regret, attempt to excuse their action (Adam blames 
Eve and Eve blames the serpent), and feel that God’s wrath is either warranted or 
not. However, they cannot go on in the conversation beyond stating what they 
have been told is good or evil.  They cannot raise questions about what God has 
said is good or evil. They cannot ask why God planted the tree in the garden if he 
did not want them to eat from it, or how knowledge of good and evil makes one 
god-like, or even how they could know that an action could be wrong if they did 
not already have knowledge of good and evil and thus wouldn’t it be fair to 
excuse them based on their lack of knowledge. They cannot raise questions 
because they have not understood. Understanding good and evil is different from 
knowing good and evil and includes an ability to question moral principles 
because one understands the complexities of moral life. I contend that to 
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understand the complexities of moral life, one must shatter moral illusions. In the 
subsequent chapters I will explain these phases of disillusion. 
Wittgenstein helps explain that “to know” and “to understand” are not 
always identical. In the myth of Adam and Eve we are told that when the two 
acquire knowledge of good and evil “their eyes were opened” and they see that 
they are naked. In the story “knowing” is tied to “seeing that.”  If seeing that is 
knowing, and understanding is distinct from knowing, then there is more to moral 
understanding than seeing that. However, we can also use “I see that…” in 
contexts of understanding as well. This dual use of “I see that” indicates that the 
context will dictate whether the utterance refers to knowledge or understanding. 
In the context of the moral conversation there are two levels of seeing that: one is 
knowledge and the other is understanding.  I next explain in what way “seeing 
that” is knowing. After, I explain what kind of “seeing that” gives us 
understanding. 
4. Seeing That 
The Adam and Eve myth describes the loss of innocence as a transition 
from “seeing” to “seeing that.” “Seeing that” is laden with knowledge or 
understanding of the significance of the event or object seen. One person might 
see a child being ushered into a van without seeing that the child is being 
kidnapped. “Seeing that” involves a “knowing that” or an “understanding that” as 
well. The innocent certainly see what they do. When they lose their innocence 
they see that what they do often has a moral content as well. They come to know 
that their action sometimes has moral significance. But they may not yet 
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understand this moral significance. This is why “seeing that” can correspond 
either to knowing or to understanding. It is crucial to my account to examine more 
closely the kind of knowledge that is inherent to “seeing that.” To do so, I turn 
now to N.R. Hanson’s essay “Observation.”60  
 Hanson begins his essay by asking whether Kepler, who regarded the sun 
as fixed, and Tycho Brahe, who thought the earth was fixed and all the celestial 
bodies orbit around it, see the same thing in the east at dawn. Is there a sense in 
which the two individuals do not see the same thing although they are visually 
aware of the same object? Hanson answers this question in the affirmative by 
equating “seeing” with “seeing that.” Because the two individuals differ in their 
knowledge of what they see, they see different things. Although I believe his 
answer to this question is incorrect, his analysis of “seeing that” is quite helpful to 
our understanding the kind of knowledge acquired through the loss of innocence. 
 Being visually aware of the same object is not equivalent to seeing the 
same thing. This is because “[s]eeing is an experience.”61 An image reflected onto 
one’s retina is not sufficient for seeing. If it were, then it would be appropriate to 
claim that a camera sees. “People, not their eyes, see.”62 In some sense Tycho and 
Kepler see the same thing – namely a bright yellow luminescent disc in the sky. 
But in another sense they do not. Tycho sees one of earth’s satellites and Kepler 
sees the center of the galaxy. Hence, something is very different about their visual 
experiences. A visual experience is not merely the physical state of light 
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reflecting upon the eye. Rather, it involves interpretation of what is seen. 
However, this is not an ex post facto interpretation. It is not a mental state 
applying a principle to an experience just had. He illustrates this point by 
examining various optical illusions.  
 Hanson presents the reader with a number of images that portray different 
objects when seen from different mental perspectives. One might see an old hag 
or a young girl, a rabbit or a duck.
63
 These images serve to illustrate that “one 
does not first soak up an optical pattern and then clamp an interpretation on it.”64 
Rather, “for you and me to have a different interpretation…just is for us to see 
something different. This does not mean we see the same things and then interpret 
it differently.” 65 The individual who sees the rabbit simply sees differently from 
the one who sees the duck. The different perspectives on a single image are 
examples of different things being seen without any interpretation being 
superimposed on the sensation. “Seeing is not only the having of a visual 
experience; it is also the way in which the visual experience is had.”66 The 
experience is had in a particular way due to the knowledge that one has of the 
object seen. Therefore, seeing differently rests on knowing differently.  
 Hanson defines seeing this way: “seeing an object x is to see that it may 
behave in the ways we know x’s do behave.”67 The seeing of x is thus shaped by 
prior knowledge of x. Since Tycho and Kepler have different prior knowledge of 
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the sun, they see differently when they see the sun. Thus, for Hanson seeing 
simply is seeing that. That is, seeing always already includes knowledge.  
 Hanson’s description of “seeing that” as laden with knowledge is correct, 
but his equating “seeing that” with “seeing” is incorrect.68 If it were true that any 
act of seeing requires prior knowledge of the object seen, then ignorant people 
would be blind. In his essay “‘Seeing’ and ‘Seeing That’, ‘Observing’ and 
‘Observing That,’”69 Peter French asks us to consider an example of a child and 
an astronomer alternately looking through a telescope pointed in a particular 
direction. The child reports seeing only a white blotch in a black background. The 
astronomer tells the child that it is a nebula. Under Hanson’s explanation, the 
child cannot be said to have seen a nebula. But rather than accepting such a 
counterintuitive claim we need only recognize that the child did indeed see a 
nebula, but he did not see that it was a nebula. The knowledge that Hanson argues 
is laden in every act of seeing is actually laden in every act of seeing that. In order 
for the child to see that it is a nebula he needs to possess some knowledge (but not 
necessarily any understanding) of what nebulas are. The presence of knowledge, 
rather than being a defining characteristic of seeing generally, is what 
distinguishes “seeing” from “seeing that.”  
 Now if in every “I see that” an “I know that” can be unpacked, it does not 
follow that an “I know that” can also be unpacked from all of the cognates of “I 
see that.” Hanson does not distinguish “seeing that” from its cognates, but French 
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is careful to do so. One distinction that is germane to the present discussion is that 
between “seeing that” and “observing that.”  
 Hanson assumes that “seeing that” and “observing that” are more or less 
equivalent terms.  French notes, however, that “observing x” is something 
different from both “seeing that x” and “seeing x.” Someone who observes as a 
profession, say a marine biologist who observes whales, would utter an infelicity 
were she to say “I see whales” rather than “I observe whales” when reporting 
what she does for a living. The observing entails a looking in order to gather 
information. “‘To observe’ is to look with a purpose.”70 One can be better or 
worse than others at observing. One can be a careful observer or a careless 
observer. As French puts it: “To be a careful observer is to pay heed to the object 
of observation so that one could answer a great number of potential questions 
about it. The careless observer finds himself in the position of having to answer 
many questions with ‘I do not know’ or ‘I did not notice,’ etc.”71 Described in this 
way, we can see that observing is a skill; a skill one must develop. Seeing, 
however, is not a developed skill, but rather a capacity.  
 There is another important aspect to the distinction between “seeing that” 
and “observing that” that French mentions only in passing, but which I think is 
quite significant to understanding the kind of knowledge acquired by the newly 
non-innocent and how it is distinct from a more developed moral understanding. 
He notes that one can utter “I observe that” only when the proposition following 
“that” is of a non-hypothetical sort.  
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One cannot, for example, say “I observe that if I throw a rock at 
the window it will shatter.” One can, of course, see that a rock 
thrown at the window will shatter it. One can observe that the 
window is glass, and when the rock is thrown one can observe that 
the window did break. What one cannot observe is that something 
will happen. No one can observe that it will rain this afternoon, but 
many of us can see that it will.
72
 
This is an important point that French raises. Utterances with hypothetical 
propositional content can follow “I see that,” but not “I observe that.” Here we 
begin to see where the “seeing that” of understanding departs from the “seeing 
that” of knowing. It is hypothetical content that partially makes up the 
understanding of the non-innocent and gives them the ability to raise ethical 
questions. There is a more developed “seeing that” beyond that which describes 
Adam and Eve or the newly non-innocent. The ability to consider hypothetical 
situations distinguishes knowing as seeing that from a more developed moral 
understanding as seeing that. The consideration of hypothetical situations relies 
on the imagination. 
5. The Moral Imagination  
In Meaning and the Moral Sciences
73
 Putnam argues that imagination is a 
necessary element of practical knowledge. In attempting to answer the question of 
how to live (which he considers to be more fundamental to ethics than deontic 
questions), he says that an agent must be able to consider various hypotheses. The 
imagination provides the agent with the capacity for hypothetical thinking. 
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Although these hypotheses may not be verifiable in the way that scientific 
hypotheses are, they are not thereby stripped of their value for practical or moral 
knowledge.
74
 Moral knowledge (what I call moral understanding) requires the 
capacity to consider circumstances that could possibly obtain or the capacity to 
entertain different ways of life.  
 For example, Putnam asks us to consider a mountain climber who figures 
out how to climb a mountain by climbing it in his head.  
A man is climbing a mountain. Halfway up he stops, because he is 
unsure how to go on. He imagines himself continuing via one 
route. In his imagination, he proceeds on up to a certain point, and 
then he gets into a difficulty which he cannot, in his imagination, 
see how to get out of. He then imagines going up by a different 
route. This time he is able to imagine himself getting all the way to 
the top without difficulty. So he takes the second route.
75
 
This example shows that using the imagination to entertain various future 
possibilities is a perfectly reasonable way to solve a problem. Therefore, moral 
reasoning, or the attempt to solve a moral problem, may require not just logical 
faculties in the narrow sense, but also “our full capacity to imagine and feel.”76 
(Significantly, but perhaps unaware of its significance, Putnam says that the 
climber’s uncertainty keeps him from being able “to go on.”) 
This use of the imagination leads Putnam to see how useful literature is to 
our moral sensibility. Literature can confront us with various hypotheses 
concerning how to act or how to live. These hypotheses may not be empirically 
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verifiable, but they give us conceptual knowledge. “Thinking of a hypothesis that 
one had not considered before is conceptual discovery; it is not empirical 
discovery, although it may result in empirical knowledge if the hypothesis turns 
out to be correct.”77 Literature gives us this conceptual knowledge by allowing the 
reader to see the world as it looks to someone (a literary character) who holds 
certain beliefs about the world or about how to live. One might disagree with a 
novel’s hypothesis, but one is now aware of a possibility of which one was 
previously ignorant. I think that Putnam’s account is quite illuminating, but I will 
add that the imaginative consideration of hypothetical situations gives us not only 
conceptual knowledge, but understanding exercised as an ability to participate in 
the moral conversation and an ability to raise ethical questions. Therefore, it is 
more appropriate to say that after reading literature I have gained understanding 
rather than knowledge.  
Putnam’s example of the mountain climber illustrates that one function of 
the moral imagination is to reveal the various consequences of different courses of 
action. Just as the climber imaginatively runs through different paths he can take 
to ascend the mountain, the moral agent can imagine the way in which different 
courses of action will have different ethical outcomes. For example, on Saturday I 
discover that my bike has been stolen from my back porch. On Sunday, someone 
shows up at my house with my bike. He tells me that he stole it the previous day, 
but then regretted his actions and decided to return it. I imagine how things will 
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play out both for me and for him if I simply accept his apology or if I call the 
police and report his crime.    
Imagining consequences is only one use of the imagination. Other uses of 
the imagination include imagining similar situations and asking myself what I 
would think or do in that situation. Or, I can imagine what it is like to be someone 
else. I can imagine what it is like to be more virtuous than I in fact am, or 
conversely what it is like to be a scoundrel. For example, as I am walking through 
downtown Tempe I pass by a homeless person. He asks for a handout. Although 
my first inclination is to keep on walking, I can imagine what a more 
compassionate person might do in this situation. Or, as I write a check to donate 
money to the Arizona Animal Welfare League I can imagine what it would be like 
not to care about the suffering of others. Life would be more carefree. 
Furthermore, I might imagine that I am a participant in a way of life that is not my 
own. For example, when I visit my in-laws in the Czech Republic I can imagine 
what they might do in a certain situation for the purpose of figuring out what 
would be the kind or respectful thing to do. Perhaps I should kiss them when I 
greet them. In all of these situations I imagine hypothetical situations to figure out 
what to do, or how to go on.  
But I might also imagine how to go on to bring about evil. I can imagine 
what the worst consequences for someone else would be, how a vicious person 
might act, or imagine a different way of life in order to act cruelly or 
disrespectfully. In fact, it seems that most evil people throughout history were 
quite imaginative. How else could the Nazis have come up with such innovative 
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ways to humiliate and torture their victims? Thus, the moral imagination need not 
lead one to be morally good. It can easily lead to wickedness. It does, however, 
give one the ability to go beyond simple knowledge of good and bad.   
 There are numerous forms a hypothetical, or conditional, proposition 
could take on. I will focus on the three main forms that grammarians label 
conditional 1, 2, and 3. “Conditional 1” is used to make a claim about the future 
the speaker thinks is likely to occur. The examples French uses in the above 
passage are of this form. For example, “If I throw this rock at the window, it will 
shatter.” The speaker uses the simple present tense in the antecedent and the verb 
“will” in the consequent to indicate her belief that is likely that the window will in 
fact shatter should the first condition obtain. “Conditional 2” is used to make a 
claim about an event that the speaker believes is not likely, but not impossible, to 
occur. For example, I might utter, “If I won the lottery, I would buy a mountain 
lodge in the Czech Republic.” Here I use the simple past in the antecedent and the 
verb “would” in the consequent to indicate that I do not think it very likely that I 
will win the lottery. This distinction is best seen by examining the following pair 
of conditionals: “If I become President, I will lower taxes” and “If I became 
President, I would lower taxes.” The first can be uttered by a candidate who 
believes it is likely (or at least wants to communicate to voters that she thinks it is 
likely) that she will become President. The second of the pair is uttered by an 
ordinary person (any non-candidate), perhaps sitting in bar discussing politics 
with her friends. It is unlikely that this person will become President in the near 
future. In both situations the hypothetical could follow “I see that,” but in neither 
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case “I observe that.” For example, one could discover upon reflection that she 
would lower taxes if she ever became President and then utter, “I see that if I 
became President, I would lower taxes.” But one cannot say, “I observe that if I 
became President I would lower taxes.” Hypothetical utterances, and hence 
hypothetical knowledge, accompany the sort of understanding belonging to 
“seeing that.” 
 There is another conditional, the one grammarians call “Conditional 3,” 
that is important, not for exploring future possibilities, but for imagining how the 
past might have been different and thereby possibly influencing my future 
decisions. This is the conditional that refers to the unreal past. That is, it describes 
what would have happened, had some condition obtained. For example, after 
getting back a test he failed Johnny utters, “If I had studied harder, I would have 
passed.” He uses the past perfect in the antecedent to indicate that he did not in 
fact study very much and “would have” in the consequent to indicate how things 
might have gone had the condition in the antecedent actually taken place. This 
kind of hypothetical thinking is an integral element of the more developed stage 
of “seeing that.” It is to understand and acknowledge what occurred and how 
things might have been different. This conditional shows us that it is not only 
future-oriented hypothetical propositions that help comprise the sort of 
understanding accompanying “seeing that,” but past-oriented ones as well.  
  When one contemplates what one will, would, could, would have, might 
have, could have, or should have done given certain conditions, one has the 
capacity to experience some of the reactive attitudes. For example, I cannot regret 
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a past action if I cannot imagine how I could have and should have acted 
differently.  Now we can see that in addition to “seeing that” as a kind of knowing 
acquired by losing innocence, moral understanding relies upon the moral 
imagination to entertain hypothetical (or possible world) situations. That is, the 
shattering of innocent moral illusions includes the imaginative ability to grasp 
both what one might or should do, as well as what one might have or should have 
done. One sees that certain actions are morally significant and one understands 
how things could have been or could be otherwise.  
 These various uses of the imagination rely on shattering the illusion that 
morality is “all about me.” To imagine what it is like to be someone else, or to 
participate in a way of life that is not my own, or how different consequences 
might affect others, depends on recognizing that my experiences are not the only 
ones of significance. To imagine hypothetical situations is to entertain different 
possibilities. The imaginative (re)creation of possible scenarios allows one to gain 
insight into the significance of different ways of life and courses of action. Not 
only can I imagine various situations, I can also morally evaluate the relevant 
possibilities in terms of good and evil. The moral imagination explores future 
possibilities and can help us avoid repeating past mistakes. These exploratory and 
corrective functions may help me see that the moral principles I had adopted are 
not adequate for every situation I can imagine. I gain the ability to question the 
moral principles I had previously accepted as adequate.   
 But “seeing that” is not merely a Gestalt shift as Hanson wants to describe 
it. French notes this as well: 
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The metaphor of the eyes being opened suggests that when people 
lose innocence they undergo a Gestalt shift, seeing the old hag 
where earlier they had seen the young woman, or the rabbit where 
before the duck was evident….I would rather suggest that those 
who lose innocence learn in a very personal way how to redescribe 
their situations, their experiences, and their actions. In effect, they 
learn first hand or in the first person how to appropriately use the 
language of responsibility with respect to themselves.
78
 
I already discussed in the first chapter how those who lose their moral innocence 
acquire this moral vocabulary and learn how to redescribe the occurrence of 
wrongdoing or evil with respect to their own agency. I have explained in this 
chapter that one can both know that one has the potential for wrongdoing as well 
as understand that one has the potential for wrongdoing. Wittgenstein helps us see 
that both knowing and understanding are abilities. The ability that one acquires is 
minimally the ability to have the reactive attitudes and to have guidance control. 
But upon shattering other moral illusions one acquires the ability to raise ethical 
questions. We can come to question whether the moral directives we have 
adopted are in fact sufficient to avoid wrongdoing.  
At the minimal level one has the ability to experience the reactive attitudes 
and to have guidance control. Strawson and Fischer and Ravizza explain this 
minimal condition of moral responsibility. This is the level of being and knowing 
that one is morally responsible. But this ability is not the only moral ability we 
have. As we discussed above, the ability that accompanies moral disillusion also 
involves employing the moral imagination to contemplate hypothetical situations. 
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This ability is not necessarily the kind of ability exhibited by the student who 
completes the formula; it does not entail answering a question. That is, the ability 
does not necessarily give us answers. Rather, I contend that the ability to go on in 
a moral sense, involves raising ethical questions. The non-innocent can ask: What 
ought I do? Am I blameworthy? What should I have done? What would I do in 
such and such a situation? The ability to raise these ethical questions is the ability 
to engage in ethical contemplation or ethical discourse. Now the individual can go 
on and actively participate in the moral conversation. In subsequent chapters I 
will show that this ability to raise ethical questions is further developed by the 
confrontation with, and contemplation of, evil, unchosen evil, and inescapable 
moral wrongdoing. The ability to raise ethical questions is a defining mark of 
moral disillusion.
79
  
We see this ability first-hand when we teach ethics courses. The ethics 
courses I took as a student and now teach as an instructor do not teach students 
how to be morally good (that might truly be a case of the blind leading the blind!), 
rather we teach them to shatter naïve illusions about moral life. In my courses I 
present arguments that support various ethical theories, and I always include a 
discussion of relevant objections to whatever theory we are discussing. I think 
most philosophy instructors do something similar. I used to worry that my ethics 
courses, and those taught similarly, were churning out moral skeptics or moral 
nihilists semester after semester. On more than one occasion a student has said to 
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me, “I came into this course one hundred percent certain of my ethical 
convictions, but now I am not so sure!”. Have I taught these students to believe 
that there is no point in trying to act ethically if no single ethical theory stands 
without objection? Perhaps. Although I hope that my students learn something 
about being a good person, I do not consider it my job to teach them to be morally 
good. It is my job to help them contemplate ethical principles and problems. 
When they lose their naïve understanding of good and evil, they gain an ability to 
raise ethical questions. This ability is a mark of their disillusion.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have distinguished two levels of moral disillusion: 
knowledge and understanding. The former includes knowing the difference 
between good and evil and knowing that one is an appropriate candidate for the 
reactive attitudes. The latter includes the ability to imagine different future 
courses of action as well as how the past could have or should have been 
different. In both knowing and understanding, one can see that one’s action has 
moral significance, but in different ways. These abilities then allow one to enter 
and participate in the moral conversation. One is an appropriate candidate for the 
reactive attitudes, one can experience the reactive attitudes, and one has the ability 
to raise ethical questions. Raising, rather than answering, ethical questions, is the 
hallmark of moral disillusion. We will continue to see that this ability provides the 
means for taking responsibility for one’s actions. In chapter 1 I stated that evil is 
distinct from wrongdoing. In the next chapter I argue for this assertion and 
explain the kind of disillusion involved with recognizing evil.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EVIL 
1. Introduction 
 In chapter 1, I disagreed with French that an acquaintance with evil is 
necessary for entry into the moral community. One can enter the moral 
community through an acquaintance with wrongdoing. However, becoming 
acquainted with evil does characterize another significant moral disillusion. But 
what is evil? In this chapter I unpack the concept of evil by examining its distinct 
qualities and explain what the acquaintance with evil involves. Although I argue 
that defining evil too stringently may lead to excluding some acts that deserve to 
be called evil, we can still discern certain features that are always present in an 
evil act. One of these features is that the victim is always in a situation of extreme 
vulnerability. Understanding the state of extreme vulnerability comprises a moral 
disillusion.  For, it is by seeing that another is extremely vulnerable, and that I am 
capable of either directly or indirectly
80
 exploiting this extreme vulnerability, or 
being causally complicit in its occurrence, that I become personally acquainted 
with evil. In this chapter I first explain why evil is a necessary part of moral 
discourse and how we ought to define it. Then, I examine some well-known 
theories of evil to formulate some general characteristics of evil acts. Next, I use 
Harry Frankfurt’s conception of a person to describe a particular kind of evil act. 
Finally, I will be in the position to explain that extreme vulnerability is an 
essential feature of evil acts.  Understanding this fact coupled with the realization 
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that one has the ability, either directly or complicity, to abuse another’s extreme 
vulnerability comprises the acquaintance with evil necessary for this phase of 
moral disillusion.  
2. Why “Evil”? 
Outside of a religious context, there has been little philosophical 
discussion of a concept of evil until recently. Religious thinkers have long had to 
grapple with the problem of evil. Philosophers, however, have not spent much 
time discussing evil as a moral category. The few philosophers who do discuss 
evil usually do so by equating it with wrongdoing. In De Malo (On Evil) Aquinas 
treats the subject of evil, but defines it as sin by which he means wrongdoing. 
There is no indication that he conceives of evil as distinct in any way from 
wrongdoing. Such discussions of evil have been the most common in the history 
of philosophy. “Evil” is considered simply to be the opposite of good, or that 
which is most undesirable, or that which is wrong. Of course one cannot think of 
“evil” and the history of philosophy without thinking of Kant. He famously 
discusses radical evil in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason. I will say 
more about Kant’s account below, but his conception of evil does not give us real 
insight into how evil differs from wrongdoing. That is, he argues that evil is the 
propensity to act on maxims contrary to the moral law. But even if all maxims 
contrary to the moral law are wrong, it does not follow that they are evil. 
Furthermore, his definition of evil cannot be accepted without also accepting his 
unrealistic metaphysical dualism.   
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 One might think that the reason philosophers have not spent much time 
analyzing evil is because it is not, in fact, conceptually distinct from wrongdoing. 
The term “evil” is therefore used emotively, dramatically, poetically, and even 
inappropriately to refer simply to wrongs. For example, in his account of the loss 
of innocence French calls undeserved harm “evil.” However, undeserved harm 
can refer simply to a wrong. In Mortal Questions Nagel asks about the evil of 
death.  “I want to ask whether death is in itself an evil; and how great an evil, and 
of what kind it might be.”81 Throughout the rest of his chapter it becomes clear 
that he means to ask what is bad about death or why death is not good. He uses 
“evil” as a device to attract the reader and to motivate interest in his discussion; 
he does not conceptually distinguish evil from bad. This usage of “evil” is not 
uncommon in philosophy. Given this backdrop, it might be tempting to conclude 
that “evil” does not refer to a moral category distinct from that already 
circumscribed by the term “wrong.” Hence, an analysis of evil does not yield any 
valuable information about the moral landscape that cannot already be discerned 
via an analysis of wrongdoing. Furthermore, some might think that “evil” is used 
mainly to demonize the wrongdoer, to cast aspersions on her character, to imply 
that she is irredeemable or cannot, and should not, be forgiven. In these cases, it is 
not simply that “evil” is superfluous, but actually dangerous. The use of the term 
would skew our understanding of the wrong act and the wrongdoer thereby 
confusing our moral judgment. It would lead to inappropriate emotional 
categorizations of individuals or their acts as evil. Because the term carries more 
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reproach and contempt than “wrong” or “bad”, use of the term would condemn 
the wrongdoer unfairly.  
 However, even if it is true that the term “evil” is sometimes used 
emotively, dramatically, poetically, and occasionally inappropriately to refer to 
acts which should be labeled “wrong,” it does not follow that there are no acts that 
are, in fact, “evil.” The fact that “evil” is used to dramatize a wrongdoing does not 
entail there are no evil acts that are distinct from wrongdoings.  It means simply 
that we have to be careful when appealing to ordinary language when defining 
“evil.” When we examine immoral acts, it is not difficult to see that acts come in 
all degrees of moral badness. Clearly, there is a moral difference between robbing 
a bank and genocide. Lumping both acts into the category of “wrongdoing” does 
not adequately capture the difference between the two. The difference is, 
however, marked by the concept “evil.” In order for our moral language, censure, 
and opprobrium to be accurate we need to distinguish evildoing from wrongdoing.  
 Here I present what I believe are a few uncontentious examples of evil 
acts. I include them not to titillate, but to provide real evidence of the need to 
think of evil as distinct from wrongdoing.  
In October 1978 a man named Lawrence Singleton offered to take 
a 15-year-old girl, Mary Vincent, from Berkeley to Los Angeles. 
On the way she fell asleep, and after she fell asleep he took her to a 
canyon in Nevada, where he beat her, threw her into the back of 
his pickup truck, ripped off her clothing, tied her hands, raped her 
several times, later dragged her from the truck, held her hands 
down and chopped them off with his hatchet. “He chopped it three 
times. The blood was spurting all over”. She was then tossed over 
a guard rail, stuffed into a culvert beneath a road, and left for dead. 
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But somehow she didn't die, somehow she survived, and she was 
later found, dazed and bleeding, naked with both arms chopped off 
below the elbows, blood streaming from them.
82
  
 
In 2009 in Canada an Afghani man murdered his three daughters 
for dishonoring his family name. Because the daughters wore 
Western “revealing” clothing, and had boyfriends, the father 
likened them to prostitutes. The girls were found dead in car that 
had been pushed into a canal. They were 19, 17, and 13 years old. 
The father was quoted saying, “I would do it again 100 times”.83 
 
In February 2012, a Nepalese woman, Dhegani Mahato, was 
accused of being a witch and burned alive. She was a mother of 
two. She was attacked and set on fire by members of her family 
and others after a shaman accused her of casting a spell to make 
one of her relatives sick. She was beaten with rocks and sticks 
before being doused with kerosene and set on fire. The attack was 
witnessed by her 9 year-old daughter.
84
 
 
In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the purchase of some diamonds 
helped fund devastating wars in Africa. Profits from the trade of 
conflict diamonds were used to fund armed conflict costing the 
lives of 3.7 million people. In Sierra Leone the profits supported 
the guerrilla army, the Revolutionary United Front, which cut off 
the hands, feet, lips, ears, and noses of civilians to keep them from 
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harvesting crops to feed the national army. To inspire fear and 
maintain power over villagers, children were kidnapped from 
villages, injected with cocaine, given a gun and told to kill their 
parents.
85
  
 
The first act is an example of malicious intentional (perhaps psychopathic) 
evildoing. The second act is motivated by honor, and the third by religious belief.  
The fourth example shows that one might be causally complicit in bringing about 
evil, without doing so directly. We see from these examples, and I will argue 
below, that evil must not be sadistic or diabolical; there are many roots of evil. In 
addition to the above acts, we can add genocide, war rape, torture, and most cases 
of abuse of children. I do not claim this list to be exhaustive. In fact, in order to 
correctly describe an act as evil, we may need to consider the specific agents and 
the particular circumstances involved, rather than kinds of acts. This sort of fine-
grained approach has the disadvantage of lacking a clear and concise definition of 
evil, but it has the advantage of accurately including all of those acts that deserve 
to be labeled evil.  
3. How to Define Evil 
The above examples show that there are convincing reasons for 
distinguishing evil from wrongdoing. How might we conceive of the distinction? 
Much of the philosophical literature on the subject over the past decade has 
focused on whether evil is quantitatively worse than wrongdoing, i.e. one murder 
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is wrong, but one thousand murders is evil, or whether evil acts have a unique 
quality or qualities which distinguish them from wrong ones.  
But definitions of moral concepts, such as the good, are notoriously 
inadequate.  Philosophers have built careers on pointing out the inadequacies of 
prior moral theories and definitions of moral terms. When a moral concept is 
strictly defined, a counterexample, improper exclusion, or contradiction is often 
found. One of the reasons this occurs is because moral life is quite rich, and strict 
definitions cannot usually account for all of its nuances. This reason also explains 
why abstract command theories of morality, like Kantian deontology or 
utilitarianism, run up against so many objections. Human interaction is often more 
complicated than a universal command theory can allow for.
86
 I think we need to 
be careful not to be too hasty in defining evil too stringently. Definitions are 
static; they draw rigid lines around the concept defined. But evil appears in many 
forms. Therefore, we need to be careful that any definition of evil is not too 
restricting, thereby excluding acts that should be deemed evil. Although it might 
be practically onerous, we may need to examine particular acts as they occur to 
determine whether they are evil.  
In his essay “Drawing Lines” James Rachels argues that we must 
determine our moral responsibilities to others in such a fine-grained fashion. Only 
by looking at the particular characteristics of another being (human or animal), 
can we know what sort of acts may harm it. Once we know what sort of acts may 
harm another, we can know what moral responsibilities we have toward it. The 
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particular ways in which a being is vulnerable to harm may be determined either 
by the characteristics of the species to which the individual being belongs, or may 
be given by the individual characteristics of the being. For example, if someone 
were to attack John, a classical pianist, and cut off his thumbs, he is harmed in (at 
least) two ways. First as a sentient being, he has been forced to undergo immense 
physical pain. This harm is determined by the fact that he belongs to a species that 
has the capacity to experience pain. It is harm qua human, not qua individual. 
Second, he is harmed because his ability to pursue his passion (playing the piano) 
has been destroyed. This harm is determined by the fact that he has a particular 
interest, namely playing the piano. It is harm qua individual, not qua human. 
Similarly, evil may be done to someone (human or animal) due to its species-
determined characteristics or its individual characteristics. This realization is part 
of the acquaintance with evil necessary for this phase of moral disillusion.  
Rachels points out that there are different approaches to defining moral 
standing each of which attempts to clarify to whom we owe a direct moral duty. 
At first philosophers thought that simply being human confers moral standing. 
This approach had the advantage of being nondiscriminatory, but has the 
disadvantage of being too vague. What is it about being human that gives us this 
status? Philosophers have often connected specific human characteristics or 
capacities to moral standing. For Aristotle, the human capacity for rationality 
gives humans importance. For Kant, human self-consciousness and the capacity to 
exercise autonomy obligate moral consideration. Utilitarians defend the theory 
that to have moral standing it is necessary only that one feel pain. But why must 
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we choose which of these characteristics gives moral standing?  Each of these 
characteristics can convey moral standing on a being, and therefore any abuse or 
harm to any one of these characteristics could constitute a wrong.  
If a being is autonomous, then harming its ability to exercise its autonomy 
is wrong. We usually do not consider children to be autonomous and we treat 
them differently because of it. Treating a rational and autonomous adult as a child 
would ignore or directly harm her ability to exercise her autonomy. The harm 
could come in the guise of physical restraint or harm to the capacity itself. 
Similarly, some beings are self-conscious and thus can reflect upon their own 
character and conduct and conceive of themselves as extended through time. As 
Rachels notes,  
[t]here are…a number of goods that self-consciousness makes 
possible: self-confidence, hope for the future, satisfaction with 
one’s life, the belief that you are someone of value, and the 
knowledge that you are loved and appreciated by other people. 
Without self-consciousness, there could be no sense of pride or 
self-worth. 
87
 
Just like being autonomous, so too does being self-conscious make one vulnerable 
to a host of harms. “[Y]ou may feel embarrassed, humiliated, guilty and 
worthless. Because you can think about your own future, you may despair and 
lose hope.”88 Therefore, there are ways of treating beings that are objectionable 
based upon their capacity for self-consciousness. Of course, the ability to feel pain 
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is a capacity that obviously makes one vulnerable to various harms. The fact that 
someone feels pain supplies others with a reason not to cause her pain.  
These capacities, and perhaps others, give us grounds for not treating 
others in certain ways. It may be that a creature’s autonomy obligates a certain 
kind of treatment, or it might be a creature’s ability to feel pain that obligates a 
certain kind of treatment. For example, I should not walk up and hit you with a 
stick, not because you are autonomous, but because you feel pain. I should not 
treat you paternalistically, not because you feel pain, but because you are 
autonomous. Rachels adds the example that one should not tell her husband’s 
friends that he is impotent, not because he is autonomous, but because he is self-
conscious and would be humiliated.   
As noted above, individual characteristics play a role in moral 
consideration as well.  For example, if a student has a dream to become a 
philosophy professor, and I steal and destroy her philosophy books, I have harmed 
her in a way that is different than if I were to steal the philosophy books from a 
student who just finished her philosophy course and has no interest in philosophy 
at all. What makes certain kinds of treatment morally objectionable depends on 
the individual and the specific circumstances.  
Facts about people often figure into the reasons why they may or 
may not be treated in this or that way. Adam may be ejected from 
the choir because he can’t sing. Betty may be given Prozac because 
she is depressed. Charles may be congratulated because he has just 
gotten engaged. Doris may be promoted because she is a hard 
worker. Notice, however, that a fact that justifies one type of 
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treatment may not justify a different type of treatment: Unless 
something unusual is going on, we could not justify giving Betty 
Prozac on the grounds she can’t sing or throwing Adam out of the 
choir because he has become engaged.
89
 
Therefore, moral standing is always with respect to some particular mode of 
treatment. There is quite a long list of characteristics, belonging both to one’s 
species and to one’s individual interests that constitute morally good reasons why 
someone should or should not be treated in various ways. A sentient being should 
not be forced to undergo unnecessary pain, an autonomous being should not be 
unfairly coerced, a self-conscious being should not be humiliated, and those 
goods someone deems necessary for her pursuit of a good life should not be 
destroyed unnecessarily.  
Rachels’s account of moral standing helps us understand that there are 
different kinds of evil acts as well. Given the characteristics of the victim, an act 
can be evil for a variety of reasons. If any of the harms I have described above are 
excessive, or especially undeserved, or maliciously caused, then they may be evil. 
They may be evil for other reasons as well, and I take this up in the next section. 
Rachels admits that his approach makes it practically quite difficult, if not 
impossible, to enumerate all of the different ways every being ought not be 
treated. Similarly, it may be difficult to enumerate all evil acts. That may be the 
price of understanding the many forms an evil act can take on. It is a feature of 
moral disillusion to accept that moral life may not fit neatly into one definition or 
theory. Furthermore, as we have seen, a given act may be evil if it involves one 
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particular agent but not another.  An act may be evil if it destroys one’s ability to 
exercise one’s autonomy, or it may be evil if it destroys the means which a 
particular individual requires to pursue her life plan and conception of the good. 
Hence, we may need to examine the particular features of acts to be able to 
correctly describe them as evil.  
Despite this indication that evil acts may appear under many guises, there 
are shared characteristics. When we think about the above examples of evil one 
common denominator in evil acts is that they all require a certain kind of 
vulnerability on the part of the victim. I argue that acknowledging that others are 
sometimes extremely vulnerable and that one has the ability to exploit this 
vulnerability, either directly or indirectly, is the personal acquaintance with evil 
that shatters certain moral illusions. Before I turn to examine this vulnerability 
more directly, I look at prior theories of evil to provide some other general 
characteristics of an evil act.  
4. What is Evil? 
First, I look at why Kant’s theory of radical evil is an insufficient account. 
His description is not only inadequate because one would have to accept his 
metaphysical dualism; there is also a glaring omission in Kant’s theory. He 
focuses solely on the harm done to the moral character of the perpetrator, or 
potential perpetrator, and ignores the harm done to the victim. Such a perpetrator-
centered approach leaves out one of the most salient features of an evil act: the 
significant or excessive harm done to the victim. It may be true that an evil act 
requires that the perpetrator of the act has certain intentions whether they are 
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motivated by malice, thoughtlessness, ambition or otherwise. But it cannot be that 
an evil act does not also require a certain level of harm
90
 experienced by the 
victim. Kant does not adequately define evil because he ignores the harm done to 
the victim. As we will see in this section, this harm is necessary for an act to be an 
evil act.  
Kant departs from theological tradition by rejecting the notion that sin is 
inherited from Adam and Eve. Because his notion of moral responsibility depends 
upon the free exercise of the will, he has no use for hereditary sin or guilt. For one 
to be morally responsible for her wrongdoing or evildoing, she must freely choose 
the maxim that results in a wrong or evil deed. Allen Wood and George di 
Giovanni point this out in their translation of the Religion by noting that Kant 
does not use the German word “Erbsünde,” which means literally “hereditary 
sin,” but opts for the Latin  peccatum originarium, which does not imply 
heredity.
91
 Kant does think that doing evil is innate to human nature, but only if 
we understand “innate to human nature” as referring to the ability or in his words 
“propensity” to do evil.  
Kant says that “[w]e call a human being evil, however, not because he 
performs actions that are evil (contrary to law), but because these are so 
constituted that they allow the inference of evil maxims in him.”92 Immediately 
we see that the definition of evil depends not on empirical or external deeds, but 
on the intentions, or constitution, of the perpetrator. Kant believes that empirical 
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acts are not sufficient to allow us to conclude that an individual is evil. We can 
only infer from a number of consciously evil actions, an underlying evil maxim. 
Although one is evil according to her constitution, one is not evil without 
choosing to be so. The ground of evil cannot lie in natural impulses, for then one 
did not choose freely and is not morally responsible, but only in the rule on which 
one chooses to act.  
Whenever we therefore say, “The human being is by nature good,” 
or “he is by nature evil,” this only means that he holds within 
himself a first ground (to us inscrutable) for the adoption of good 
or evil (unlawful) maxims, and that he holds this ground qua 
human…93 
Because the disposition (i.e. the first subjective ground of the adoption of 
maxims) is adopted through the power of choice, it is noumenon. In other words, 
choosing one’s maxims is an activity of pure reason, which is noumenal. 
Therefore the evilness of one’s deeds lies not in the suffering experienced by the 
victim, which is empirical, external, and phenomenal, but by the kind of maxim 
adopted by the perpetrator.  
 Kant’s framework provides three ways in which one can do wrong. One of 
these ways of doing wrong is what he labels “radical evil.” To understand the 
propensity for wrongdoing and evildoing, we have to understand the 
predispositions that are directed towards the good, but can be corrupted into doing 
wrong or evil.  
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Kant says we have three predispositions to good and three corresponding 
propensities for wrongdoing and evildoing. The first predisposition is to satisfy 
physical and psychological needs dictated by the preservation of the individual 
and species. This is a necessary predisposition for humans qua human, but various 
vices can be grafted on to it. Kant includes gluttony, lust and “wild lawlessness.” 
The wrong associated with the corruption of this predisposition is weakness. In 
cases of weakness one has adopted the categorical imperative, but is sometimes 
too weak to follow it. Here one does wrong empirically. 
The second predisposition is to rationally evaluate the satisfaction of basic 
and culturally conditioned needs in the light of our conception of happiness. One 
compares one’s own status with that of others in the community and desires equal 
worth in order to be happy. Because of a “constant anxiety that others might be 
striving for ascendency” comes gradually “an unjust desire to acquire superiority 
for oneself over others.”94 The propensity for evil in these cases is impurity. One 
follows the categorical imperative, but for the wrong reasons. One does not do it 
out of duty, but for fear of a bad reputation, or out of inclinations. This is worse 
than weakness for Kant even though the outward empirical actions may be in 
accordance with the moral law. 
The third predisposition is to submit our will to the command of the moral 
law, and thus to universalize the principles upon which we act. In the noumenal 
realm one adopts a supreme principle for oneself, such as the categorical 
imperative. At the phenomenal or empirical level one performs in accordance 
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with the supreme principle one has adopted. Here enters depravity or radical evil. 
The propensity for evil corresponding to this predisposition is the subordination 
of the moral law to the maxim of self-love. Radical evil consists in making self-
interest one’s supreme practical principle, and subordinating the moral law to it. 
In Kant’s words, “the statement, ‘The human being is evil,’ cannot mean anything 
else than that he is conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his 
maxim the (occasional) deviation from it.”95 This is an intelligible (or noumenal) 
action. Therefore, evil does not consist fundamentally in temporal (empirical) 
violations of the moral law. We can be radically evil even if our temporal actions 
happen not to violate the moral law. This evil is radical because it comes about 
through one’s own choice to subvert the moral law. The moral purity of the agent 
has been corrupted.  
The difference between a propensity and predisposition is that the former 
is something we bring upon ourselves whereas the latter is natural and original. 
We bring this propensity upon ourselves by being too weak to follow the moral 
law, by following the moral law for the wrong reasons, or by choosing a maxim to 
act upon which deviates from the moral law. The propensity to evil is in human 
nature but not in the same way as the predisposition to good. Our predispositions, 
that is, our natural pursuit of happiness and satisfaction of our needs are good in 
themselves and should be guided by the moral law. Evil occurs when we are not 
so guided and choose self-love to guide our actions. Not following the moral law 
is due to frailty, impurity, or corruption. Therefore, humans are evil in that they 
                                                 
95
 Ibid., 55. 
  95 
subordinate the moral law to some other incentive to act, namely self-love. 
Consequently, the sole difference between good and evil persons is which maxim 
guides them.  
Clearly, Kant’s main concern is the moral purity or character of the 
perpetrator or potential perpetrator of evil. This account leaves out that feature of 
evil acts which is integral to the act being evil, namely significant harm to the 
victim. Furthermore, Kant’s three propensities to evil cannot explain the 
difference between a wrong act such as stealing and an evil act such as genocide. 
Even if it is true that the perpetrator was either too weak to follow the moral law, 
followed the moral law for the wrong reasons, or subverted the moral law to self-
love, these three possibilities do not sufficiently capture what we mean when we 
refer to an act as evil, and not merely as wrong. Kant’s account might be useful in 
thinking about the moral psychology of why some people act immorally, but it 
does not fully explain the degree of immoral action that the category of evil helps 
demarcate. I now turn to some more contemporary theories
96
 of evil that do so. 
These theories will provide us with some general characteristics of evil acts and 
lay the ground for seeing that victims of evil are in situations of extreme 
vulnerability.  
Claudia Card provides us with a coherent and fairly correct account of 
evil. She defines evil as “foreseeable intolerable harm produced by culpable 
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wrongdoing.”97 She notes that the intolerable harm experienced by the victim is 
the most salient aspect of an evil act. The harms, not the perpetrators’ 
psychological states, distinguish evil from wrongdoing. But neither intolerable 
harms nor culpable wrongdoing alone is sufficient for evil. They must both be 
present for an act to be evil. Card’s approach to evil is attractive because it 
focuses on that aspect of an evil act that strikes us as necessary for an act to be 
evil; namely, immense suffering or life-wrecking harm experienced by the victim 
(caused by human agency not natural causes). Although she emphasizes the 
intolerable harm condition of her definition of evil, she is careful also to include a 
“perpetrator component.” This is the “foreseeable” element. An evil act is not just 
one in which intolerable harm obtains. The intolerable harm must have been 
foreseeable (although not necessarily foreseen) by the agent who caused the ham. 
Thus, “foreseeable” entails that there was some agent who was able to foresee the 
intolerable harm she caused. But the perpetrator need not have maliciously 
foreseen the intolerable harm she caused.  “Foreseeable” does not mean 
maliciously intended. One need not intend to cause intolerable harm for the act to 
be evil. Finally, we are responsible for acts that have such consequences even 
without intending them. “For we can be responsible for causing what is 
reasonably foreseeable, even if it is not what we aimed for.”98 We can cause evil 
without directly intending to, and we can be morally responsible for doing so.  
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 If Card’s account of evil is correct, it is important to ask why it is correct. 
Answering this question will tell us why the elements of her definition are 
necessary for any definition of evil. I turn now to Paul Formosa’s argument for 
why a “combination approach” to the concept of evil is appropriate.   
 Formosa points out that there are four different approaches to a theory of 
evil. On a victim approach, it is something about the kind and degree of harm 
inflicted upon the victim that constitutes an evil act. On a perpetrator approach, 
like Kant’s, it is something about the perpetrator, such as an intention or motive, 
that constitutes an evil act. On a bystander approach it is something about the 
bystanders or evaluators of an act, such as the horror it inspires or its 
incomprehensibility
99
 that constitutes an evil act. On a combination approach, 
which Formosa endorses, it is something about the combination of these factors 
that constitutes an evil act.  
Formosa believes, as does John Kekes,
100
 that there can be many roots of 
evil. It is not simply that one kind of motive or intention is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for evil. “Motives such as envy, malice, greed, hatred, 
boredom, honor, pride, revenge, ambition, thoughtlessness, a lack of self-esteem, 
ideology, and faith can all, at times, be roots of evil.”101 It may be empirically true 
that some of these factors result in the occurrence of evil more often than others, 
but any one of them may lead to evil.  
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 Victim approaches are attractive because they can account for the many 
roots of evil. If the “evil-making” component of an act lies in the harm done to the 
victim, then an evil act need not be caused by specific motives or intentions. We 
need not try to learn about the psychology of the perpetrator, which even Kant 
admits we can only make assumptions about based on empirical acts, and we can 
focus on the palpable harm done to the victim. This approach has the advantage of 
excluding acts that, although maliciously motivated, result in only minor harm.  
However, this strength of victim approaches also reveals a weakness. “The 
general problem with victim approaches is that they must require that any 
culpably wrongful act that inflicts much harm is necessarily evil, because no other 
factors, besides the amount of harm, are at all relevant to a judgment of evil.”102 
Therefore, while focusing on the culpable harm done to victims is necessary for 
knowing whether an act is evil, it is not the only relevant factor. The motives and 
intentions of the perpetrator are also relevant to judging an act to be evil. Hence, 
victim approaches to evil are inadequate.  
 Perpetrator approaches have the advantage of picking out the 
maliciousness or depravity of the evildoer. For example, Mary Midgley argues 
that evildoers lack motives that ordinarily stop people from committing evil 
acts.
103
 As we saw above, Kant believes that radical evil consists in subverting the 
moral law to the maxim of self-love. But neither of these accounts can explain the 
many roots of evil. Midgley’s approach, and those like hers, cannot explain evil 
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done from relatively ordinary motives. Evil acts are not always motivated by 
malicious or sadistic motives. Greed, thoughtlessness, ambition, and honor can all 
motivate evil acts. Therefore, the perpetrator of evil need not have some abnormal 
psychology. On the other hand, Kant’s account, and those like his, cannot explain 
evil done from especially sadistic motives. Kant explicitly argues that one does 
not do evil for evil’s sake. Given the previous explanation of how the various 
propensities to evil corrupt the good predispositions, Kant concludes,  
The depravity of human nature is therefore not to be named malice, 
if we take this word in the strict sense, namely a disposition (a 
subjective principle of maxims) to incorporate evil qua evil for 
incentive into one’s maxim (since this diabolical), but should 
rather be named perversity of the heart…. An evil heart can coexist 
with a will which in the abstract is good. 
104
 
Because of the naturally good predispositions, a human agent cannot will to do 
evil for evil’s sake. Such an agent would be what he calls diabolical, and for Kant, 
humans may be perverse or corrupt, but never diabolical.
105
 Yet, we are all 
familiar with stories of people who committed evil acts for the sake of evil. 
Therefore, perpetrator approaches are inadequate because they cannot include the 
many roots of evil.  
Furthermore, whether the emphasis is on acts done out of ordinary or 
extraordinary motives, perpetrator approaches cannot explain that we ordinarily 
do not consider an act to be evil unless a certain kind or degree of harm is also 
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present. One can shoplift out of malice, but the deed is still not evil. “All 
perpetrator approaches must require that any act perpetrated in a particular 
fashion, no matter how small and trivial the harm inflicted, must be evil.”106 
Hence, perpetrator approaches are inadequate because they ignore the significance 
of the harm done to the victim. 
 Formosa’s analysis shows us that both victim and perpetrator approaches 
are inadequate on their own, and yet each presents relevant features of an evil act. 
We are still left with the bystander approach that says an act is evil given a certain 
kind of negative response by a hypothetical bystander.  This approach claims that 
an act is evil if incomprehensible or horrific to bystanders; it completely excludes 
both the victim and the perpetrator.  By excluding these essential components, it 
cannot adequately explain evil. If something about the victim and something 
about the perpetrator are both relevant to a theory of evil, then the bystander 
approach must be inadequate. Now we are in the position to formulate some 
general guidelines about an evil act. 
Formosa’s analysis provides us with three necessary features any theory of 
evil must have: 
First there must be a perpetrator component, which identifies what 
it is about the way evil is perpetrated that makes them deserving of 
our very strongest moral condemnations. Second, there must be an 
unjustifiability component, which identifies what it is about evil 
acts that make them morally unjustifiable. Third, there must be a 
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victim component, which identifies what it is about the amount of 
harm that evil acts inflict that makes them so morally abhorrent.
107
 
I rely on this account for a general definition of evil, but I make the following 
addition. Formosa states that the perpetrator need not directly intend harm. “It is 
enough that an evildoer acts in a way such that harm is a reasonable foreseeable 
consequence of the act.”108 I agree. This definition can account for an evildoer 
acting either intentionally or thoughtlessly. I add that because various motives, 
intentions, and cares can move one to do evil, the perpetrator element reduces to 
the claim that human agency is necessary for bringing about an evil act.
 109
 Thus, I 
define the perpetrator element as “brought about by human agency.”  
Formosa rightfully argues that a victim element is necessary in an act of 
evil. He says that the kind of harm that a victim suffers from an evil act must be 
life-wrecking, but he does not elaborate on what this means. What do we mean by 
“life” and what do we mean by “wreck”? I will discuss in the next chapter that 
Kekes believes that the harm of evil acts is that it creates obstacles to attaining a 
good life. This is probably correct, but is still vague. Death is certainly life-
wrecking, but only if we define life merely biologically as the condition that 
separates animals and plants from inorganic matter. But not all death is evil, and 
not all evil harm includes death. Both Formosa’s and Kekes’s accounts implicitly 
include the idea that a good life is one in which one can pursue the goals one sets 
for oneself.  To wreck this pursuit is to destroy or severely injure one’s ability or 
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capacity to do so. Hence, a life-wrecking harm is a harm that destroys or 
jeopardizes the person’s ability to live a good life. The victim cannot without 
severe difficulty pursue her conception of the good. I would also add that the 
notion of “wreck” includes the idea that the effects of the harm are often 
irreparable. One cannot compensate the harm done with a fungible good. For 
example, when a store keeper loses some inventory to theft, she can be financially 
compensated. When a victim loses her dignity or hope, she cannot be. She may in 
time recover her dignity and hope, but the harm is irreparable. This irreparability 
is what often jeopardizes an agent’s ability to live a good life, and often strikes us 
as an evil-making component of the act. When we examine the cases presented at 
the beginning of this chapter, the harms were all brought about by human agency 
and they all destroyed or greatly injured the victims’ abilities to attain good lives. 
Therefore, “irreparable life-wrecking harm” names the kind of harm brought 
about by an evil act. In section 6 below, I add more content to this notion by 
examining the vulnerability of the victim of evil.  
 Formosa’s complete definition is: 
An evil act is an act of wrongdoing in which the perpetrator of that 
act is at least partly responsible for other individuals suffering what 
would at least normally be a life-wrecking or ending harm, and 
where in so acting we judge the perpetrator, in the light of all the 
relevant factors, to be deserving of our very strongest 
condemnations. The relevant factors include intention, motive, 
effect, degree of harm, and the perpetrator’s situation and 
circumstances.
110
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This combination approach allows for many roots of evil and includes different 
elements that are relevant to an act’s evilness. Now we have some essential 
elements of an evil act. But not all combination approaches define evil in the right 
way.  
 Marcus Singer also presents a combination theory of evil. He defines evil 
as: 
Evil acts…are acts that are horrendously wrong, that cause 
immense suffering and are done with an evil intention or from an 
evil motive, the intention or motive to do something horrendously 
wrong causing immense unwarranted suffering. And malevolence, 
the doing or willing of what is wrong because it is wrong is what 
malignant evil, evil in its most extreme form, consists in. If an 
action is thought of as so wrong or bad that one cannot conceive of 
oneself as performing it, or conceive of any reasonably decent 
person as doing it, then that action is evil.
111
 
Singer has incorporated those features that Formosa has argued are necessary for 
an act to be evil. There is a perpetrator component because the act must issue 
from an evil intention or from an evil motive. There is a victim component 
because the act must cause immense unwarranted suffering. There is a bystander 
component because one cannot conceive of any reasonably decent person as 
doing it. Singer admits that there are gradations of evil such that different evil acts 
may be evil in slightly different ways, but he believes he has shed light upon the 
nature of evil. 
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 There are, however, a number of problems with his definition. First, he 
argues that an evil act must issue from an evil intention or motive. In fact Singer 
explicitly states “[o]ne cannot do something evil by accident or through 
thoughtlessness.”112 But this claim is false. If an individual commits an act out of 
negligence, and the kind and degree of harm necessary for evil obtains, then the 
act might be evil.
113
 As J.L. Austin points out we have differing standards of what 
we deem acceptable behavior depending on the circumstances surrounding the 
action.  
The extent of the supervision we exercise over the execution of 
any act can never be quite unlimited, and is expected to fall within 
fairly definite limits (“due care and attention”) in the case of acts 
of some general kind, though of course we set very different limits 
in different cases. We may plead that we trod on the snail 
inadvertently: but not the baby—you ought to look where you are 
putting your great feet. Of course it was (really), if you like 
inadvertence: but that word constitutes a plea, which is not going 
to be allowed, because of standards.
114
  
Particular circumstances give rise to specific standards of behavior. These 
standards dictate whether an individual’s excuse is acceptable or not. If one walks 
into a room and trips and falls we might accept her appeal to clumsiness. If, 
however, she walks into a room filled with babies lying on the floor, we expect 
that she take due care in her steps. In such a situation an appeal to simple 
clumsiness or thoughtlessness would be inadequate to exculpate. The point is that 
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there may very well be circumstances where “I did it by accident” or “I wasn’t 
thinking” not only do not excuse a perpetrator from blame, but are sufficient for 
an act to be evil. Therefore, malicious intent is not a necessary element of evil.  
 Singer also includes a bystander component that I think is unnecessary for 
an act to be evil. He says that a test for whether an act is evil is that one cannot 
conceive of a reasonably decent person as doing it. I understand Singer’s intuition 
here. When most of us think of genocide, war rape, torture, as well as a host of 
other atrocious acts, we cannot conceive of how a reasonably decent person could 
participate in such acts. The problem with this criterion is that it is too subjective 
to be reliable as a definition for evil. Conceptions of “acts beyond the pale” of 
wrongdoing have changed throughout history. There are numerous examples: 
public torture used to be a common occurrence in Western countries that now 
shun it as cruel and evil.
115
 It is doubtful that no one involved in these practices 
was reasonably decent. Also, the oppression of women and minorities was the 
status quo until relatively recently. It seems possible that the perpetrators of this 
oppression were “reasonably decent” despite their horrible treatment of others. 
Further, the interest in the moral status of animals has grown recently. If more and 
more people become convinced that animals should not be imprisoned and eaten, 
it does not follow that those who do not understand this now are not reasonably 
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decent individuals. What these examples illustrate is that as our understanding of 
the moral community develops, and as we understand who deserves moral 
consideration and which acts should be condemned, we improve our ethical 
behavior. However, it does not follow that we are not “reasonably decent” now 
even if is true that we can be more ethical in the future.  
 Furthermore, reasonable decency is not an incorruptible trait. Just because 
someone might be considered reasonably decent, it does not follow that she is 
incapable of committing evil acts. In fact, ordinary decent people have throughout 
history and literature shown themselves to be more than willing to commit evil 
deeds. One of the tragedies of evil is that it does not belong exclusively to 
monsters. For example, most ordinary Germans did not resist when Hitler asked 
them to help “cleanse” their society of Jews. More recently, Serbs turned against 
their Bosnian neighbors without much opposition. Or, in Heart of Darkness Kurtz 
commits atrocious acts once freed from the social constraints of Victorian 
England. It did not take much for these otherwise “reasonably decent” individuals 
to turn into perpetrators of evil. One might argue that these individuals were never 
reasonably decent, but were so perhaps only in appearance. This argument only 
further supports my point that we cannot trust whom we judge as reasonably 
decent. Therefore, the test of whether one can conceive of a reasonably decent 
person doing an act, fails as a test for evil.  
Singer says that he is only interested in the nature of what he calls 
“EVIL,”116 and not particular acts of evil, or evils. However, I think it is precisely 
                                                 
116
 Singer, 186. 
  107 
the particular acts of evil that can tell us something about the nature of evil. For 
example, it is one thing to understand the general claim that evil results in 
immense suffering or a life-wrecking harm. It is a more developed moral 
understanding, however, that can see that a particular kind of act will always have 
such miserable consequences. It follows from understanding what it means to be a 
person that the destruction or abuse of that which is necessary for personhood 
would constitute an evil act. Harry Frankfurt’s conception of personhood allows 
us to name a particular act of evil.  
5. Defining Evil through Frankfurt’s Conception of the Person 
In the preceding sections I have outlined some of the necessary elements 
of an evil act. I also appealed to Rachels’s analysis of the different ways a being 
can be harmed to show that we may need to examine particular circumstances and 
specific capacities to decide whether an act is evil. I now present one particular 
evil act.  
One way that an act can be evil is that it severely damages or destroys the 
capacity or capacities necessary for personhood. Frankfurt provides us with a 
conception of a person that points to what this capacity is. He begins his argument 
by noting that it is not helpful to look at what is unique about persons as prior 
theories of personhood have done. Rather, to understand what is significant about 
being a person we need to examine what is most important to us as persons. In 
Frankfurt’s words: 
[t]he criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to 
distinguish the members of our species from the members of other 
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species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which 
are the subject of our most human concern with ourselves and the 
source of what we regard as most important and most 
problematical in our lives.
117
 
One essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the 
structure of a person’s will. Humans are not alone in forming desires or even in 
making decisions based upon deliberation. However, it does seem to be a peculiar 
characteristic of humans that they can form second-order desires. In addition to 
wanting to be moved to do a particular act, humans can also want, or not want, to 
have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting their will to be a 
certain way. Many animals have the capacity to form first-order desires, which are 
simply the desire to do or not do this or that. But humans also have the capacity to 
want or not want the desires they have.  
 An agent might want to act without the desire being the agent’s will. 
Consider statements of the form “A wants to X” where “X” is some action. 
Statements of this form identify first-order desires. But the mere fact that an agent 
has a first-order desire does not mean that the agent is motivated to act on the 
desire. That is, the existence of a first-order desire does not necessitate that the 
desire plays a decisive role in what the agent actually does or tries to do. A wants 
to X even if A also has other desires that are stronger or more motivating, or when 
A wants to do something else instead. Only when A wants to X and the desire for 
X is moving A to do what she is actually doing, does the statement “A wants to X” 
identify A’s will. An agent’s will is the desire by which she is motivated in some 
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action or the desire by which she will be motivated when or if she acts. “An 
agent’s will, then, is identical with one or more of her first-order desires.”118 
Thus, the notion of will as Frankfurt uses it is the notion of an effective desire.  
 Now let’s consider statements of the form “A wants to want to X” which 
identify second-order desires. These kinds of desires can be either effective or not. 
To illustrate the latter possibility, Frankfurt relates the story of a physician 
researching narcotics addiction who wants to help his patients by knowing what it 
is like to desire the drug as an addict. It is a genuine desire insofar as he does not 
merely desire to want the drug, but rather to be moved to some extent to take the 
drug. That is, he wants to be moved by the desire to take the drug. However, it is 
entirely possible that he does not want this desire to be effective. He knows the 
dangers of addiction quite well, and does not want to actually become addicted. 
He wants to want to take it, but he wants not to take it. His second-order desire to 
take the drug does not entail that he has a first-order desire to take it.   
 Frankfurt admits that such an individual does not represent the ordinary 
case. He “stands at the margin of preciosity, and the fact that he wants to want to 
X is not pertinent to the identification of his will.”119 There is, however, the kind 
of situation such that the statement “A wants to want to X” does pertain to what A 
wants her will to be. Here we see the distinction between second-order desires and 
what Frankfurt calls “second-order volitions.” In these situations the statement 
means that A wants the desire to X to be the desire that moves her effectively to 
act. She wants the desire to provide the motive for what she actually does. In such 
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cases, when we say that “A wants to want to X,” then we also mean that she 
already has the desire to X. It is only by having the first-order desire to X that A 
can coherently have the second-order volition that X be her will.
120
 Not only does 
A have certain desires, but she also desires to desire in a certain way and wants 
those desires to move her effectively to act.  In other words, A wants her will to be 
a certain way. When A wants a certain desire to be her will, then she has a second-
order volition. “[I]t is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order 
desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person.”121 
 There is a close relationship between the capacity for forming second-
order volitions and another capacity that Frankfurt thinks is essential to being a 
person—freedom of the will. It is only because a person has second-order 
volitions that she is capable of enjoying or lacking freedom of the will. To 
understand what Frankfurt means by “freedom of the will” he contrasts it with 
other kinds of freedom that are sometimes confused with freedom of the will. 
Having a free will does not mean that one is free to do what one wants to do. This 
freedom is freedom of action. Freedom of the will is the freedom to want what 
one wants to want, or in other words, to will as one wants to will.  
When we ask whether a person’s will is free we are not asking 
whether he is in a position to translate his first-order desires into 
actions. That is the question of whether he is free to do as he 
pleases. The question of the freedom of the will does not concern 
the relation between what he does and what he wants to do….the 
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question about the freedom of his will has to do with whether it is 
the will he wants to have. 
122
 
An agent enjoys freedom of the will when she conforms her will to her second-
order volitions. That is, her will is free when she can have the will she wants to 
have. Frankfurt provides us with the example of the unwilling addict to illustrate 
an unfree will. This addict hates her addiction and always struggles unavailingly 
to resist its force. She tries to overcome the desire for the drug, but it proves too 
powerful to withstand. She has conflicting first-order desires, both to take the 
drug and to refrain from taking it. She also has a second-order volition to refrain 
from taking the drug. She wants this desire to be effective in her action.  It is this 
desire she wants to constitute her will. However, she is in fact moved to act by 
another desire – the desire to take the drug. Therefore, she does not have the will 
she wants. Given the power of the desire to take the drug, she is not free to will as 
she wants to will.
123
  
The enjoyment of a free will means the satisfaction of certain 
desires – desires of the second or of higher orders – whereas its 
absence means their frustration. The satisfactions at stake are those 
which accrue to a person of whom it may be said his will is his 
own. The corresponding frustrations are those suffered by a person 
of whom it may be said that he is estranged from himself, or that 
he finds himself a helpless or passive bystander to the forces that 
move him.
124
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The capacity to exercise freedom of the will, that is, the capacity to conform one’s 
will to one’s second-order volitions, is essential to being a person. Therefore, an 
individual whose capacity to do so is irrevocably damaged or destroyed is not a 
person. Because this capacity is what constitutes an individual’s personhood, any 
attack on it is also an attempt to damage or destroy that individual’s personhood. 
Recall that in the previous section I gave a general definition of evil and said that 
it must be brought about by human agency and must result in a life-wrecking and 
often irreparable harm. Hence, I define a particular kind of evil act as any agent-
caused act that damages or destroys an individual’s125 personhood by damaging or 
destroying that individual’s capacity to form second-order volitions, or capacity to 
conform one’s will to one’s second order volitions.  
 Let’s now examine this definition more closely. I include “agent-
caused”126 in the definition of evil because there can be non-agent-caused damage 
or destruction to one’s will that does not constitute evil. Although some 
participants in the discussion of the religious problem of evil include natural evil 
as a kind of evil, I do not do so here. Since nature is indifferent to human projects 
or to one’s will, the natural damage or destruction to one’s capacity to be a person 
is accidental. As I argued in section 4 of this chapter, any act of evil must have a 
perpetrator component, by which I mean it must be brought about by human 
agency.  If, for example, Alzheimer’s Disease destroys one’s capacity to conform 
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one’s will to one’s second-order volitions, or even to form second-order volitions, 
it is certainly sad for that individual and her family, but this event is not evil.   
 It also does not seem sufficient for evil that a particular second-order 
volition is thwarted. In fact, the thwarting of one’s attempt to conform one’s will 
to one’s second-order volitions occurs quite often. Legal and moral prohibitions 
are aimed precisely at stopping an individual from acting on a specific desire if 
the action resulting from the desire is against the law or immoral. By doing so, the 
individual’s ability to effectively act from her desire is frustrated. This sort of 
frustration occurs quite regularly and, furthermore, is necessary for societal and 
interpersonal interaction. It is clearly not evil.  
There is another kind of coercion directed at an agent’s will that seemingly 
fits my definition of evil, is in fact not evil, and therefore might serve as an 
objection to it. There are two social institutions targeted at altering behavior by 
changing the individual’s second-order volitions: the moral education of children 
and the behavioral correction of prisoners. Surely these two institutions are good, 
at least in theory. How a specific society chooses to educate its children or correct 
its prisoners may in fact be evil. My point here is that it need not be.  
 Both the moral education of children and the correction of prisoners are 
focused on altering or eliminating the second-order volitions of the child or 
prisoner which motivate actions that are immoral and/or illegal. When the little 
boy opens the birthday girl’s presents and is sent to his room, the goal of the 
punishment is to show him that his agency has an upshot in the world and that he 
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is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes.
127
 These realizations are 
supposed to have the effect that the boy does not open the birthday girl’s presents 
the following year. Even if the first-order desire arises within him to open the 
girl’s presents, he has a second-order volition not to be the kind of person who 
opens little girl’s presents. More generally, he realizes that all of his actions might 
have a moral component such that he does not want certain first-order desires that 
may harm others to be effective in his action. He wants some specific desires to 
be his will and not others; he wants his will to be a certain way.  
 With the behavioral correction of prisoners, it seems unrealistic that the 
goal is the moral correction of the individual, rather than an attempt to awaken the 
realization that time in prison is not worth satisfying whatever desires motivate 
illegal acts. This realization might be arrived at through rational reflection or 
through fear. Either way, if the reformed prisoner has the second-order volition 
not to be the kind of person who commits the act that would land him in prison, 
the correction of his behavior has been successful from a legal standpoint.  
 Here we have two examples where the will of the individual was subject 
to thwarting and alteration. Do these cases fit my definition of evil? I have 
defined evil as agent-caused damage or destruction of one’s capacity to form 
second-order volitions or to conform one’s will to one’s second-order volitions. 
At first glance, one might think that the moral education of the child and the 
behavioral correction of the prisoner fit this definition. They are both prohibited 
to act on that desire they want to be effective in their action. Notice, however, that 
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in both examples the capacity of the individual to conform her will to her second-
order volitions is not under attack. Rather, only particular second-order volitions 
are targeted for correction or elimination. The latter is not sufficient for evil and is 
often good. This is not to say that there may not be some example where the 
targeting of an individual’s particular second-order volition does make up part of 
the explanation of why the act was evil.
128
 But the targeting on its own is not 
sufficient for evil. However, if the targeting included inhibiting the capacity of the 
individual to want what one wants to want, then this would be evil. 
 This definition of evil might help answer McKenna’s worry, discussed in 
chapter 1, that French’s account of losing innocence for the sake of responsibility 
may justify child abuse. French states that “there seems to be a moral obligation 
for the mature members of society to cause the end of innocence, to guide 
children through the passage to adulthood.” 129 Since this passage requires a 
personal acquaintance with wrongdoing, McKenna worries that French has not 
said enough to ensure that his argument cannot be used as a license for child 
abuse.  
I have explained above why the moral education of children, although 
aimed at the alteration of the child’s second-order volition(s), does not necessarily 
constitute an evil act. It is because in education only a particular second-order 
volition is targeted for correction rather than her capacity to form second-order 
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volitions or her ability to conform her will to her second-order volitions. 
Conversely, in child abuse we have empirical evidence that the trauma caused 
often significantly damages or destroys the ability of the individual, both as a 
child and later as an adult, to conform her will to her second-order volitions. 
Many victims of abuse have long-term psychological and behavioral problems. 
Several studies have shown that many adults who experienced abuse as children 
exhibited symptoms of anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
reactive attachment disorder among others.
130
 Individuals who are depressed or 
who have PTSD, do not want to be motivated to act by these disorders. That is 
why they are classified as disorders. They interfere with the individual’s ability to 
be motivated by what she wants to be motivated by. These individuals share 
something in common with Frankfurt’s drug addict who hates her addiction. They 
are unable to pursue those desires they truly prefer to have. Under my definition 
of evil, child abuse then easily fits, but moral education does not. Now, the 
significant damage and/or destruction to the individual’s capacity to will as she 
wants to will need not be the only reason that child abuse is evil. Surely it also has 
to do with attacking the extreme vulnerability
131
 of, or exploiting, the child. But it 
explains one way in which it is evil. Namely, the capacity essential for 
personhood has been damaged and maybe even destroyed.  
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One might object that there are situations in which it is evil to target for 
alteration or elimination a particular second-order volition. Frankfurt tells us that 
sometimes one cares about something, not so much, but in such a way, that it is 
impossible for her to refrain from a certain course of action.
132
 In a case of 
volitional necessity, a person can do no other than A; she is unable to refrain from 
doing A. Conversely, in a case of unthinkability a person cannot do A; she is 
unable to perform A. In this latter case, she cannot do A because doing A is 
unthinkable for her. Unthinkability and volitional necessity are modes of 
necessity which set the limits of a person’s will and thereby shape the boundaries 
of her volitional identity. Because the elements which determine both volitional 
necessity and unthinkability are outside of a person’s direct control, they 
constitute the stable volitional nature of the person. Since these volitional limits 
are important to the identity of the individual, if they were altered or eliminated, 
then the identity of the individual would also be altered or eliminated. Would this 
be an evil act? 
 There may be cases where it would be evil. But again this act would not 
always be sufficient for evil. Imagine that the target of alteration or elimination 
was the second-order volition of a Nazi who cared about exterminating Jews in 
such a way that he could not refrain from doing so. There does not seem to by any 
moral objection to going through with the alteration or elimination. In fact, the 
Allies instituted a “re-education” program in Germany after the end of WWII for 
precisely this purpose. If there were still dedicated Nazis who survived the war 
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and avoided capture, then the attempt at their re-education was a good thing. 
Therefore, even if the second-order volitions targeted for alteration and 
elimination are ones engendered by the agent’s deep care, this act is not alone 
sufficient to define evil.  
 I do not intend my definition of evil to be exhaustive. There are other 
examples of wrongdoing that we would call “evil” even if they do not involve the 
damage and/or destruction of one’s capacity to will as one wants to will. There 
may be physical harm that is evil, and there is certainly harm to animals that is 
evil. But the present definition explains what is always evil, even if there are other 
kinds of evil as well.
133
 This present account of evil is important for persons 
because the capacity to have a free will, understood in the special way as the 
ability to want what one wants to want, is essential to being a person. In other 
words, evil is that which “de-personifies” the agent.  
 Finally, Frankfurt’s conception of the will can help us understand the 
distinction between evil acts and evil character. Any moral agent can have a first-
order desire to cause harm to another. If the harm damages or destroys the 
victim’s capacity to want what she wants to want, then it is evil. When an agent 
commits an evil act because she has a first-order desire to cause the victim harm, 
the act itself does not tell us anything about the perpetrator’s character. However, 
when the perpetrator has a second-order volition to damage or destroy the 
victim’s capacity to will as she wants to will, then the perpetrator has an evil 
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character. In such cases, the perpetrator wants the desire to harm the victim to be 
her will, that is effectively motivate her action. The perpetrator’s desire to cause 
harm identifies her will and, consequently, identifies her as a person, specifically 
an evil person.  
 This particular act of evil, namely agent-caused damage and/or destruction 
of one’s capacity to will as one wants to will, and the more general guidelines 
discussed in the preceding section, namely immense suffering on the part of the 
victim and some relevant feature of the perpetrator’s motives or intentions, share 
a common characteristic: they both require that the victim be in a state of extreme 
vulnerability. I now show that extreme vulnerability is indeed present in cases of 
evil. Furthermore, I argue that the acquaintance with evil necessary for the 
shattering of moral illusions is the recognition that one has the ability to exploit, 
either directly or indirectly, the extreme vulnerability of others.  
6. Extreme Vulnerability 
I have presented both general characteristics of an evil act and named a 
particular kind of evil act. However, when I think of the various acts that 
philosophers call evil, viz. genocide, war rape, torture, the molesting and 
murdering of children, just to name a few, there is a shared characteristic among 
the victims that is not mentioned in the analyses of evil above. This shared 
characteristic is the extreme vulnerability of the victim of an evil act. Card and 
Formosa believe that immense suffering on the part of the victim is a necessary 
component of an evil act. I do not doubt their claim. However, what often makes 
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immense suffering possible is extreme vulnerability.
134
 Understanding one’s 
ability to exploit another’s extreme vulnerability is a personal acquaintance with 
evil. This understanding shatters the illusion that all harm can be adequately 
described by “wrongdoing,” and leads the way to realizing that non-malicious 
agents can bring about evil.
135
   
 Robert Goodin defines vulnerability as that which “amounts to one 
person’s having the capacity to produce consequences that matter to another.”136 
Ruth Sample describes this vulnerability as “a relationship between two or more 
people, at least one of whom is in a position of causal relevance to the welfare of 
the other(s).”137 Understood in this way, being vulnerable is quite an ordinary 
component of relationships and social interaction. We are all capable of producing 
consequences that matter to another, and others can produce consequences that 
matter to us. Therefore, being vulnerable in itself clearly does not entail being 
harmed or being wronged, and certainly not being a victim of evil. But it does 
mean that one is in the position of possibly being harmed by another. Being 
vulnerable is necessary but not sufficient both for being harmed and also for being 
a victim of evil.  
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 When one is vulnerable, one is dependent on others. Goodin argues that 
the dependency of others and our ability to help them alone obligates us to 
provide assistance. He challenges the thesis of voluntarism
138
 which argues that 
responsibilities may only be “voluntarily self-assumed.”139 He contrasts such 
special moral responsibilities, which are created by specific people with respect to 
specific people, with general moral rights and duties which are universal and thus 
the same for everyone. For example, I have a general moral duty not to murder, 
and others have a general moral duty to refrain from murdering me. I have a 
special or particular moral duty to love my son. I do not have a duty to love all of 
the children in the world, nor do others have the duty love my son. We can 
distinguish between these two kinds of duties, and yet both are still morally 
binding. Goodin rejects the idea that these special obligations arise due to some 
choice or decision we have made in respect to another; rather they arise due to the 
fact that “those persons to whom we owe special obligations are dependent on us 
for something crucial to them.”140 He thinks so even in the case of one’s children. 
He believes that one is obligated to love and care for one’s children, not because 
one chose to have children, but because ordinarily the parent is in the best 
position to provide the love and care the children need. The children are 
dependent on the parents for parental love. It follows then that in situations 
involving special obligations, I may have done nothing prior to create the 
relationship of dependency, but if it exists, I am morally obligated to provide the 
                                                 
138
 Goodin does not mean the metaphysical view that the moral law is a function of God’s will.  
139
 Goodin, 13.  
140
 Sample, 36.  
  122 
assistance needed by the other person. The fact of dependency is enough to 
obligate.  
This dependence can be both general and particular. General dependence 
imposes a negative obligation on others whereas particular dependence imposes a 
positive one. I am generally dependent upon others in the sense that I rely on 
others to refrain from harming me. I am vulnerable to the possibility that another 
may physically assault me as I walk down the street, break into my house at night 
while I sleep, or kidnap, torture, and murder me.  This dependence is negative 
because I hope that others refrain from acting and harming my well-being. Notice 
that I do not necessarily have an active relationship with the others upon whom I 
am generally dependent. This general dependence corresponds to the general 
moral duties that Goodin argues are universal.  
Dependence also has a particular form. A situation of particular 
dependence is one in which the dependent requires another person, not just to 
refrain from interfering, but to act in a particular and direct way in order to fulfill 
some need. The drowning swimmer is particularly dependent on the passerby 
because the passerby has the ability, and is the only one close enough, to save the 
life of the drowning swimmer. The drowning swimmer does not require non-
interference, but direct aid. In cases of particular dependence the dependent and 
the other person have an active relationship. This relationship might be activated 
simply because the other (the non-dependent) has the ability and is in the 
proximity to offer the required aid. This ability and proximity activate a special 
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duty to provide assistance. Goodin says that we are obligated to “suspend the 
ordinary rules of behavior in dealing with those particularly vulnerable to us.”141 
 I think Goodin’s analysis of vulnerability can shed light on a feature 
present in acts of evil. The dependence in cases of evil comes out of extreme 
vulnerability. That is, the dependent is vulnerable to immense suffering or an 
irreparable life-wrecking harm. Sample gives us a good summary of Goodin’s 
definition of extreme vulnerability. There are four elements: “an asymmetry of 
power, the possession by the more powerful person of what another needs, a 
monopoly by the more powerful person on the thing needed by the weaker person, 
and control of the needed object by the more powerful person.”142 Goodin’s focus 
here is on why exploitation of the vulnerable is wrong.
143
 I think his argument can 
be extrapolated to provide insight into evil acts as well. If the thing needed by the 
dependent is her own life or dignity, her capacity to will as she wants to will, that 
which is crucial to pursuing her life as she wishes, or the life or dignity of her 
loved ones, then we begin to see why the malicious or thoughtless control and 
destruction of that needed thing would constitute an evil act.  
 We can also think of extreme vulnerability simply in terms of the ability to 
be severely harmed. If immense suffering or an irreparable life-wrecking harm 
must be suffered for an act to be evil, what allows for the possibility of such a 
degree of harm is the victim’s extreme vulnerability. The more vulnerable one is, 
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the greater the potential for a harm to be life-wrecking or result in immense 
suffering. It follows that the same act done to two different individuals may be 
evil in one case but not the other. For example, I often walk around my 
neighborhood with my wife and our infant son. If a stranger were to come up to 
us and punch me in the face, this act would be wrong, but not evil. I would feel 
pain, but not immense suffering or a life-wrecking harm. Even if the perpetrator 
acted maliciously, the harm element is missing to make his act an evil one. On the 
other hand, if the stranger were to come up to us and punch my infant son in the 
face, then the act is evil. The very same act done to two different victims is wrong 
in one case and evil in another. The difference is that my infant son is in a state of 
extreme vulnerability (due to his infancy). The extreme vulnerability allows for 
the harm done to him to result in immense suffering or take on life-wrecking 
proportions. In other words, extreme vulnerability is a necessary condition for the 
harm element necessary for an act to be evil. Because extreme vulnerability is an 
essential element of an evil act, then when one understands, or sees that, other 
individuals are in situations of extreme vulnerability and, moreover, that one has 
the ability to abuse or exploit this vulnerability either directly or indirectly, then 
one has had a personal acquaintance with evil.   
There is another interesting feature of the vulnerability of victims of evil. 
In cases of evil the victim is particularly dependent, not just on anyone, but on the 
perpetrator. We might think it is a truism to say that to avoid harm the victim 
requires the perpetrator not to inflict harm on her. But there is an interesting facet 
of this relationship. Goodin tells us that an agent is morally obligated to help 
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those in need, when the person’s need will not be satisfied without assistance 
from others, and the agent has the ability to provide the assistance. That is, the 
agent has a special obligation. In cases of evil, the victim is not only in need but is 
in a situation of extreme vulnerability. Therefore, the object needed is not merely 
desired, but required for survival, well-being, or personhood. The perpetrator 
stands in closest proximity to the dependent to provide assistance given the fact 
that it is the perpetrator’s actions that will directly deprive the dependent of the 
object (perhaps her own life, dignity, personhood, etc.) that is crucial to her 
continued ability to pursue her life as she wishes. The perpetrator does not only 
withhold assistance, which alone is morally blameworthy, i.e. is wrong, but takes 
direct action to exploit the extreme vulnerability of the dependent in a malicious 
or thoughtless way that causes immense suffering or a life-wrecking harm, i.e. is 
evil. The perpetrator has not only the power and ability to aid but to harm and 
destroy as well. This power further obligates the perpetrator. The violation of this 
further obligation in a malicious or thoughtless manner that causes immense 
suffering or a life-wrecking harm is evil. 
 For example, it is obvious that Jews during the Holocaust were in an 
extremely vulnerable situation. They depended on the Nazis to allow them to live. 
The Jews had a particular dependence because they required the Nazis, that is, 
each and every individual Nazi, to take action to save them from immense 
suffering or death.  Because the Nazis were causing the harm, they were in the 
best position to end it. Or, in the report of the girl who hitched a ride with the man 
who tortured, raped, and left her to die, she had a particular dependence on him 
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not to subject her to these experiences. Often it is the perpetrator who puts the 
victim into the state of extreme vulnerability making the perpetrator the only 
person upon whom the victim is particularly dependent. This relationship helps 
explain why such acts are evil. In situations of genocide, war rape, the molestation 
and torture of children, the perpetrator is the only person (or persons) who has the 
ability to come to the aid of the victim for the very reason that the perpetrator has 
forced the victim into the situation of extreme vulnerability and is directly causing 
the harm. One reason (but not the only one) that genocide is evil is that the 
victims are extremely vulnerable to the direct actions of the perpetrators. The 
perpetrators are morally obligated to aid the dependents because of the 
relationship of particular dependence. Yet, the perpetrators inflict the very 
immense suffering and life-wrecking harm only they could have prevented.  
 This particular and direct dependence is exploited by the perpetrator to 
commit an evil act. This theory explains why crimes against children are usually 
evil acts. Children are in a position of perpetual dependence. They are extremely 
vulnerable in ways that adults are not. But of course adults are often extremely 
vulnerable as well. On March 31, 1992 a Serbian paramilitary group slaughtered 
hundreds of Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) civilians in the town of Bijeljina in 
northeastern Bosnia. This was the first day of the Bosnian war. The soldiers shot 
and killed fleeing civilians in the streets. The civilians, mostly women, children, 
and elderly men, were placed into this situation of extreme vulnerability by the 
soldiers.  It is not merely that the soldiers were simply bypassing those in need 
and violated a Good Samaritan obligation. We might find such people morally 
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blameworthy for not supplying aid when they had the ability and proximity to do 
so, but we would not usually consider them to be evil.
144
 One feature of the act 
that makes it evil is that the soldiers created the situation of extreme vulnerability, 
made the victims particularly and directly dependent on them, and  then took 
positive action to exploit their extreme vulnerability in order to cause them 
immense suffering and life-wrecking harm.  
7. Conclusion 
 An act is evil is when it is maliciously or thoughtlessly motivated by an 
agent who exploits someone who is in a situation of extreme vulnerability causing 
the victim immense suffering or an irreparable life-wrecking harm. We see this 
both through the analysis of evil through Frankfurt’s concept of a person and 
through the analysis of Goodin’s concept of vulnerability. This approach has the 
advantage of containing both a perpetrator and a victim component. It picks out 
something peculiar about all victims of evil, namely extreme vulnerability.  
Finally, it helps explain the acquaintance with evil necessary for a certain moral 
disillusion: the shattering of the illusion that the category of wrong sufficiently 
characterizes all of the degrees of badness. When I say that an individual must 
have a personal acquaintance with evil it would be absurd to claim that an 
individual is required to accept that she is directly capable of genocide, war rape, 
or torture. I do not want to argue that such an acquaintance is necessary for this 
moral disillusion. The acquaintance with evil need not entail the explicit 
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acknowledgment of such a concrete proposition. Rather, the acquaintance with 
evil is the recognition that one is either directly or indirectly capable of 
maliciously or thoughtlessly exploiting someone in a situation of extreme 
vulnerability causing them immense suffering or an irreparable life-wrecking 
harm. This recognition need not be explicit; it may be an inchoate intuition. 
Nevertheless, it is an awareness of the extreme vulnerability of others and one’s 
direct or indirect ability to maliciously or thoughtlessly exploit it with the direst 
consequences. This awareness provides the means for taking responsibility for the 
evil one causes. As I mentioned at the beginning of chapter 2 this awareness need 
not make the agent morally good. Moral disillusion does not entail moral 
goodness; it entails moral understanding. This understanding gives one the ability 
raise ethical questions about moral goodness or the adequacy of certain moral 
principles and directives. In the next chapter I show that another phase of moral 
disillusion involves understanding that one can bring about unchosen evil and be 
held morally responsible for doing so.  
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CHAPTER 5 
UNCHOSEN EVIL 
1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I defined evil and asserted that we can do evil 
directly or indirectly. An agent can do evil directly either intentionally or 
inadvertently. When an agent does evil directly and intentionally, she is 
malicious, or diabolical. Recognizing that some people are malicious is important 
to accurately evaluating moral character. However, not all evil is malicious. 
Moreover, if most of us are not malicious, then we might think that most of us do 
not bring about evil. But, this is an illusion. Many of us do bring about evil even 
though we think evil ought to be avoided. We can bring about evil inadvertently 
or indirectly; we can bring about evil without directly choosing to do so.  
 In this chapter I address the illusion that non-malicious people do not 
bring about evil. There are at least two ways in which non-malicious people do 
evil. A person may find herself in certain circumstances such that she does 
something dreadful. The Milgram experiments and the Stanford Prison 
Experiment provide empirical evidence that many people will commit horrible 
acts when they are told to or given permission to do so. But non-malicious evil 
does not only occur under circumstances we might happen to find ourselves in. It 
is also possible that we create the circumstances that lead to evil. These 
circumstances can arise do to our characteristics or our cares. Because it is not 
abnormal for non-malicious people to do evil, we are bound to fail if we resolve 
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never to do evil again. Our goal instead should be to shatter those illusions that 
may keep us from minimizing the evil we bring about.  
In this chapter I will explain how non-malicious people do evil either by 
finding themselves in situations where they do dreadful things, or by creating 
those circumstances from their own characters and cares. These evildoers may 
hold the belief that evil ought to be avoided; nevertheless they do evil. I show that 
we are powerfully motivated to act by what we care about, not always by what we 
believe. Because evil can be done by non-malicious agents who hold the belief 
that evil is morally wrong, moral responsibility ought to track what we care about 
rather than what we believe.  
2. Situations of Evil 
The Milgram experiments
145
 on obedience to authority were conducted by 
Yale psychologist Stanley Milgram beginning in 1961. Milgram set out to test the 
hypothesis that the millions of accomplices to murder during the Holocaust were 
following orders despite holding the belief that murder (and genocide) is morally 
wrong.
146
 The results of the tests indicate that obedience to authority is a very 
powerful motivator even when that obedience will result in violating a moral 
belief.  
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 In the test, a volunteer subject was given the role of “teacher.” 
Unbeknownst to the test subject, the role of the “learner” was played by an actor 
who was part of the psychologist’s team conducting the test. The “teacher” and 
“learner” were separated into two rooms where they could still communicate, but 
no longer see each other. The “teacher” was told that her task was to teach certain 
word pairs to the “learner.” Every time the “learner” made a mistake, the 
“teacher” was to administer an electric shock to the “learner.” The voltage of the 
shock increased 15 volts after each mistake. The “teacher” was given a test shock 
to be made aware of what the “learner” would experience. In one version of the 
test, the “learner” told the “teacher” that she had a heart condition.  
The “teacher” was given a list of word pairs. She would read the word 
pairs to the “learner” along with four possible answers. The “teacher” believed 
that for every wrong answer the “learner” was receiving a shock. From the room 
in which the “learner” was supposedly situated, the “teacher” heard pre-recorded 
sounds for each shock level. After administering several of the increasingly severe 
shocks, the “teacher” would hear banging on the wall coming from the “learner’s” 
room, complaints about her heart condition, screams, and eventually only silence.  
 Once all responses from the “learner” had ceased, many of the people 
playing the role of the “teacher” wanted to stop the experiment. However, they 
were told to continue and assured that they would not be held responsible for what 
happened to the “learner.” The experiment was ended either when the test subject 
refused to continue despite being prompted by increasingly authoritative 
commands, or after she had administered the highest level shock, 450 volts, three 
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times in succession. In the first set of experiments, 65% of the test subjects 
continued despite the “learner’s” complaints and screams, and administered the 
highest voltage of shock. The experiment was repeated multiple times in different 
cultures and the results consistently showed that between 60-65% of test subjects 
were willing to complete the experiment.  
In the Stanford prison experiment,
147
 conducted by Stanford psychologist 
Philip Zimbardo in 1971, out of a group of seventy-five student volunteers, twelve 
were selected to play “prisoners” and twelve selected to play “prison guards.” The 
basement of the psychology building at Stanford was converted into a mock 
prison. The “prisoners” were given uncomfortable prison clothing, ankle chains, 
and were assigned numbers. They were “arrested” in their homes, then brought to 
the prison where they were finger-printed and strip-searched. The “guards” were 
given uniforms and wooden batons and told that although they should not harm 
the prisoners, they could use fear tactics to communicate their status of authority.  
A prison riot broke out on the second day. The “prisoners” blockaded their 
prison door and refused to follow the orders of the “guards.” The “guards” used 
fire extinguishers on the “prisoners” to quell revolt. To avoid future revolts the 
“guards” instituted a roll call where “prisoners” had to count off by stating their 
prisoner number. Some “prisoners” were not allowed to urinate or defecate, 
mattresses were confiscated forcing many to sleep on the concrete floor, and some 
were forced to go nude as an act of humiliation. As the days went on, many of the 
“guards” became increasingly ruthless, and many of the “prisoners” showed signs 
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of psychological distress. Although the experiment had been planned to continue 
over two weeks, Zimbardo shut it down after only six days. In this short time, 
about one third of the “guards” showed sadistic tendencies. Many of the “guards” 
were disappointed that the experiment ended early. Of the fifty outside observers 
who saw the “prison” over the six days, only one person objected on moral 
grounds to its horrendous conditions.  
Both of these experiments provide empirical evidence that people can do 
dreadful things given certain circumstances. The Milgram experiments show us 
that people are quite willing to check their moral beliefs at the door when a figure 
of authority orders them to harm another. The Stanford prison experiment shows 
us that people can become cruel, brutal, and even sadistic when given authority 
supported by an institutionalized ideology. The test subjects who participated in 
these experiments were not malicious individuals. They gave no indication, prior 
to the experiments, of desiring to exploit the extreme vulnerability of others. They 
believed that it was morally wrong to do evil to others. Yet, in both cases, it did 
not take much prodding for them to become evildoers. These experiments provide 
strong evidence that, given the right conditions, people can easily become 
perpetrators of evil. To understand that such a possibility exists, one must give up 
the illusion that only malicious people do evil things. Non-malicious, even 
ordinarily good, people are capable of atrocious acts.  
But it is not always the case that we happen to find ourselves in situations 
that move us to act in evil ways. We might also create such situations given our 
characteristics and what we care about.  
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3. Kekes on Unchosen Evil 
 The notion of unchosen
148
 evil plays a major role in John Kekes’s analysis 
of evil in Facing Evil. He shows how the individual‘s own characteristics are 
sometimes the source of the life-wrecking harm that keeps one from attaining a 
good life. The individual does not choose to have the characteristics that cause her 
harm, and is thus an agent of unchosen evil. When the agent realizes this fact 
about herself, the experience can be tragic. I will bolster Kekes’s position by 
examining Frankfurt’s conception of how cares motivate action often more 
powerfully than purely cognitive beliefs and deliberate choices. Bringing these 
approaches together allows us to see that moral disillusion is more than realizing 
that one is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. There are multiple 
phases of disillusion. One loses moral innocence by seeing that one can cause 
harm to others. Eventually, one might also see that one can exploit the extreme 
vulnerability of others and cause them life-wrecking harm. The more complex 
phase that I am presenting in this chapter includes seeing that not all evil is 
malicious. We can cause both others and oneself life–wrecking harm even without 
choosing to do so, and we can be held morally responsible for doing so. 
Recognizing this moral fact shatters the illusion that good people cannot do evil.  
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 Kekes’s argument begins with the assertion that we all aspire to live good 
lives. He does not mean good in the sense of morally good, but in the sense that 
we all hope to pursue our own conception of the good whatever it may be. The 
problem is that our aspirations to live good lives are often frustrated by what 
Kekes calls “essential conditions of life.”149 By examining three tragic stories, viz. 
Oedipus the King, King Lear, and Heart of Darkness, he illustrates that the 
essential conditions of life are the contingency of life, the indifference of nature, 
and human destructiveness. One’s capacity to live a good life is vulnerable to 
these conditions.  
 These conditions, however, are not purely external to human agency. They 
also manifest themselves through human characteristics. Because we cannot 
choose our characteristics, we are sources of unchosen evil. In the following 
section I will explain unchosen evil, not so much in terms of characteristics as 
Kekes does, but in terms of what one cares about. In this section, however, I 
follow Kekes’s argument.  
  The obstacles that keep us from living good lives arise regardless of how 
morally decent or deserving we are. In fact, as I will show below, they can even 
arise out of cares that we would ordinarily consider morally good or praiseworthy. 
The temptation is to explain away these obstacles by positing a supernatural 
harmony to the world; in Kekes’s words “by succumbing to the transcendental 
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temptation.”150 That is, I might think to myself that even if I have had bad fortune 
in life, as long as I remain morally pure of heart, I will get my just deserts in the 
afterlife. Or, one often hears people explain others’ undeserved suffering by 
claiming that God has His reasons. What seems horrible to us is really part of a 
hidden harmony that we are incapable of understanding as finite beings. Or, I am 
not an agent of evil because I do not intend to exploit the extreme vulnerability of 
others. But such thoughts are illusions.  
Although we are vulnerable to constitutive and circumstantial luck such 
that we may not be able to attain the life we want for ourselves, obstacles to the 
good life do not only originate from circumstances external to human agency. 
Kekes argues that these obstacles often arise due to one’s own characteristics. I 
will later argue that many of the obstacles come from what we care about. To 
illustrate this vulnerability, Kekes considers three tragic situations. 
The first is depicted in Oedipus the King by Sophocles. Before Oedipus 
was born it was foretold that he would kill his father and marry his mother. 
Although his parents arranged to have him killed, Oedipus avoided death and 
grew into adulthood. He believed himself to be the son of the king and queen of 
Corinth. Oedipus learned of the prophesy and left Corinth so that the foretold 
events would not obtain. However, it is precisely these reasonable actions that 
brought about the occurrence of the prophesied events. His self-imposed exile 
brought him to Thebes where his biological father ruled as king. Oedipus met a 
band of men along the road, was provoked into a fight, and killed them. 
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Unbeknownst to him, one of the men was his father. He entered the city and 
solved the riddle of the Sphinx liberating the city from its oppression. As a reward 
he was made king and took the widowed queen, his unknown mother, as his wife.  
 He unknowingly committed both parricide and incest, two acts that he and 
his society thought were deeply immoral. Yet, his actions throughout his life were 
as reasonable and decent as one could expect. He was only led to kill his father 
and marry his mother due to his devotion to avoid performing these very acts. 
After discovering the truth of what he had done, he famously blinded himself, his 
wife/mother committed suicide, and his children/siblings were disgraced. The 
effects of his actions were life-wrecking for himself, his mother, his father, and 
his children. Thus, he was an agent of evil. But he was not an intentional agent of 
evil. He was motivated by his cares; cares we would ordinarily consider 
praiseworthy. Although he was seemingly reasonable and virtuous, he led a tragic 
life.  
This tragedy picks out what Kekes considers to be one of the essential 
conditions of life: contingency. 
We can take, then, as the suggestion of the play that human life is 
vulnerable to contingency.  Our sensibility allows for contingency 
because it allows that there are vast areas of our lives in which we 
lack understanding and control…As a result we may be reasonable 
and decent, and we may still find ourselves forced to do evil that 
we abhor in circumstances we are not responsible for.
151
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Oedipus was an agent of evil despite the fact that he actively tried to avoid the 
very acts he eventually performed. Circumstances beyond his control arose such 
that his reasonableness and virtue led him into tragedy.  
 However, the mere fact that we are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of life is 
hardly a new insight. We are all painfully aware that we cannot always achieve 
what we intend to given circumstances we do not control. Kekes tries to tie the 
fact of contingency into Oedipus’s character. If he had not been so assertive, he 
would not have admitted to killing his (at the time of the killing unknown) father 
and his parricide would have remained in the past. But I do not think his argument 
is entirely convincing, nor is it necessary. Moreover, Aristotle admits as much 
when he says that “one swallow does not make a summer,”152 meaning that we 
cannot judge a person to be flourishing until her life is complete. Thus, being a 
victim of bad luck is hardly sufficient to explain unchosen evil for which we are 
morally responsible.  
 The main part of my argument has to wait until the next section where I 
discuss the importance of what we care about. However, I can already say now 
that what makes the story of Oedipus significant for my present purposes is that 
he is brought to do evil by what he cares about.  His hope for a good life is not 
destroyed by another exploiting his extreme vulnerability. Rather, it is destroyed 
by his own cares. He was motivated to act because he cared about acting 
virtuously; specifically, avoiding incest and parricide. Yet, these cares led to 
commit the very acts that directly opposed what he cared about. Not only was he 
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an agent of unchosen evil, but the evil he did was to himself. He realized that his 
own cares brought about a life-wrecking harm visited upon himself.  It is this 
tragic realization that moved him to blind himself. He learned that reasonableness 
and virtue do not always produce a good life. Although the lesson was tragic, he 
learned something about the nature of moral life; we may cause evil without 
choosing to do so.  Recognition of this possibility is a moral disillusion. In the 
next two sections, I fill out this phase of disillusion by explaining both how our 
cares can motivate unchosen acts, and also how we can be held morally 
responsible for performing them.  
 The second essential condition of life is indifference and is depicted in 
King Lear. Lear divided his kingdom among his two wicked daughters, and 
disowned Cordelia, who loved him. He aced foolishly and came to pay for his 
foolishness though his own suffering. He learned his lesson and took 
responsibility for the events that occurred. He understood that his suffering came 
about due to his actions. After losing everything he began to cultivate those 
virtues we ordinarily consider praiseworthy: pity, compassion, and remorse for 
what he had done. He was reunited with Cordelia who had forgiven him. But we 
do not get the happy ending that we might expect. Cordelia was executed and 
Lear died with a broken heart. “We learn that goodness may be punished, that 
suffering and moral growth need not be compensated for, and that people come to 
undeserved harm. This situation is caused by the indifference of the scheme of 
things towards human merit.”153 
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 The story of Lear illustrates that there is no cosmic justice. Good people 
may suffer and the wicked may flourish. Being good is not always its own reward 
and one can easily profit by acting unjustly. There is no moral harmony to the 
universe compensating those who suffered undeservedly. A virtuous life does not 
necessarily lead to a good life. The universe does not reward rationality or 
goodness. But the world is not evil. It is simply indifferent to human agency. 
Being moral may not end in reward at all.
154
 The universe is indifferent to moral 
merit. 
The third essential condition of life is human destructiveness. In Heart of 
Darkness, Kurtz traveled to Africa to civilize the natives. “He had a strong sense 
of moral and cultural values.”155 He intended to overcome their barbarism not by 
waging war, but through the excellence of his character and intelligence. He 
traveled to a distant outpost in the African jungle and lived there among what he 
considered to be primitive tribes. The natives come to regard him with awe such 
that he seemed a supernatural being to them. He was given such power that 
nothing stood in his way. There was nothing to restrain him. He ordered midnight 
rituals of sex, violence and cruelty. Finding himself there in a position of absolute 
power he discovered within himself the barbarism he had set out to conquer. “The 
horror! The horror!” was the realization that the heart of darkness was inside 
himself.  
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This story shows that destructiveness is not always explained by appealing 
to external factors acting upon us, but is often brought about by what moves us to 
act. It can be a source of evil and create an obstacle to good lives. Therefore, we 
are often our own obstacle to attaining a good life. This realization is tragic. But 
understanding this feature of moral life dissolves the illusion that moral purity is 
attainable. 
The essential conditions of life are not responsible on their own for evil in 
the world. If they were, then we could blame the way the world is for the 
occurrence of evil. The essential conditions of life manifest themselves through 
human vices. According to Kekes, contingency, indifference, and destructiveness 
give rise to specific characteristics. Contingency often appears as insufficiency, 
indifference as expediency, and destructiveness as malevolence. 
 Kekes argues that insufficiency is due to an inadequate development of 
some capacity required for acceptable moral conduct. The lack may be cognitive, 
emotive, or volitional. If cognitive, then the insufficiency often appears as 
dogmatism. Dogmatists may have a strong commitment to moral principles but 
their principles are mistaken. They have not developed the required critical 
faculty to discover they are wrong. If emotive, then the insufficiency often takes 
the form of insensitivity. Such people feel contempt for victims of evil and are 
insensitive to the suffering of others. These people lack the emotive capacity to 
sympathize with their intimates and realize they are suffering. They cannot see 
that others are vulnerable where they are not. It is also unchosen since its source 
may be genetic, hormonal, or environmental. If volitional, then the insufficiency 
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appears as weakness. These people are too weak to do what they recognize they 
ought to do. They are incapable of making the required effort. In all cases the evil 
is characteristic, yet unchosen. 
 Expediency is due to pursuing the goods of life without regard for the evil 
that may result from one’s pursuit. These agents concentrate on achieving their 
goals without care for those who get sacrificed along the way. Expediency can 
take the form of selfishness or fanaticism. When someone is selfish all that 
matters is one’s own goal and everything else is an instrument for reaching it. 
When someone is a fanatic some external goal dominates her actions and she is 
fully committed to achieving the goal such that everything is a mere instrument in 
the pursuit. In both cases one is indifferent to the evil one causes.  
Malevolence is the disposition to act contrary to what is good. The 
emotional source is ill will. The malevolent person rationalizes her deeds and 
perceives them as righteous or justified. Through malevolence, destructiveness 
finds expression. 
Although I do not see the direct link between contingency as a fact of life 
and dogmatism, insensitivity, and weakness of will in human character, I think 
Kekes’s general point is correct. Human character is partly influenced by the way 
the world is. The moral agent does not appear ex nihilo with the capacity to 
choose one action or another. Rather, the agent’s character is formed by her 
tradition and social circumstances. For this reason, it is important for moral 
evaluation to look at the agent’s character rather than merely her ability to choose 
one act over another. It is not that choice does not play an important role in moral 
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evaluation; rather, the claim is that it cannot play a foundational role. Tradition 
and education have as their object character. Social norms form one’s character. 
People have commitments because they grow up in a tradition that teaches them 
how to be. They might adopt or reject that tradition, but they do not choose it 
initially. Therefore, the formation of character precedes making choices. People 
find themselves in a position to choose because they already have commitments to 
the alternatives they confront. This approach supports the conclusion that the 
domain of morality is wider than the domain of choice. I will explain in the 
following section that our commitments come about by virtue of what we care 
about.  
 The contingency of human existence, the moral indifference of nature, and 
the presence of destructiveness in human motivation sometimes give rise to tragic 
situations. Part of the tragedy is that overcoming these obstacles is not within our 
control, and that we create the obstacles often because of what we care about. 
Although the tragic figures mentioned above did not choose the evil they caused, 
each brought about its occurrence due to his character. Each story illustrates in a 
different way that we are often the source of unchosen evil. Recognizing this fact 
eradicates the false hope that the universe coincides with reason, or that happiness 
will reward moral merit. If one falsely and naïvely believes that cosmic justice 
will compensate the good and punish the evil, one is blind to certain moral facts. 
One of these moral facts is that we may bring about unchosen acts of evil.  
 In this section I have established that unchosen evil is an undeniable 
feature of moral life. In the next section I explain how it is possible for an agent to 
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perform an action without choosing to do so. We will see that we are often 
motivated to act based on what we care about and not what we believe. The 
following section will then address how an agent can be held morally responsible 
for actions that that she does not choose to perform. These pieces fit together to 
reveal that an agent can bring about unchosen evil and be held morally 
responsible for doing so.  Awareness of this possibility shatters the illusion that 
only malicious individuals bring about evil.  
4. The Importance of What We Care About 
 Our vulnerability to unchosen evil, to life-wrecking harm we visit upon 
ourselves and others, is best understood by appealing to Frankfurt’s conception of 
cares. It is important to examine cares in addition to explicitly held beliefs 
because cares often motivate without our choosing that they do so; that is, we 
often have them without choosing them and, hence, they motivate unchosenly. 
Beliefs, on the other hand, are held for reasons.
156
 The content of our beliefs have 
a truth value; they are propositions that we hold to be true or false. Because we 
hold beliefs based on reasons, we can either accept or reject them based on either 
good or insufficient reasons. When a belief motivates me to act, it usually does so 
because I have already accepted the belief to be true. More generally, I can reflect 
upon my beliefs about the world, retain those which are coherent and have 
grounds, and discard those which are unfounded or result in a conflict or 
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contradiction.
157
 But cares are held not only cognitively, but affectively and 
volitionally. They can motivate us to act with or without our explicit cognitive 
consent. Moreover, in situations where what we care about conflicts with what we 
believe, the care often proves to be the more powerful motivator. Frankfurt gives 
us the example of a teenage mother who truly believes it would be best to give up 
her baby for adoption, but cannot bring herself to go through with it. What she 
cares about guides her action despite believing that an alternative action would be 
best. What we see in this example is that one’s cares often guide an agent’s action 
and show us what the agent’s will really is. Because we are often guided to act by 
what we care about even when we hold a belief that it would be best to do 
otherwise, we can see how one might visit an unchosen evil upon oneself and 
others.  
 Frankfurt tells us that caring consists in guiding oneself along a distinctive 
course or in a particular manner. The agent’s actions are thereby guided by one’s 
cares.  
Caring, insofar as it consists in guiding oneself along a distinctive 
course or in a particular manner, presupposes both agency and self-
consciousness. It is a matter of being active in a certain way, and 
the activity is essentially a reflexive one. This is not because the 
agent, in guiding his own behavior, necessarily does something to 
himself. Rather, it is more nearly because he purposefully does 
something with himself. 
158
 
What it means to care about something is to be guided in a certain way. But one is 
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not guided through life like an empty raft on a river. Rather, one plays an active 
role in how one is guided. The activity is reflexive insofar as the agent cares about 
what (or who) she is. In other words, it is important to the agent what she cares 
about. Frankfurt adds, 
[w]e are particularly concerned with our own motives. It matter 
greatly to us whether the desires by which we are moved to act as 
we do motivate us because we want them to be effective in moving 
us or whether they move us regardless of ourselves in or even 
despite ourselves.
159
 
When we are moved to act by something we care about, we are not completely 
passive. The cares move us to act because we want them to be effective in moving 
us to act. We may not always choose which cares move us to act, but we reflect 
upon the cares we have and have a second-order volition that they be effective in 
our action.
160
  
 But caring about something should not be confused with liking or wanting 
something or considering something to be of value. The difference between these 
beliefs and attitudes and caring can be seen by examining their temporal 
characteristics. Caring can easily be distinguished from wanting, liking, or 
valuing something because “the outlook of a person who cares about something is 
inherently prospective.”161 Someone who wants, likes, and values something can 
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do so in a temporally discrete moment without considering whether she has a 
future. Moments of wanting, liking, and valuing, can occur as isolated or discrete 
moments whereas the moments in the life of someone who cares about something 
are bound together by a “continuing concern with what he does with himself and 
with what goes on his life.”162 Frankfurt adds, “[c]onsiderations of a similar kind 
indicate that a person can care about something only over some more or less 
extended period of time.”163 Thus care can neither be momentary nor 
instantaneous. Because cares guide our actions and lives, they are much more 
intimately connected to who we are and what goes on in our lives.  
 For this reason cares are more important to who we are than our decisions 
and choices. The making of a decision takes only a moment. If one decides to care 
about something, it does not follow that the person does in fact care about it. It 
only follows that the person has formed the intention to care about it. Whether the 
intention gets fulfilled is another matter.  Decisions indicate what an agent intends 
to be her will, but not what her will actually is. “If we consider that a person’s 
will is that by which he moves himself, then what he cares about is far more 
germane to the character of his will than the decisions or choices he makes.”164 
But cares are not more important than decisions only because the agent can 
change her mind after a moment, but because despite having decided on a certain 
course of action she may be unable to carry out her intention. She may not be able 
to bring herself to follow the course of action upon which she has decided.  
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The fact that someone cares about a certain thing is constituted by 
a complex set of cognitive, affective, and volitional dispositions 
and states. It may sometimes be possible for a person, by making a 
choice or decision, effectively to bring it about that he cares about 
a certain thing or that he cares about one thing more than another. 
But that depends upon conditions which do not always prevail. It 
certainly cannot be assumed that what a person cares about is 
generally under his immediate voluntary control.
165
 
We often see cases where what one cares about conflicts with what one intends. 
Whether it is the man who has decided to leave his wife, but cannot bring himself 
to leave, or the teenage mother who has decided it would be best to give up her 
newborn baby for adoption but cannot bring herself to do so.
166
 What each person 
cares about, and not only what one has decided would be best for her to do, tells 
us about the character of her will. It is possible then, that when an agent is guided 
by her cares she may act contrary to how she intends to act. Thus, we see that 
insofar as an agent is guided by what she cares about, it is possible that she acts 
unchosenly.
167
 Moreover, if one’s care-guided actions result in evil, to oneself or 
to others, then one has become a source of unchosen evil.   
 With this framework of cares in place, we can understand that unchosen 
evil can arise in two different ways. The first way is that one is guided by one’s 
cares and evil results as a contingent consequence of one’s actions. In such cases, 
the cares do not entail the performance of an evil act, rather evil occurs given the 
contingent circumstances. This kind of unchosen evil is depicted by the story of 
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Oedipus. He cared about avoiding parricide and incest, and he cared about taking 
responsibility for killing his father. Clearly, there is nothing essential about these 
cares that would entail any occurrences of evil. In fact, we would ordinarily 
consider such cares to be praiseworthy. And yet, evil occurred. Oedipus’s cares 
guided him in such a way that he committed parricide and incest. Take another 
example. Imagine a new mother who cares immensely for her new baby. It is her 
first and, as first-time parents are wont to do, she is excessively worried about 
every aspect of his eating and sleeping. Every cry the baby utters sends the 
mother into a near panic worried that the baby is in desperate need of something 
she is not providing. She knows that she does not need to worry so much and 
repeatedly tells herself as much. In other words, she holds the belief that there is 
nothing wrong with the baby. Yet, she cannot help herself. She cannot bring 
herself to stop worrying. The constant worrying creates a tense atmosphere that 
the baby senses. The baby’s eating and sleeping habits worsen because of the 
tension and the worry he senses. As his eating and sleeping become more 
irregular, the mother’s worry intensifies. And the cycle continues. Ordinarily, we 
praise a caring mother and would castigate a mother who is indifferent to her 
baby’s needs. Yet, in this case the mother’s cares bring about a negative situation. 
If we add to the story that the baby’s health deteriorates to the point of a life-
wrecking injury or death, then the mother would be a source of unchosen evil. Her 
ordinarily praiseworthy cares guided her such that she brought about evil without 
choosing to do so.   
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 The second way that one’s cares can guide actions that bring about 
unchosen evil is when certain cares necessarily, or at least ordinarily, have an evil 
upshot in the world. These are situations where one cares about harming others, or 
cares about acquiring something for oneself such that one is indifferent to the 
vulnerability of others. This kind of unchosen evil is depicted by Kurtz in Heart 
of Darkness. He cared about having absolute power and about visiting violence 
upon others. What is interesting about Kurtz’s situation is that he was unaware 
that these cares characterized his will until he was guided by them. His lack of 
awareness is what makes the story tragic. He realizes only after the violence and 
destruction had been done, that the source of the violence and destruction was his 
will. He discovers that he could not bring himself to treat the natives with 
kindness or respect. We can see that becoming aware that one actually cares about 
things that one believes are morally abhorrent, and that one has acted upon these 
cares despite holding the belief that such acts should be condemned, is a kind of 
tragedy.  Caring about attaining absolute power and being violent towards others 
are cares that either necessarily, or at least ordinarily,
168
 cause harm to others. 
Often this harm will be life-wrecking and, hence, evil. In such cases, one has not 
chosen to do evil. Before Kurtz journeyed to Africa he truly believed in the moral 
and cultural mores of Victorian England. Yet, he could not act upon his beliefs. 
He could not bring himself to act according to his beliefs, and instead acted under 
the guidance of his cares. By being motivated to act by what he cared about rather 
than what he believed, he became a source of unchosen evil.   
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 So far I have argued that unchosen evil is an undeniable feature of moral 
life, and on the basis of Frankfurt’s conception of cares I have shown that 
unchosen evil can come about due to how we are guided by what we care about. 
But Frankfurt is not alone in seeing how our cares are often more powerful 
motivators than our beliefs. In her essay “Alief and Belief” Tamar Szabό Gendler 
explains that beliefs are not alone in guiding our action. Alongside beliefs, we 
have “aliefs” which guide our actions often in ways contrary to how our beliefs 
might guide us. For example, when some people visit Hulapai Skywalk, the 70 
foot glass walkway extending outward from the rim of the Grand Canyon, they 
often cling to the side rail or to the security guard, not wanting to move to the 
center of the walkway or even to look down. But why else did they travel to the 
Grand Canyon, purchase the expensive ticket, take the shuttle to the entry point, 
and walk out onto the glass? They must have held the belief that it would be safe 
and enjoyable to do so. If they had even the slightest doubt about the safety of 
Skywalk, they would not have gone to the trouble to be there. And yet, once they 
walk out onto the glass, something else was going on alongside their belief that it 
was safe. They had the alief that it was not safe and that they should get off.   
 Gendler cites other examples provided by psychological studies. Test 
subjects were reluctant to drink a glass of juice in which a completely sterilized 
cockroach had been stirred, hesitant to wear a washed shirt that had been 
previously worn by someone they disliked, and disinclined to eat fudge that had 
been formed into the shape of dog feces. In each case, the test subjects believed 
that the juice was sterile, the shirt was clean, and the feces-shaped fudge had not 
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somehow changed its chemical composition.
169
 However, they also held the alief 
that the items should be avoided. Clearly, these examples show that there is 
something alongside the content of beliefs that motivates how we act.  
 But the content of the alief does not necessarily replace the content of the 
belief. If we had asked the visitors to the Skywalk if they thought the glass 
platform was safe even as they clung in fear to the side, they would have probably 
replied in the affirmative.  
In each of the cases presented above, it seems clear what the 
subject believes: that the walkway is safe, that the substance is 
edible or potable…Ask the subject directly and she will show no 
hesitation in endorsing such claims as true. Ask her to bet, and this 
is where she will place her money. Ask her to think about what her 
other beliefs imply and this is what she will conclude…. At the 
same time, the belief fails to be accompanied by certain belief-
appropriate behaviors and attitudes: something is awry.
170
 
Perhaps the belief has been temporarily forgotten. However, if the visitors to the 
Skywalk truly thought the walkway was unsafe, they would probably do more 
than simply hold the attendant in fear or only reluctantly move toward the center. 
They would probably scream in terror! Such behavior seems quite strange if we 
hold a belief-desire-intention type approach to understanding action. However this 
behavior is not so strange when we realize that there is something going on 
alongside the belief that motivates behavior; namely, what one cares about. In the 
case of the Hulapai Skywalk, one’s natural care to avoid danger is activated by 
                                                 
169
 Tamar Szabo Gendler, “Alief and Belief,” The Journal of Philosophy, Volume CV, no. 10 
(October 2008), 635-636. 
170
 Ibid., 638. 
  153 
the visual experience of looking beneath one’s feet and seeing only empty space. 
The person experiences an alief that runs counter to her explicitly held belief.  
This sort of phenomenon is not rare. Therefore, any theory of action that excludes 
the possibility of aliefs ignores a fundamental aspect of human behavior. Because 
our behavior can also have moral import, it is crucial to moral disillusion to 
understand that one is guided by more than one’s explicitly held beliefs. That is, 
not everything one does comes from a deliberate conclusion or even from a 
choice.  We are often guided by primitive desires or what we care about. Just 
because we hold the morally right belief, it does not follow that we will perform 
the morally right action. 
In “Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief 
Distinction” Uriah Kriegel argues that moral judgments come in two varieties, 
moral aliefs and moral beliefs. Only the former are inherently motivating. The 
belief that one ought to perform some act, and the desire to perform that same act, 
could each exist in each other’s absence. This modal separability shows that they 
do not make up a unitary mental state. To say that a belief is not inherently 
motivating is to say that there is no internal necessary connection between belief 
and motivation.  
 Kriegel shows that we have two complementary faculties.  Thought is both 
rationalist and associationist; not just one or the other. We use the associationist 
mechanism for the purpose of everyday life and revert to the rationalist rule-based 
mechanism when greater accuracy is required. The former allows us to think and 
react quickly to our environment. It is unconscious, inflexible, but fast, efficient 
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and directly tied to action. We employ the latter when we encounter conflicts that 
we have to reason out. It is explicitly conscious, flexible, but slow and inefficient. 
Just as there is a duality of processes in our thinking, so too is there a duality of 
products.  The associationist mechanism produces aliefs, whereas the rationalist 
mechanism produces beliefs. This dual process approach thus theorizes two ways 
in which we can explain our behavior. Some of our acts are motivated by what we 
alieve and some by what we believe.  
 This structure further explains the behavior of the agents in Gendler’s 
psychological examples. Kriegel states it thusly: “an alief is a mental state whose 
occurrence causally explains our behavior in cases where our behavior does not 
match our beliefs, but may be operative as well when our behavior does match 
our beliefs.”171 The question remains in what way this distinction plays in our 
moral judgment. 
 It is quite a familiar occurrence that a person’s honest moral proclamations 
are not mirrored by her moral practice. Kriegel refers to the psychological 
study
172
 that shows that many people who would never assent to a racist 
proposition like “Black men are more dangerous than white men,” nevertheless 
show traces of racist dispositions, a tendency registered in differential activation 
of the amygdala (associated with threat detection) in the presence of white and 
black faces. Although the moral belief is explicit and conscious, the behavior of 
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the subjects is explained by their aliefs. Aliefs are inherently action-guiding. This 
inherent motivational aspect is what constitutes an alief. Moral beliefs, on the 
other hand, are characterized by their conscious accessibility and their 
dissociation from ongoing action. They are only indirectly connected to action. 
Beliefs may lead to action and may shape aliefs over the long-term, but they are 
not constitutively motivational states as are aliefs.  
 When moral aliefs and moral beliefs diverge, as in the implicit racist 
mentioned above, we have an individual who has not aligned her aliefs and 
beliefs. Either there is a lack of goodness or a weakness of will. The implicit 
racist either does not want to align her aliefs and beliefs or is not volitionally 
strong enough to do so. Certainly, it is conceivable that when an agent realizes she 
ought to perform some action, but lacks the motivation to do so, this lack of 
motivation can be explained by her not caring enough.  
 This framework shows why holding morally good beliefs is not sufficient 
to make one morally good. The amoralist can reason to the conclusion that one 
ought to perform such and such an act, that is, can reason to the right thing to do, 
but completely lack the motivation to do the right thing. The amoralist’s moral 
beliefs are disconnected from her motivation, and probably from what she cares 
about. If by “practice” we mean how we behave, then moral beliefs are only one 
part of moral practice, and seemingly not the main part. Moral aliefs are more 
essential to moral practice than moral beliefs.  
 Moreover, the primacy of aliefs over beliefs in moral practice is reflected 
in our moral evaluation. We are usually quite bothered when the self-proclaimed 
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anti-racist shows racist tendencies in her behavior. In fact, we find her more 
blameworthy for her racist behavior than praiseworthy for her anti-racist beliefs. 
Conversely, we are often enamored with the self-proclaimed egoist whose actual 
behavior reflects a concern for others. Assuming these individuals truly hold the 
beliefs they say they do, our moral evaluation tracks how they behave, not what 
they believe.
173
 “When aliefs and beliefs diverge, the true moral character of a 
person is reflected more accurately in her aliefs.”174 The reason for this is that real 
moral commitments and cares are constitutively tied to the motivational states that 
govern behavior.  
 Because an agent can reflect upon her aliefs and beliefs, notice if her aliefs 
and beliefs diverge, and attempt to align her aliefs and beliefs, she can be held 
morally responsible for what she alieves. She can either endorse or attempt to 
alter the aliefs she recognizes. Moral agents do not exist in a discrete isolated 
moment. They have a history; one in which they have the capacity to reflect upon 
their behavior and alter it in future instances if it strikes them as inappropriate. 
This capacity gives us guidance control over our behavior even if that behavior 
emanates from aliefs or cares. Having guidance control over what one alieves 
means that we can be held morally responsible for what one alieves. In chapter 6, 
I investigate more fully the importance of reflecting upon what we alief and what 
we care about. 
 One reason that aliefs are inherently motivational might be that they can 
be produced by what the agent cares about, and cares are inherently motivational. 
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Because the agent cares about x, she alieves y. It is not the case that because she 
believes x, she alieves y. The test subjects do not believe, but alieve, that the juice 
is contaminated because they care about staying healthy. The visitors to the 
Skywalk do not believe but alieve, that they are going to die because they care 
about survival. Aliefs do not respond to truth in the way that beliefs do. One can 
alieve in a certain way despite believing some truth that eliminates any reason for 
holding the alief. We should not, however, conclude that aliefs and beliefs are 
essentially opposed. It happens quite often that what one alieves overlaps with 
what one believes. However, when they are distinct, as in the above examples, the 
alief tends to motivate behavior despite holding a conflicting belief. One reason 
that aliefs are such powerful motivators of action might be that they are generated 
by what the agent cares about.  
 In this section I have relied on Frankfurt’s account of the importance of 
what we care about to explain that cares might bring about aliefs and unchosen 
evil. Aliefs are not irrational, but may be arational. They do not always conflict 
with explicitly held beliefs, but they sometimes do. And when they do, they often 
guide our actions despite our holding a conflicting belief.  When aliefs and cares 
motivate in ways that bring about evil, then the agent is a source of unchosen evil. 
Although the agent does not explicitly choose to act in the way she does, she 
cannot bring herself to do otherwise. In the next section I explain that despite the 
absence of a choice, one can still be held morally responsible for what one does. 
Moreover, acknowledging that one can bring about evil without choosing to do 
so, and yet still be morally responsible, comprises this phase of moral disillusion.  
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5. Moral Responsibility for Unchosen Evil 
 In the previous two sections I explained both that unchosen evil is an 
undeniable feature of moral life, and also that unchosen evil can come about due 
to the way in which our cares move us to act. In this section, I argue that the agent 
who acts unchosenly may be held morally responsible for her actions. To do so, I 
go back to Fischer and Ravizza’s explanation of guidance control. Their 
description of this kind of control clarifies two important elements of my 
argument. First, it lends a structural explanation to the way in which our cares 
guide us. Second, it demonstrates how an agent can be held morally responsible 
while acting under guidance control. Merging Frankfurt’s conception of cares 
with Fischer and Ravizza’s analysis of guidance control will justify how an agent 
of unchosen evil may be held morally responsible.  
Frankfurt attacks the Principle of Alternate Possibilities in “Alternate 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” In his example, Jones shoots Smith while 
Black stands waiting to interfere and ensure that Jones decides or wills to shoot 
Smith should Jones decide not to shoot Smith. Because Black is a counterfactual 
intervener, Jones lacks an alternate possibility to shooting Smith. Yet, he shoots 
Smith without any coercion or intervention by Black, and we hold him morally 
responsible for it.  The example illustrates that an agent may be held morally 
responsible even if she lacks any alternate possibilities. We hold an agent morally 
responsible for her actions, not based upon the availability to choose among 
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various possibilities, but based upon the quality of her will at the time she 
performs her action.
175
  
For Frankfurt, moral responsibility is essentially a time-slice notion.
176
 It 
must be, he claims, because “[u]nderstanding what a person is, either as an entity 
of a certain generic type or as an individual, differs from understanding how he 
came to be that way.”177 Thus, one of the themes that connects the various essays 
collected in The Importance of What We Care About is that inquiry into who we 
are, rather than what has produced us, is the more philosophically interesting 
enterprise. Concentrating on a causal history of an agent rather than on the present 
structural features of the person’s will cannot reveal what is essential to that 
person qua person.  
 In “The Problem of Action” Frankfurt explicitly attacks the causal 
approach to understanding the nature of action. The problem with appealing to 
causal histories, both to explain action and also to explain the difference between 
actions and mere happenings, is that casual theories suppose that actions and mere 
happenings differ only in their histories and not in themselves. Such an 
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explanation is implausible since it directs attention away from the events at issue 
and from the times in which they occur. These theories tell us nothing about the 
agent since they look only to prior causal events. It is no wonder, according to 
Frankfurt, that such theories frequently run up against counterexamples.  
 To find out about the agent, whether our focus is understanding the nature 
of action, moral responsibility, or personhood, we must take a time-slice 
approach. This approach is necessary given the nature of what it is to be a person. 
A person’s identity is constituted by her second-order volitions which are 
motivated by her cares. Those desires that a person wants to have and wants to be 
effective are those which comprise her will and her identity, and which move her 
act. Thus what is important is not how a person came to perform an action, but 
whether this action is presently under her guidance. Guidance does not require the 
ability to do otherwise as we saw in the case of Jones, Smith, and Black. Rather, 
there are two ways we can understand guidance. In Frankfurt’s terms, as 
discussed in the previous section, we are guided when we have second-order 
volitions that certain desires and cares are effective in our action. In Fischer and 
Ravizza’s terms, we have guidance control when we are moderate reasons-
responsive. I now briefly repeat the argument I made in chapter 1 for why having 
guidance control, rather than choice among alternative possibilities, is necessary 
for ascribing moral responsibility to an agent.  
 In chapter 1, I unpacked the notion of guidance and how it relates to moral 
responsibility, but I will briefly repeat the argument. Inspired by Frankfurt-style 
cases, Fischer and Ravizza distinguish two different kinds of control, only one of 
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which is necessary for moral responsibility. Regulative control is the kind of 
control where the agent has alternative possibilities. But what is important for 
ascriptions of moral responsibility is not what the agent could do, but what she 
actually does. Therefore, we examine the actual scenario rather than looking to 
the presence of alternative scenarios. 
  The absence of regulative control does not entail that a morally 
responsible agent does not have any control over what she does. Although she 
may not have regulative control, i.e. alternative possibilities, she must have 
guidance control. “Guidance control of an action involves an agent’s freely 
performing that action.”178 In a situation where an agent has guidance control, she 
freely does whatever she does. It does not matter whether she could have freely 
done something in an alternative sequence. One way to think of regulative control 
is as a dual guidance control. In these situations the agent has guidance control in 
both the actual sequence and the alternative one. But this kind of control is 
unnecessary for holding an agent morally responsible. Recall Fischer and 
Ravizza’s example of Sally, who while driving a car, turns the car to the right. 
This car is a driver instruction automobile with dual controls for the driver 
instructor. If Sally had not turned or guided the car to the right, the instructor was 
ready to engage his controls to ensure the car turned to the right. Sally does not 
have regulative control because she could not have done otherwise than turn the 
car to the right. However, she does exercise guidance control. She freely turned 
the car to the right.  This unusual case points out something significant regarding 
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action and control. One can have a certain sort of control without having the sort 
of control that involves alternative possibilities.  
 Having guidance control means being moderate reasons-responsive. 
Recall that an agent is moderate reasons-responsive when her action-issuing 
mechanism is reasons-receptive in a strong way and at least reasons-reactive in a 
weak way. The agent must be able to respond in a regular fashion to reasons so 
that her responses and actions create a pattern or seem logical. The mechanism is 
reactive in weak way when it can react to a sufficient reason to do otherwise. It 
need not actually react to a sufficient reason, but if there is a possible world where 
it does, then it is weak reasons-reactive. It follows then that an agent need not 
have alternative possibilities available to her. There must only be some possible 
world where her action-issuing mechanism reacts to a sufficient reason to do 
otherwise. When an agent is able to recognize a sufficient reason to do otherwise, 
and there is some possible world where she acts otherwise based on this sufficient 
reason, then the agent has guidance control over her actions and can be held 
morally responsible for them.  
 What both the Frankfurt-style cases and Fischer and Ravizza point out is 
that the traditional association of moral responsibility with control is correct. But 
the relevant sort of control does not involve alternative possibilities. The sort of 
control associated with moral responsibility is guidance control. When an agent is 
guided by her cares, she exhibits guidance control even if she could not have 
volitionally brought herself to do otherwise. Therefore, the agent is morally 
responsible for her actions even when she does not choose to be guided by her 
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cares from among various alternative possibilities. One can still be moderate 
reasons-responsive even when being guided by what one cares about.  As I stated 
above, what one cares about helps constitutes one’s will. Hence, when one is 
guided by one’s cares, one acts according to one’s will. That is, one acts as one 
really wants to act even if it is unchosen. Therefore, an agent can be held morally 
responsible for acts of unchosen evil.  
 For these reasons, one can also be held morally responsible even when 
acting under volitional necessity. There are occasions when a person realizes that 
what she cares about matters to her not merely so much, but in such a way, that it 
is impossible for her to pursue or to refrain from a certain course of action. These 
cares motivate second-order volitions in the agent and sometimes exhibit a 
peculiar kind of necessity “in virtue of which his caring is not altogether under his 
own control.”179 Frankfurt names these two kinds of necessity volitional necessity 
and its counterpart unthinkability. In a case of volitional necessity, a person can 
do no other than A; she is unable to refrain from doing A. Conversely, in a case of 
unthinkability a person cannot do A; she is unable to perform A. In this latter case, 
she cannot do A because doing A is unthinkable for her. Unthinkability, like 
volitional necessity, is a mode of necessity which sets the limits of a person’s will 
and thereby shapes the boundaries of her volitional identity. Because the elements 
which determine both volitional necessity and unthinkability are outside a 
person’s direct control, they constitute the stable volitional nature of the person. 
These situations differ from those in which a person feels an external compulsion 
                                                 
179
 Frankfurt, 86. 
  164 
too powerful to resist. It is not that the person lacks the power to refrain from 
acting in a particular way. Rather, volitional necessity is such that the person 
lacks the will to act in a particular way. 
 Volitional necessity prevents the person from organizing her will in the 
appropriate way to will other than she does. Of course the person has the physical 
capacity to act otherwise, but she cannot bring herself to do so. “Not only does he 
care about following the particular course of action which he is constrained to 
follow. He also cares about caring about it.”180 She guides herself away from 
being affected by anything that might dissuade her from following the course of 
action or from caring as much as she does about following it. She cannot bring 
herself to do otherwise because she does not want to. The necessity is generated 
when someone requires herself to avoid being guided in what she does by any 
forces other than those by which she most deeply wants to be guided.  Despite the 
force of the necessity, the agent is still moderate reasons-responsive, that is, still 
exhibits guidance control and wills as she wants to will, and is therefore morally 
responsible for her actions.
181
  
6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued that unchosen evil is an undeniable feature of 
moral life. Malicious individuals are not the only agents who bring about evil. I 
have also shown how our cares guide our actions, and that they often do so 
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without our making any choice. It follows then that our cares may guide us to 
bring about unchosen evil. Finally, I have shown how merging Frankfurt’s 
conception of cares with the notion of guidance control explains that we can still 
be held morally responsible for acts we do not necessarily choose to perform. It 
follows then that we can be held morally responsible for bringing about unchosen 
evil. I have brought these elements together to claim that when one acknowledges 
these fundamental elements of moral life, one has shattered certain moral 
illusions. One has cast aside the naïve hope in a cosmic reckoning based on moral 
worth, and in the possibility of moral purity. More importantly, one understands 
that responsibility can be attributed, not only to actions one chooses to do, but for 
the evil one does unchosenly. In order to take responsibility for, and potentially 
minimize, evil in the world it is important that one recognizes how one can be a 
non-malicious unintentional agent of evil. That is, given this understanding one 
can ask questions about the adequacy of moral principles and directives, take 
responsibility for the evil one brings about, and attempt to minimize said evil.
182
  
 One might wonder if the agent must experience unchosen evil in the same 
way that the innocent must confront wrongdoing experientially rather than merely 
conceptually. Recall that in chapter 2 I explained that the moral imagination and 
the exercise of hypothetical thinking are involved in these more complex phases 
of moral disillusion. One can shatter illusions by imagining what it would be like 
for her cares to bring about evil even if she has never experienced it firsthand. 
One can understand that one can be an unchosen source of evil even if one has 
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somehow avoided bringing about unchosen evil. Therefore, although the first 
phase of moral disillusion requires an acquaintance with wrongdoing, these more 
complex phases can be experienced through the exercise of the moral imagination 
and hypothetical thinking. One sees that unchosen evil is an undeniable feature of 
moral life and that one can be morally responsible for it.   
As I mentioned throughout this chapter, understanding that one is a source 
of unchosen evil is often tragic. One realizes that one’s cares can visit evil on 
others and upon oneself. Understanding moral tragedy comprises the second part 
of this more complex phase of moral disillusion. In the next chapter, I turn to 
examine the nature of moral tragedy in more detail.  
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CHAPTER 6 
MORAL TRAGEDY 
1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I discussed unchosen evil. I argued both that it is 
an undeniable feature of moral life and also that awareness of oneself as a 
potential source of unchosen evil is an essential component of moral disillusion. 
The unchosen evil one brings about is often tragic. It is tragic precisely because 
one has brought it about without choosing to do so. Moral tragedy is a corollary to 
unchosen evil. That is, one aspect of this disillusion is understanding that one can 
bring about unchosen evil. Another aspect of it is to understand the tragic nature 
both of the evil one causes and the realization that one can bring it about 
unchosenly.  Understanding that moral tragedy is an undeniable feature of moral 
life helps comprise another moral disillusion. To deny that moral tragedy can 
arise is to deny a feature of moral life. I will show in this chapter that it is to deny 
one’s moral responsibilities to other persons. In order to come to this conclusion I 
investigate the nature of tragedy. First, I examine Aristotle’s conception of 
tragedy, but find it unsatisfactory because it cannot account for an agent 
knowingly bringing the tragedy about. Then, I rely on W.H. Auden’s distinction 
between the Greek tragedy of necessity and the Elizabethan tragedy of possibility 
to set the stage for Alasdair’s argument that the contemporary emphasis on the 
right over the good has tragically alienated us from the good life. I find 
MacIntyre’s arguments problematic and thus unable to explain how we should 
understand moral tragedy. Finally, I turn to Gowans’s theory of inescapable moral 
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wrongdoing and his account of “responsibility to persons” to explain how moral 
tragedy arises. Gowans argues that it can be tragic when one does something 
wrong even when performing the morally best action.  I argue that one shatters a 
moral illusion by recognizing the possibility of moral tragedy and that it can be 
brought about by one’s own agency.  
2. Kinds of Tragedy 
 For Aristotle the goal of tragedy as literature is to arouse pity and fear in 
the audience. The audience members should pity the character and fear that the 
same events could happen to each of them. The manner by which audience 
members feel pity and fear is by virtue of the story representing a universal 
possibility. That is, what happens to the characters in a tragedy could happen to 
anyone. Accordingly, the plot should portray a situation that is possible for each 
of us to imagine ourselves in.  
From what we have said it will be seen that the poet’s function is 
to describe, not the things that has happened, but a kind of thing 
that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or 
necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the 
one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of 
Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it 
consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has 
been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is 
something more philosophic and of graver import than history, 
since its statements are of the nature rather of universals…. By a 
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universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of 
man will probably or necessarily say or do…183 
Tragedies make universal statements about human life. As such they make 
statements about situations that we all may find ourselves in. Where history 
reports how a singular individual acted, tragedy exposes us to universal situations 
that may befall any of us.  
 Pity and fear are most effectively aroused by a reversal of fortune. The 
reversal of fortune often accompanies a discovery that moves the character out of 
a state of ignorance into one of knowledge.  This reversal comes about either due 
to some character flaw or to fortune, but not because of depravity.  
…pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of 
one like ourselves…. [T]he change in the subject’s fortunes must 
be not from bad fortune to good, but on the contrary from good to 
bad; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some 
great fault on his part…184 
The reason that pity and fear may be aroused in the audience members is that 
there is nothing idiosyncratic about the tragic figures. Furthermore, the character 
flaw that brings about the tragedy is not malice or depravity. As we saw with 
Oedipus it was his desire to avoid parricide and incest, accompanied by an 
ordinary amount of assertiveness and pride (pride being a virtue for Aristotle, but 
not for later Christians) that gave rise to his reversal of fortune. Oedipus and other 
tragic figures do not bring about their tragic downfall by willingly doing evil. The 
reason for this is that willingly doing evil is impossible for Aristotle. If such a 
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situation were portrayed in tragedies, there could be no arousal of pity and fear 
because no one could relate to such an impossibility. The plot of the tragedy must 
be a universal situation. As with Oedipus, it is ignorance and misfortune 
accompanied by common character flaws that give rise to tragedy.  
 Although Aristotle offers us considerable insight into the nature of 
tragedy, he misses that tragedy may arise due to acts one performs willingly. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, although one may perform an action 
unchosenly, she may still perform it willingly. Moreover, as I discussed in chapter 
3, there are various roots of evil including performing an evil act intentionally. In 
section 4 of this chapter I will argue that we often give rise to tragedy by willingly 
fulfilling one responsibility at the expense of another. Finally, Aristotle’s 
conception of tragedy is unsatisfying because it allows for the universe to be a 
player rather than simply a venue. One of the lessons we learn from King Lear is 
that the universe is indifferent to human agency.  
 King Lear has a different manner of portraying the tragic situation or 
tragic character. W.H. Auden notes that what characterizes the Elizabethan 
tragedies are failed opportunities to make a choice or choices that would avert the 
tragedy. This emphasis on choice is very different from the tragedy of necessity 
that characterizes Greek tragedy. In the Greek tragedies, the characters cannot 
avoid their fate no matter what they do. In Elizabethan tragedies the character can 
always avert the tragedy, but never seizes the opportunity to do so. 
In a Greek tragedy everything that could have been otherwise has 
already happened before the play begins. It is true that sometimes 
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the chorus may warn the hero against a course of action, but it is 
unthinkable that he should listen to them, for a Greek hero is what 
he is and cannot change…. But in an Elizabethan tragedy, in 
Othello for example, there is no point before he actually murders 
Desdemona when it would have been impossible for him to control 
his jealousy, discover the truth, and convert the tragedy into a 
comedy.
185
 
We can think of these two kinds of tragedy as tragedy of necessity and tragedy of 
possibility. In Greek tragedy, the characters cannot avoid the tragedy no matter 
what they do. In Elizabethan tragedy the characters have opportunities to avert the 
tragic conclusion. The tragic conclusion is not inevitable because they are 
avoidable up to a certain point. The tragedy lies in lost opportunity, rather than in 
necessity.  
 We see this distinction in Oedipus the King and King Lear. Oedipus tried 
to avoid the prophesied events, but everything he did actually brought about the 
very state of affairs he sought to avoid. His was a tragedy of necessity. One of the 
reasons we pity Oedipus is because he could not avoid his fate. Lear, on the other 
hand, has to make choices throughout the play and always has the opportunity to 
make the choice that will lead him away from a tragic end. He could always make 
a better choice, but seals his own fate. We pity Lear because he could have 
avoided tragedy if only he had made better choices. Although the good-making 
aspects of life were under his control, we learn from the story that the world is 
indifferent to moral worth.  
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 The Greek tragedies arise out of an emphasis on character whereas the 
Elizabethan tragedies focus on choice. These emphases are reflected in the 
philosophies of the times as well. Aristotle defines virtue and vice through an 
examination of character, and Christian and Enlightenment philosophers make 
choice the foundation of morality, forgiveness, and redemption. These two views 
are not inconsistent, but have different emphases. Under “character-morality” our 
choices are formed by our characters. Under “choice-morality” our choices form 
our character. The question is whether character or choice should be the 
foundation of morality.
186
  I will not debate the merits of choice and character 
morality here. What is significant for the present discussion is to see that there are 
different ways of understanding tragedy. The question remains how we should 
understand moral tragedy.  
 One way to understand the difference between the emphases of Greek and 
Elizabethan or Christian tragedy is due to a shift from an emphasis on the good to 
an emphasis on the right and rights. After Hobbes we see philosophers discussing 
right and rights more than the good.  Alasdair MacIntyre argues that this shift in 
focus has brought about a tragic situation. By subsuming the good to the right, we 
have fragmented our system of moral values and reduced moral life to the 
following of rules. Individuals in contemporary society are consequently alienated 
from the good life. This alienation is a kind of tragedy. I examine MacIntyre’s 
approach to tragedy, but find it problematic. I then turn to an account of moral 
tragedy that arises from conflicting responsibilities to other persons.  
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3. MacIntyre and the Good Life 
 In After Virtue MacIntyre argues that individuals in contemporary society 
can no longer cultivate the Aristotelian virtues due to the existence of shallow 
practices that provide no way of unifying life. Without a return to the kind of 
connectedness between life and practices that characterized ancient and medieval 
village life, we are doomed to live episodically and alienated from the good life. 
The inability to achieve the good life is a kind of tragedy. To understand how he 
arrives at this conclusion I turn to his analysis of virtue through an examination of 
practices. 
 In order to motivate his inquiry into virtues, MacIntyre explains why such 
an endeavor is required. He notes that philosophers engaged in debates 
concerning what is “good,” “permissible,” “obligatory,” etc. assume that there is a 
well-demarcated subject matter for investigation. However, they fail to notice that 
such terms have significance only within specific historical contexts. How these 
terms are applied in specific societies depends on the cosmological background 
and historical context of the specific society. Therefore, to uncover what moral 
concepts mean one must look to the cosmology and history of the relevant 
society. When these concepts are extrapolated from their context, they lose their 
authority.
187
 Only history can tell us why certain normative rules were in good 
order and then fell into disorder. It follows that MacIntyre’s intellectual history is 
crucial to the success of his philosophical argument. Later in this section I will 
                                                 
187
 See also, G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958). She 
makes a similar argument attacking deontologists for using the word “ought” out of its theological 
contexts. She claims “ought” loses its meaning when ripped out of its original context.   
  174 
focus on some of the misleading comments he makes about the history of the 
Enlightenment, which will in turn cast doubt upon his philosophical conclusions. 
But first, his argument.  
 MacIntyre claims that Nietzsche was the first philosopher to point out that 
we do not know the history, and hence the meaning, of our moral concepts. He 
showed us that appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will. 
Thus, the endeavors of Enlightenment thinkers to ground a rational morality in a 
rational human nature were doomed to fail. Staying true to his prescription to 
appeal to historical context for clarification, MacIntyre points out that the 
Enlightenment project, which Nietzsche eventually pulls the rug out from under, 
was only made possible by the rejection of the Aristotelian moral system. It was 
only because they rejected the Aristotelian and Scholastic moral tradition that 
Enlightenment thinkers needed to discover new rationalist foundations for 
morality. The failure of the Enlightenment project, foreseen by Nietzsche, has 
brought about a chaos of moral values in contemporary society.  Robert Wokler 
describes MacIntyre’s position the following way: 
That project was in his view centrally concerned with providing 
universal standards by which to justify particular courses of action 
in every sphere of life, and although Enlightenment thinkers 
manifestly did not agree as to exactly which principles might be 
acceptable to rational persons, he claims they nevertheless 
collectively propagated the doctrine that such principles must 
exist…. Many post-Enlightenment philosophers have continued to 
pursue that aim, but in the absence of any prevalent framework of 
values within which moral judgments could be agreed, they have 
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only shown, according to MacIntyre, that this ideal cannot be 
attained…. Without already settled moral beliefs, we have come to 
identify our principles only in terms of abstract notions of the self 
and individual choice, freed from the contingencies of social roles 
or historical tradition.
188
 
In such a society where individualism is deified, each may formulate her own set 
of values. We are lost in an alienated society without a cohesive set of values 
resulting in the fragmentation of the self. But Nietzsche’s criticisms are directed 
only at the moral systems of the Enlightenment philosophers, not at what came 
before. Therefore, if the Aristotelian moral system can be resurrected and 
sustained, then Nietzsche’s criticism of morality can be rejected. Hence, the key 
question becomes whether Aristotle’s ethics be vindicated.  
 MacIntyre begins to address this key question by examining the nature of 
virtues. The core of any account of virtue is practices.   
He defines a practice as 
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
derivative of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended.
189
 
Internal goods are those goods which can only be acquired by participating in and 
excelling at a certain practice. They can only be identified and recognized by 
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engaging in the practice in question. The standards of excellence by which we 
judge excellent or poor performance in a practice develop historically via 
participation in the practice and are raised when performers in a practice excel. 
For example, by playing football one cultivates those skills peculiar to excelling 
in football. Those engaged in this practice judge the participant’s performance 
based on the rules of football which have developed over time as the sport has 
been played. We also judge the player’s performance based on how well she 
executes the skills (i.e. internal goods) necessary to, and peculiar to, being 
successful in the sport. As the sport (i.e. practice) develops over time, so too do 
the standards of excellence.  
 The good related to a practice can be both internal and external to the 
practice. The former can be acquired only through the specific practice in which 
they inhere. One acquires them by excelling at the particular practice. External 
goods are contingent to a given practice and can be acquired through many 
different practices. Wealth, power, and fame are obvious examples. One might 
acquire wealth and fame by excelling at playing football, but they do not allow 
one to excel at playing football nor do they belong essentially to the practice. 
They are goods of competition not goods we cultivate in order to excel in a 
specific practice. 
 With this conceptual framework in place MacIntyre explains the nature of 
virtues. A virtue is a quality which allows us to achieve those goods internal to 
practices.  
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A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are 
internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us 
from achieving any such goods.
190
 
There are three virtues necessary for any practice with internal goods and 
standards of excellence: justice, courage, and honesty. This means that regardless 
of the practice in question the participant needs these virtues to excel at the 
practice. Although different cultures define truthfulness, courage, and justice 
differently, they all define them in some way. MacIntyre concludes from this 
observation that these three virtues are goods without which practices cannot be 
sustained.  
 One might think that there cannot be evil practices if practices require 
virtues. But MacIntyre claims that we do not have to condone everything that 
flows from a virtue. It is possible that evil may be brought about by virtues. 
I do have to allow that courage sometimes sustains injustice, that 
loyalty has been known to strengthen a murderous aggressor and 
that generosity has sometimes weakened the capacity to do 
good.
191
  
 I interpret this position as claiming that when we think, for example, of those 
Nazis who exhibited qualities such as efficiency or dedication to overcome 
obstacles to their goals we might say that although they cultivated the virtues, 
they misused them, or used them in the wrong practice. But to make this claim 
directly opposes how Aristotle defined virtue. For Aristotle, a Nazi cannot be 
courageous because the trait is not cultivated in the right place, time, or manner.  
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For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and 
pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much 
and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both 
intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence. 
Similarly with regard to actions…192 
According to Aristotle there can be no courageous thief or heroic Nazi.
193
 
Although a certain characteristic might appear like a virtue, if it is not with 
reference to the right objects, people aim, or way, then it is not a virtue. There is a 
simple reason for this. If we allowed the Nazi to have courage, then it would 
follow either that courage is not that important a virtue, or not a virtue at all. Part 
of the problem for MacIntyre is that he relativizes virtue to practices. This move 
forces him to conclude that all practices have virtues even if they are not moral 
virtues. Like Aristotle, MacIntyre wants to equate the development of excellence 
through a cultivation of internal goods with the general concept of virtue. Unlike 
Aristotle though, it follows from his argument that one can cultivate virtues even 
when engaged in evil practices.  
 Nevertheless, MacIntyre’s biggest worry is that contemporary society has 
fragmented our system of moral value such that we live an episodic life ununified 
by virtue. He considers the way in which virtues provide a unity to life. He 
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observes that one of the reasons that attention to virtue has fallen out of favor in 
recent times is that contemporary philosophers think atomistically about human 
action.  
That particular actions derive their character as parts of larger 
wholes is a point of view alien to our dominant ways of thinking 
and yet one which it is necessary to consider if we are to begin to 
understand how a life may be more than a sequence of individual 
actions and episodes.
194
 
We do not usually think about how individual actions derive their character as 
parts of larger wholes. Yet it is necessary to think this way in order to understand 
how life is more than just a sequence of individual actions. Furthermore, the unity 
of human life becomes invisible to us when we make sharp distinctions between 
the individual and the roles she plays, so that life appears as unconnected 
episodes. The self so conceived cannot be the bearer of Aristotelian virtues 
because a self so disconnected loses the social relationships necessary for the 
Aristotelian virtues to function. Not only are virtues acquired and developed 
through social situations, but they also can only be acquired and developed 
throughout one’s life and not in a single isolated action. A virtue is not a 
disposition that engenders success only in one kind of situation. Someone who 
possesses a virtue can be expected to manifest it in different types of situations. 
Therefore, the acquisition and development of the virtues requires a unified life.  
 MacIntyre argues that possessing virtues provides unity to a life. Because 
one possesses particular virtues in different situations, these virtues connect the 
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situations and unify them in the life of the possessor. However, I also understand 
his argument as claiming that the virtues cannot be acquired by an episodic self 
because an episodic self does not have the social relationships or engage in the 
social practices necessary for virtue. Hence a unity of self must be in place for the 
virtues to be acquired at all. For the self to have unity, the individual must 
compose a narratable life.   
To be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s 
death is…to be open to being asked to give a certain kind of 
account of what one did or what happened to one or what one 
witnessed at any earlier point in one’s life than the time at which 
the question is posed….Thus personal identity is just that identity 
presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity of a 
narrative requires.
195
  
The unity of life consists in the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. The 
good life for the individual is how the individual might best live out that unity. 
One can best live out this unity by embarking on a narrative quest. The quest is 
for the good that will enable us to order other goods and understand the integrity 
of life.  
Virtues then are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only 
sustain practices and enable us to achieve goods internal to practices, but also 
which will sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good. They allow us to 
seek the good for ourselves as well as communally or politically. The good life is 
the life spent seeking the good life for persons, and the virtues necessary for the 
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seeking are those which enable us to understand what the good life is. Thus the 
virtues are situated not only in relation to practices but in relation to the good life. 
 Once he has established that cultivation of the virtues through practices is 
necessary for attainment of the good life, MacIntyre explains why virtues have 
been disappearing from contemporary life. There are a variety of virtue concepts 
functioning in a variety of ways. But there is a lack of consensus concerning the 
place of virtue relative to other moral concepts and to which dispositions are to be 
included among the virtues. The ancients understood not only games but also 
family and politics as practices with internal goods. The modern conception of 
family and politics does not. Furthermore, labor has shifted from outside the 
household and has led to an alienation and a move away from practices with 
internal goods. The internal goods of working have been transformed into the 
external good of payment. Practices have been moved to the margins of social and 
cultural life. The notion of engagement in a practice is no longer socially central. 
The aesthete has become a central figure of modern society and the narrative 
understanding of the unity of life has been marginalized. The virtues have been as 
a result transformed.  They have been deprived of their conceptual background.  
 For these reasons, MacIntyre believes, the Aristotelian notion of virtue has 
fallen out of favor and a rationalist account of duty and moral obligation has 
gained prominence. One no longer finds value in practices; morality is now seen 
primarily as rule following rather than as the acquisition of virtues necessary for 
the good life. The focus is on what is right and not what is good. The individual is 
extracted from his context and reduced to an atomistic rule follower. He says that 
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the reason for this attention to rules was based on problems posed by 
philosophical egoism. A person came to be seen as someone who would do 
whatever was in his own interest unless constrained. Obedience to rules became 
the only remedy to the unruly passions, which were seen as dominating a person’s 
existence. This outlook has led us to become alienated from the practices that will 
lead to a good life. This alienation is tragic.  
Although MacIntyre does not explicitly couch his argument in terms of 
tragedy, it certainly is a kind of tragedy that we are alienated from pursuit of the 
good life. If he is correct that we are disconnected from those practices and 
virtues necessary to attain a good life, this would indeed be a tragic situation. I 
like MacIntyre’s account for pointing out that not all virtue comes out of reason. 
Virtue comes out of what we do. He makes a compelling case for thinking about 
morality, not only in terms of rational principles, but in terms of behavior. 
Thinking of morality in this way supports my claims in chapter 4 that one can be 
morally responsible for acting according to one’s cares or aliefs even if one holds 
a rational belief to the contrary. But there are a few objections to his account: one 
that is historical and two that are philosophical. Because MacIntyre’s 
interpretation of history provides the foundation for his philosophical claims, the 
objection from history is just as damaging to his argument as are the philosophical 
objections.  
MacIntyre argues that the emphasis on individualism in the Enlightenment 
project led to a fracturing of values. But it is doubtful that the notion of 
individualism arose as he describes it. It is unlikely that a few Enlightenment 
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philosophers attempting to counter philosophical egoism were responsible for the 
development in society of the notion of individualism. One might even doubt 
whether there was any unified project that can be assigned to the Enlightenment. 
It may be thought that the diversity of thinkers linked with that 
whole assemblage is too great, or the tensions between them too 
profound, to allow any ascription of a generic identity or common 
purpose to them, and eighteenth-century scholars who have failed 
to uncover any such “project” or “movement” or even “the 
Enlightenment” after a lifetime’s research devoted to the subject 
could be forgiven their exasperation when confronted by so great a 
leap and quick fix.
196
 
 But even if we grant that there was indeed an Enlightenment project, there are 
two historical events that preceded it that support the notion that the 
Enlightenment took off because the principle of individualism already existed, 
rather than because it invented the principle. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council 
was called by Pope Innocent III. Canon 21 requires that all Christians confess his 
or her sins at least once a year to his or her parish priest. Previously, only the 
nobility were expected to participate in confession. Although this canon only 
reaffirmed prior legislation requiring confession from all Christians, it is only 
after this Council that the policy is taken seriously and implemented. It reflects a 
growing realization in European society that each individual person was 
important.
197
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The second event that helped bring out the notion of individualism was the 
Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther introduced the concept of the priesthood of 
all believers. Each person was to have a direct relationship with God. This idea 
also helps influence the Enlightenment thinkers who place such high value on 
individuality. It is odd that although he places such great importance on 
understanding the historical context of systems of moral value, MacIntyre seems 
to think that Enlightenment thinkers invented the principle of individualism ex 
nihilo. These historical objections cast doubt on MacIntyre’s argument from 
history that we are presently in a tragic situation due to the failure of the 
Enlightenment.  
The first philosophical objection relies on exposing a false dichotomy that 
MacIntyre sets up between virtue ethics and the Enlightenment system of 
morality. MacIntyre is wrong that the Enlightenment emphasis on reason and 
obligation precludes the pursuit of virtue and the development of character. In 
fact, virtue plays an important role in Kant’s moral philosophy.  
In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant argues that virtue and the moral law are 
intimately related. He explains the difference between acts and ends as they relate 
to obligation and virtue. One can be coerced to perform an action but not to set an 
end. Duties prescribed by external law can only consist in actions. Only internal 
and ethical lawgiving can prescribe as duties the adoption of ends. Virtue brings 
inner freedom because compliance with the system of laws comprising it brings 
one’s capacity for free choice in accord with one’s will. Only a virtuous 
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disposition can lead one to adopt ends on the basis of their being duties, and 
fulfillment of duties of virtue strengthens one’s virtuous disposition.  
Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but 
unjust opponent is fortitude (fortitudo) and, with respect to what 
opposes the moral disposition within us, virtue (virtus, fortitudo 
moralis). So the part of the general doctrine of duties that brings 
inner, rather than outer, freedom under laws is a doctrine of virtue. 
The doctrine of right dealt only with the formal condition of outer 
freedom (the consistency of outer freedom with itself if its maxim 
were made universal law) that is, with right. But ethics goes 
beyond this and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an 
end of pure reason…an end that…it is a duty to have.198 
Virtue is the strength of will in overcoming obstacles (vices) that we put in the 
way of our moral maxims. Pure practical reason is thus a capacity for ends.  It 
could not determine maxims for actions if it were indifferent to ends. Ethics does 
not give laws for action. Jus does that and it is the subject of the Doctrine of 
Right. Ethics gives maxims for actions. Laws that can only be given by one’s own 
will prescribe not actions, but maxims of adopting objective ends. 
Virtue plays the important role that one must be the master of one’s own passions. 
It allows one to follow the ends of pure practical reason. Although Kant clearly 
explains virtue in terms of rule following, duty, and moral obligation, it is not 
correct to conclude, as MacIntyre does, that virtue is necessarily excluded by rule-
following ethics. But perhaps MacIntyre would reply that Kant does not employ 
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the correct understanding of virtue. It is more than a good will; it requires the 
practices previously described. This brings me to the second objection.  
 The second philosophical objection is from David Miller. Miller argues 
that the virtues may not be necessary to excel in certain practices. He claims that 
there is a difference between those practices which serve only to provide internal 
goods and those which serve some social ends beyond themselves. The first are 
“self-contained” practices and the second are “purposive” practices.  
Games are exemplars of the first category and seem to represent what 
MacIntyre has in mind when he speaks of practices. Here the distinction between 
internal and external goods has its clearest application. Clearly the good which 
consists in playing a game well cannot be understood outside the context of the 
game itself. The standards of excellence that determine what it is to play the game 
well are defined by those involved with the game-the players, judges, and 
spectators. But in the case of practices like architecture or farming there is an 
external purpose that determines both the goal of the practice and the conditions 
by which it may be judged. In these cases the good derived from being excellent 
in the practice is not simply constituted internally. The standards of excellence are 
related to a wider purpose.  
The good which consists in playing a fine innings at cricket is 
obviously incomprehensible in the absence of the game itself, and 
moreover the standard of excellence involved-what it is that makes 
the innings a fine one-can only be identified by reference to the 
history of the game…. On the other hand, in the case of a 
productive activity like architecture or farming, or in the case of an 
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intellectual activity like physics, there is an external purpose which 
gives the practice its point and in terms of which it may be 
judged.
199
 
Hence we see that there are (at least) two distinct kinds of practices: those that are 
self-contained and those that have external purposive ends.  
 This distinction between self-contained and purposive practices is clear 
but it may not always be clear into which category a practice should fall. In the 
case of self-contained practices criticism can only be carried out from within the 
practice itself. But in the case of purposive practices the whole practice may be 
reviewed via the end it is meant to serve. MacIntyre assumes that all practices are 
self-sustaining.  
 But suppose virtues were understood primarily in terms of purposive 
practices. It would be impossible to defend any list of virtues without making 
reference to the social purposes that the practices are meant to serve. We can now 
only understand virtues based on the needs and values of a certain society. 
 Furthermore, Miller argues, self-contained practices like games and sports 
can exist only after basic social functions have been discharged. They are in that 
sense luxury items. If external goods like money and power allow one the means 
to pursue internal goods in games which we have just seen are luxury items, then 
it is not the case that the modern world has seen the complete erosion of the 
virtues.  
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 Finally, Miller raises the question of whether we really consider the 
qualities that allow one to excel in games to be virtues. The fact that participation 
in these practices is optional, that is people are not required to participate in them 
by physical necessity or moral obligation, counts against application of moral 
terms such courage and temperance. Justice in sports, that is abiding by the rules 
and having the rules apply equally to all, is really good sportsmanship rather than 
justice as we think of in the courtroom, in war, and before the law.  
 If Miller is correct that self-contained practices do not require virtues and 
only purposive practices do, then the practices that require virtues are few and far 
between. Furthermore, I think Miller lumps two kinds of practices under the 
category of “purposive,” and that if we distinguish two kinds of purposive 
practices, those that require virtues will be even fewer. Miller says that all 
purposive practices serve social ends. But I think we can also distinguish between 
kinds of social ends. There are those social ends necessary for the continued 
existence and flourishing of the members of the society and those social ends that 
are useful or helpful, but not necessary. For example, the practice of medicine is 
necessary to the continued existence of the members of a society. People need to 
remain healthy to exist and flourish. On the other hand, art is purposive in the 
sense that it serves a purpose outside itself and creates objects of beauty for 
people to enjoy. However, the end it serves is not necessary for the continued 
existence of the members of society. Even if we can argue that art does serve 
some necessary social end, it is not clear that it requires the same kind or degree 
of virtues required by medicine or other practices which clearly serve necessary 
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social ends.  If most practices do not require virtues at all, or do not require fully 
cultivated virtues in the robust sense which MacIntyre intends, then virtues do not 
provide the conditions necessary for moral personhood. 
For these reasons, I do not think that MacIntyre provides a good 
foundation for thinking about moral tragedy. Certainly being alienated from the 
goods that make a good life would be tragic. However, MacIntyre’s argument that 
we are currently in such a predicament is unconvincing. By his own argument, if 
we have practices, then we have virtues. But we do in fact have practices. 
Therefore, we have virtues. Perhaps the virtues we have are different than the 
ones he would like us to have. Or if he insists that we do not have virtues, then he 
is wrong that virtues are embedded in practices. There is a more compelling way 
to think about tragedy. It is to think about moral tragedy in terms of how we fail 
others rather than how we fail ourselves. It is a moral illusion to think that the 
locus of moral behavior is the cultivation of virtue for ourselves or for its own 
sake. Rather, it is fulfilling our responsibilities to others. When we shatter the 
illusion that moral life is “all about me” we can see that we sometimes transgress 
a moral value even when we follow the morally best course of action.  
4. Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing 
 Christopher Gowans argues that we are sometimes faced with situations in 
which moral wrongdoing is inescapable. By inescapable wrongdoing he does not 
mean that we find ourselves in situations in which we have conflicting 
deliberative conclusions. It is not the case that an agent can be obligated to both 
perform and refrain from performing the same action. He also distinguishes his 
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discussion of inescapable moral wrongdoing from the traditional discussion of 
moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma obtains when an agent is given two 
alternatives A and B, and the agent can conclude that there are appropriate moral 
reasons both to do A and to do B, but there are no overriding reasons to perform 
one instead of the other. But these situations do not bring about the kind of 
inescapable wrongdoing Gowans has in mind. He points out that situations may 
arise in which an agent has overriding reasons to pursue one course of action over 
another, and yet by pursuing this course of action one transgresses a moral value. 
“[T]hough deliberative conclusions may not conflict, there are conflicts in which 
infringement of a genuine moral value is unavoidable.”200 In such situations, 
“whatever we do we will transgress a genuine moral value.”201 The traditional 
discussion of moral dilemmas has focused on the deontic possibility of conflicting 
deliberative conclusions. Although this discussion is philosophically interesting, it 
ignores the most morally salient feature of the conflict; a moral value is 
transgressed no matter what one does. Thus, we should investigate moral conflicts 
as raising a normative issue, not only a metaethical one. Gowans shows that 
inescapable wrongdoing arises due to our “moral responsibilities to particular 
persons in virtue of our appreciation of the intrinsic and unique value of each of 
these persons, and of our connections with them.”202 This account of moral 
responsibility is based on understanding wrongdoing in terms of one’s 
responsibility to others, but not simply in terms of producing optimific states of 
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affairs or a duty to the moral law. I claim that understanding the possibility of 
inescapable wrongdoing characterizes the shattering of a moral illusion. It is the 
illusion that one can avoid all moral wrongdoing simply by following the moral 
law.  
 Most of us have faced a moral conflict at some point in our lives. We have 
been in situations where some moral reasons support one course of action and 
other moral reasons support another course of action. In such cases one usually 
chooses “the lesser of two evils.” Choosing the lesser of two evils is the morally 
best choice. However, choosing the lesser of two evils still entails choosing an 
evil. That is, we may act for the best and yet still choose an evil. Although we 
may make the choice through no fault of our own, we will do something morally 
wrong no matter what we do. 
Many philosophers believe that inescapable wrongdoing is impossible. 
Although it may be sometimes difficult or impossible to know what the best 
course of action is, there is a course of action that is completely free of 
wrongdoing. For example, Kant argues that negative duties cannot conflict. A 
negative duty is a duty that forbids any act whose maxim cannot be made into a 
universal law. These are acts we should never perform such as, “do not lie.” There 
is one way to fulfill a negative duty since it is simply a case of not performing the 
forbidden action. If there is an apparent conflict between negative duties, then 
conflict is just that, apparent. Reasoning correctly will resolve any apparent 
conflict between negative duties. Duties cannot conflict due to the practical 
necessity that characterizes them. 
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A conflict of duties (collisio officiourum s. obligationum) would be 
a relation between them in which one of them would cancel the 
other (wholly or in part). –But since duty and obligation are 
concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certain 
actions and two rules opposed to each other cannot be necessary at 
the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance with one rule, to 
act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even 
contrary to duty; so a collision of duties and obligations is 
inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur).
203
  
Because a duty expresses a practical necessity, two conflicting rules cannot both 
be necessary at the same time. Practical necessity differs from natural necessity. It 
is not necessarily what is the case, rather it is necessarily what ought to be done 
commanded by the moral law. The moral law is discovered by pure reason. 
Autonomous agents, as noumena, are free from natural necessity but are subject to 
the law of freedom which requires that every autonomous act be in accordance 
with the universal laws of reason. That is, an autonomous agent may choose not to 
act in accordance with these rules, but as far as she acts rationally she acts in 
accordance with them. In this sense the “ought” of the moral law is one of 
practical necessity. Given this necessity, duties cannot conflict. It is inconceivable 
that two contradictory states of affairs are both necessary. Just as it is impossible 
according to natural law that two objects are located in the same place at the same 
time, so is it impossible according to the moral law that two inconsistent acts be 
obligatory.  
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 It is true that Kant’s moral philosophy precludes the possibility of 
inescapable moral wrongdoing. Therefore, it is inconsistent to accept both Kant’s 
conclusion and the notion of inescapable wrongdoing.  But rather than showing 
inescapable wrongdoing to be impossible, the inconsistency may give us reason to 
reject Kant’s thesis that obligations cannot conflict. In order to have good reason 
to do so, we need good evidence that inescapable wrongdoing is a fact of our 
moral experience. We gather this evidence through empirical examples and 
through Gowans’s theory of moral responsibility that he calls, “responsibility to 
persons.” 
 We gather empirical evidence for inescapable wrongdoing through our 
own experience of being faced with moral conflicts, but also through vivid 
examples in literature. Gowans presents inescapable wrongdoing by examining 
Melville’s Billy Budd. It is important to the story that it takes place historically at 
a time when a number of mutinies in the English navy had recently occurred. The 
crew of the HMS Bellipotent was made up of some sailors who had participated in 
these mutinies and some who had been brought into the navy by impressment. 
Billy was one who had recently been impressed. His character was such that he 
was quite simple and incapable of malicious intent. Billy suffered from a speech 
impediment that was exacerbated by stressful situations. The first-mate, Claggart, 
was a mean-spirited person who did not like Billy’s simple demeanor. He 
continually picked on Billy knowing that Billy was an easy target for his 
machinations. Well aware of the King’s worry over rebellion, and thus the 
importance for the Captain of the ship to oppress any thoughts of mutiny, 
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Claggart accused Billy of mutiny.  Billy’s speech impediment kept him from 
explaining himself and in frustration he struck Claggart who fell dead to the deck. 
Not only did Captain Vere and the crew know that Billy was incapable of 
intentionally murdering Claggart, Vere also knew that he was incapable of 
organizing a mutiny. They knew that Claggart’s accusations were false. But Vere 
was a man to whom maintaining order was very important. He ordered an 
immediate trial so that the idea of mutiny would not resonate with any of the other 
crew members.  
 The court believed that Billy held no malice towards Claggart and would 
not have struck him if he could have spoken. The court also accepted that 
Claggart targeted Billy because of Billy’s simple innocence. Claggart was envious 
of Billy and hated him because of his simplicity and innocence, and for these 
reasons falsely accused him of mutiny. Captain Vere knew these facts as well. He 
freely admitted that there were moral grounds for showing Billy leniency. And yet 
he also cited naval law that dictated the execution of any sailor who strikes his 
superior officer. Vere argued that as members of the King’s military, they owe 
allegiance to the King’s laws. Although the law may be imperfect in this case, 
they had an obligation to enforce it. We can see that Vere and the officers of the 
court will perform a morally wrong act no matter what they do. On the one hand, 
they have moral reasons of compassion and justice to let Billy go free. On the 
other hand, they have reasons to execute Billy based on their responsibility to 
enforce the law. Vere decided that their responsibility to enforce the law 
preempted all other moral obligations. Billy was executed.  
  195 
 We might immediately respond to the story by saying that although Vere 
had conflicting responsibilities, it is clear what he ought to have done. The moral 
reasons for letting Billy go free override the moral reasons for fulfilling one’s 
responsibility to enforce the law. Gowans agrees. Recall that inescapable moral 
wrongdoing is not a situation where reasons for two courses of action are equal. It 
may indeed be quite clear which action is supported by overriding reasons. 
Nevertheless, even if Vere had let Billy go free, he would have neglected his duty 
to the king to enforce the law. Regardless of which course of action he pursues, 
one of his responsibilities must be ignored. Even if letting Billy go free is the 
morally best course of action, he can only perform it by ignoring his responsibility 
to the king. If doing something wrong is understood as not fulfilling one’s 
responsibilities, then Vere would have done something wrong even if he 
performed the morally best action. He would have done something wrong in some 
sense, no matter what he did. Hence, wrongdoing is inescapable in some 
circumstances.   
 Many philosophers would object and argue that Vere would not have done 
anything wrong if he had deliberated correctly and realized that the reasons for 
letting Billy go free were more compelling than the reasons for enforcing the law. 
But this objection is based on a peculiar position.  
[T]he view that wrongdoing may always be avoided is committed 
to something like the following position. In a given situation, there 
is only one actual moral responsibility, and that is to do what moral 
deliberation determines in the final analysis ought to be done. 
Hence, the conclusion that Vere morally ought to take a particular 
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course of action completely eliminates the validity of those moral 
reasons favoring incompatible courses of action. 
204
 
If the correct conclusion is that Vere ought to have let Billy go, then it follows 
that he did not also have any responsibility to enforce the law. That is, if moral 
obligations cannot conflict, then it only appeared that he had another moral 
responsibility. But this conclusion rests on ignoring some features of our moral 
responsibility to others.  
 One reason many philosophers believe that inescapable wrongdoing is 
impossible is because they believe that “the primary concern of morality and 
moral theory is the determination and justification of conclusions of moral 
deliberation.”205 For utilitarians and Kantians, sound deliberation taking a first 
moral principle as a starting point, cannot produce conflicting moral judgments. If 
one reasons correctly, and then acts based upon the derived moral conclusions, 
then one has done what one ought to do. It would be incoherent to argue that there 
are situations where a correct conclusion, all things considered, of an agent’s 
moral deliberation about what to do would conflict with itself such that the agent 
ought and ought not perform a specific action. However, there are situations 
where although an agent does what she ought to do, some moral value is 
transgressed. In this sense, moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable.  
If we understand wrongdoing as transgressing some moral value based on 
some responsibility to someone, then there may be cases where an agent will do 
something morally wrong no matter what. It is in the specific sense of 
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transgressing moral responsibilities that inescapable wrongdoing arises. Rather 
than beginning with an abstract moral principle, the “responsibility to persons” 
account begins by finding the locus of moral responsibility in our relationships 
with others.  
We are to start with reflection upon what is involved in our 
particular, concrete relationships with persons with whom we are 
to a greater or lesser extent, and in various ways, intimate, 
especially relations of kinship, friendship, and love. It is mainly in 
the context of such relationships that we first come to employ and 
understand moral considerations.
206
 
Although all of our responsibilities will not be found in intimate relationships, 
these relationships serve as paradigms on the basis of which responsibilities in 
other contexts may also be understood. We all suppose that we have specific 
responsibilities to those persons with whom we are so related. For example, I 
have several responsibilities to my son, such as the responsibility to nurture and 
protect him. This responsibility differs from those I have toward my wife, such as 
the responsibility to be supportive and loyal. The specific responsibilities arise 
due to the specific nature of the relationships I have. The responsibilities are 
rooted in two kinds of consideration. “The first is the perception that each of these 
persons has intrinsic and unique value. The second is the recognition that some 
connection or another obtains between oneself and these intimates.”207 
 To say that a person has intrinsic value means that we find others to be 
valuable in themselves. However, we need not do so on the basis of their being 
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free and rational beings. For Kant only the noumenal person should be regarded 
as an end in itself. Respect for persons is derived from the moral law dictated by 
pure practical reason. But on Gowans’s approach we do not have to value a 
person via the application of an a priori law; rather, we come to think this about 
people due to our interaction with them. Our relationships with others are built 
upon the experience of their intrinsic value. 
 To say that each person is uniquely valuable means that each person’s 
intrinsic value is different from that of everyone else. For Kant, a person is 
intrinsically valuable due to characteristics shared by everyone: persons are 
rational and autonomous. It follows that nothing that distinguishes persons from 
one another is of moral significance. Kant is not alone in approaching morality 
from this kind of standpoint. Utilitarianism is also founded on a principle of 
abstract moral equality. Bentham asserts that everyone is to count for one and no 
more than one. However, even if individuals are equal to one another because of 
these shared characteristics, and although it is true that the concept or moral 
equality plays an important role in questions of morality, it does not follow that 
how persons differ from one another does not have any moral significance. 
Moreover, it does not follow that every alternative to the principle of moral 
equality of persons results in regarding some people as more valuable than others. 
It may be that each person is uniquely valuable and that the value of each person 
is incommensurable.
208
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 We experience this incommensurability most poignantly when a loved one 
dies. We think that the person cannot be replaced because of his or her unique 
value.  Gowans points out that when Creon kills Antigone, Haimon commits 
suicide because of his inability to go on living without her. Creon thinks that there 
are other women whom Haimon could love and take as a wife. But Antigone’s 
unique value cannot be replaced. Haimon is not distraught because a free and 
rational being is now gone. If that were the case, then she could easily be 
replaced. Although Haimon could have found another wife whom he presumably 
would have loved dearly, she could not replace the person who was Antigone. We 
can understand this story only by seeing that each person has unique value.  
  One might think that focusing on the unique value of persons will lead to 
regarding some people as more important than others. There are indeed some 
situations where consideration of unique value should be put aside, such as before 
the law. But there are many situations where it would be odd not to consider 
another’s unique value and the specific relationship one has. Further, just because 
one does consider another’s unique value and the specific relationship they have 
with one another when deciding what to do, it does not follow that one degrades 
the intrinsic and unique value of others.  
The woman who saves her husband from drowning before saving 
another passenger on the ship is making a comparative assessment 
with respect to that action. She is judging that it is more important 
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to her to save her husband than to save the other passenger. But she 
need not be taken as judging that her husband is more valuable 
than the passenger simply speaking. She can acknowledge that that 
person is also an intrinsically and uniquely valuable being, albeit 
one for whom she does not have the same responsibilities as for 
her husband.
209
  
In this situation we would not morally criticize the woman for choosing to save 
her husband before the other passenger. In fact, we would probably morally 
criticize her if she chose to save the other passenger before her husband. The 
locus of the woman’s moral responsibility is found in her relationship to her 
husband.  
 Although we understand that persons are intrinsically and uniquely 
valuable by examining our more intimate relationships, we can then extend this 
recognition to strangers as well. I recognize that every person has intrinsic and 
unique value even if I do not know specifically what is uniquely valuable about 
that person. We are in less of a position to understand what is uniquely valuable 
about strangers. Yet, we recognize that they are uniquely valuable. Thus, there is 
a sense of moral equality. The fact that persons are intrinsically and uniquely 
valuable means they are deserving of a certain kind of treatment. The treatment 
depends on the kind of relationship one has with another. In contemporary society 
relationships are established both through choice and also through unchosen 
circumstances. I chose to get married and hence chose to assume moral 
responsibilities to my wife. But merely encountering others can be sufficient to 
establish a relationship. A relationship is a state of affairs relating one individual 
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to another. Awareness of another’s plight is sufficient to relate one person to 
another. Therefore, we need not conclude that the “responsibility to persons” 
account would justify ignoring a drowning stranger or starving children in a 
developing country. Rather, it reflects our intuition that our responsibilities are 
often strongest to those with whom we share an intimate relationship. 
Nevertheless, we also have moral responsibilities to others we encounter.  
 These differences in the kinds of relationships we have produce different 
kinds of moral responsibilities. My responsibilities to my son include nurturing 
and protecting him. My responsibilities to my students include fairness in grading 
and ensuring the assignments are worthwhile. Recall in chapter 3 that I argued on 
the basis of Rachels’s analysis of moral considerability that our moral 
responsibilities differ depending on the person (or animal) with whom we are 
interacting and on the situation we are in. For example, it is wrong to hit you with 
a stick, not because you are autonomous, but because you feel pain. It is wrong to 
treat you like a child, not because you feel pain, but because you are autonomous. 
We can now add to this account that various responsibilities also arise due to the 
kind of relationship one has with another.  
Now it is possible to see that sometimes moral responsibilities may 
conflict with one another. Even if I deliberate correctly and conclude what the 
morally best action is, I still may do something wrong. Because I have various 
relationships with others, and consequently various moral responsibilities to 
others, a situation may arise where I can fulfill one responsibility but not another. 
In this sense a moral value is transgressed. Not fulfilling a moral responsibility 
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constitutes a wrong. When a moral value is transgressed, a wrong has been 
committed. Hence, it is possible that wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable. If the 
wrongdoing fulfills the conditions I laid out in chapter 3 for evildoing, then it 
follows that evildoing is also sometimes inescapable.
210
  
 Sometimes the wrongdoing or evildoing can take on tragic dimensions. 
There are numerous kinds of tragic-making characteristics. It can be tragic when  
the morally best action seriously harms or allows to be harmed a 
person or social entity to whom the agent is morally 
responsible,…the morally best action results in a harm that is 
either irreversible or extremely difficult to repair,…the morally 
best action results in a harm that is far-reaching in its 
consequences,…the morally best action not only fails to fulfill a 
moral responsibility, but actively works against that 
responsibility,…the morally best action harms or neglects a person 
whom the agent especially values,…the morally best action harms 
or neglects a person who is especially undeserving of this harm or 
neglect,…the morally best action renders the agent a tool in the 
evil projects of others,…the morally best action involves doing 
something that is degrading to the agent,…finally, the moral 
conflict is one in which the moral reasons for two conflicting 
actions do not override each other, and yet each overrides the 
reasons for all other alternative actions.
211
 
If moral wrongdoing or evildoing are sometimes inescapable, and they sometimes 
take on tragic dimensions, then it follows that moral tragedy is sometimes 
inescapable. The tragic situations are ones where the agent makes the morally best 
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choice, a wrong is committed, and the wrong is tragic. One must understand that 
one can bring about moral tragedy unchosenly and often inescapably to have a 
full understanding of moral interaction among persons. Hence, understanding 
inescapable wrongdoing and moral tragedy shatter the illusion that following the 
moral law will keep one morally pure. One discovers that wrongdoing is 
sometimes inescapable and also tragic. The shattering of this illusion does not 
result in the avoidance of future moral tragedies; because they are sometimes 
inescapable they cannot always be avoided.  To believe that they can be is a moral 
illusion. Rather, it is a moral disillusion to recognize undeniable features of moral 
life and sees that she can be morally responsible for what is unchosen, 
inescapable, and tragic while still doing the right thing. The disillusion gives one 
the ability to question moral principles and directives.  
 That one does not choose the circumstances that might lead to the 
inescapability of wrongdoing might be unfair, but what is unfair is not unreal. To 
deny that inescapable moral tragedy is a feature of moral life is to deny some of 
our moral responsibilities. Recognizing the nature of inescapable moral 
wrongdoing and moral tragedy is to take responsibility for oneself as a moral 
individual. 
5. Regret 
 Taking full responsibility for oneself as a moral individual often involves 
feelings of regret. If one commits an evil act despite having made the best moral 
choice, it is natural for the agent to regret what she has done. The agent feels 
regret because the state of affairs she brought about do not reflect her values. As I 
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discussed in chapter 1, feelings of regret, remorse, and indignation play an 
integral role in being a moral agent. 
 When we value something or somebody, we adopt and pursue ends with 
respect to it. Kant and Frankfurt both endorse this view, but in different ways. For 
Kant, when we value the rational capacity of another we adopt and pursue the end 
to respect that rational capacity and treat the individual accordingly. For 
Frankfurt, when we care about something we make ourselves vulnerable to the 
fate of what it is we care about. In a situation of inescapable moral wrongdoing, 
the ends we have adopted cannot be pursued. Our responsibilities come into 
conflict creating an obstacle to our fulfilling at least one of them. This inability to 
pursue the ends we have adopted produces feelings of regret. 
 Gowans argues that it is appropriate for an agent to feel moral distress in 
situations where responsibilities conflict. In fact, he claims that the existence of 
feelings of moral distress constitute a phenomenological argument in support of 
the thesis that inescapable wrongdoing occurs. Those who claim that conflicts of 
obligation are only apparent must also conclude that there is no good reason for 
an agent to feel moral distress in these situations. If an agent cannot do anything 
wrong as long as she does what is morally best, then there would be no good 
reason for the agent to feel regret for doing something wrong. But moral distress 
does occur and we should try to explain it rather than dismissing it. Faced with a 
conflict of responsibilities, I do not feel regret or remorse because two actions, A 
and B, cannot both be done. Rather, I feel regret or remorse because I cannot do 
both A and B.   
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 In chapter 1, I argued that the individual losing moral innocence does not 
lose innocence by realizing that bad things happen. Rather, the individual loses 
innocence by realizing that she can bring about bad things. That is, one must 
locate wrongdoing in terms of one’s own agency. At this more complex phase of 
moral disillusion, one also locates the transgression of value due to inescapable 
wrongdoing in terms of one’s own agency. And one feels regret. 
 Gowans’s phenomenological argument is based on the original 
formulation of moral distress made by Bernard Williams. Williams defines regret 
as the feeling that things would have been much better had they been otherwise. 
He defines agent-regret as the feeling one has towards one’s own past actions 
whether intentional or not.  
The constitutive thought of regret in general is something like 
“how much better if it had been otherwise”, and the feeling can in 
principle apply to anything of which one can form some 
conception of how it might have been otherwise, together with 
consciousness of how things would then have been better. In this 
general sense of regret, what are regretted are states of affairs, and 
they can be regretted, in principle, by anyone who knows of them. 
But there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall 
call “agent-regret”, which a person can feel only towards his own 
past actions…212 
When one feels agent-regret, one wishes that things had been otherwise, but not 
necessarily that one had acted otherwise. Rather, the agent has a negative 
evaluation both of the circumstances that constrained her choices and of that she 
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was the one who brought about the state of affairs. Even if an agent’s action is 
justified by utilitarianism or Kantian ethics, she still might justifiably feel agent-
regret that she had to be the one to do whatever she did. For example, Captain 
Vere could justifiably feel agent-regret even if he had deliberated correctly and let 
Billy go free. He still would have let his responsibility to the king go unfulfilled. 
That his action would have been morally the best thing to do would not make 
feeling agent-regret irrational. Because the feeling is a natural part of moral life it 
would be irrational to dismiss its validity. The agent regrets not just that a state of 
affairs obtained, but that she was the one who brought it about. Williams and 
Gowans help show that an unrealistic optimism towards maintaining one’s moral 
purity reflects a lack of understanding concerning one’s moral responsibilities. 
The morally disillusioned individual sees that she lives in a morally tragic world 
and regrets that she is sometimes complicit in bringing tragedy about even when 
she does whatever is morally best.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have shown that understanding inescapable moral 
wrongdoing and moral tragedy describe a moral disillusion. Understanding 
tragedy as inescapable due to one’s own agency differs from the tragedy of 
necessity that characterized Greek tragedy and Aristotle’s conception of tragedy. 
It also differs from the Elizabethan form of tragedy which was characterized by 
the possibility of averting the tragic conclusion. MacIntyre’s conception of 
tragedy proved to be untenable due to his misleading interpretation of history and 
problems with his philosophical account. The Greek and Elizabethan approaches 
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to tragedy are problematic because they maintain the illusion of moral purity. The 
Greeks believed that one cannot willingly do wrong. Hence, by being virtuous one 
could be morally pure. Kant and utilitarians believed that one can avoid 
wrongdoing by following the categorical imperative or the greatest happiness 
principle, respectively. In other words, one can be morally pure. The focus is on 
maintaining one’s own moral goodness. But the accounts of unchosen evil and 
inescapable moral wrongdoing shatter these moral illusions. Because 
understanding these features of moral life shatter naïve illusions of maintaining 
moral purity, it follows that not recognizing these features supports an illusory 
morality ignoring facts about moral life. Moral disillusion is not characterized in 
part by the ability to know the morally right way to act; rather it is characterized 
by understanding that even when we do the morally right thing, we may still bring 
about evil or transgress moral obligations. One takes responsibility for the 
unchosen or inescapable evil one brings about. The proper response to unchosen 
or inescapable evil is not the fabrication of an abstract moral principle that denies 
their existence, but inquiry into their nature, feelings of regret or remorse, and acts 
of confession, contrition, apology, restitution, or reparation. In these ways one 
takes responsibility for the evil one causes.  
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CHAPTER 7 
KIERKEGAARD AND THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 
1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapters I described the different phases of moral 
disillusion. I showed that moral life is richer than barely being the target of the 
reactive attitudes. Acquiring a more nuanced understanding of moral life gives 
one the ability to raise questions concerning the adequacy of moral principles and 
directives. In this chapter, I bring in Kierkegaard’s conception of the self, and I do 
so for two reasons. First, Kierkegaard gives us a compelling account of moral 
disillusion that is compatible with my approach. Second, he prescribes shattering 
moral illusions whereas I have heretofore only described it. Prescribing moral 
disillusion both raises an important question and also clarifies a possible 
confusion. One component of the process of shattering moral illusions is 
becoming interested in how we relate to ourselves and to others. To prescribe the 
process is to say that we ought to become interested in ourselves and how we 
relate to others. I consider this interest to be consistent with Frankfurt’s 
description of our second order cares. Frankfurt argues convincingly that people 
not only care about things, but that they also care about what they care about.  
Although Frankfurt maintains that caring about what we care about is simply 
descriptive of what is it to be human, he adds that we can affect what we care 
about, and that some cares are worthier than others. Hence, like Kierkegaard, he 
argues we ought to care about some things and not others. But in previous 
chapters I argued that our cares are not entirely within our control. Thus, the 
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question is: How can we affect our cares if they are not entirely within our 
control? The answer to this question lies in the increased understanding of moral 
life that accompanies moral disillusion. The clarification that reemerges from this 
discussion is that moral disillusion and moral goodness are conceptually distinct. 
As I have repeated throughout the previous chapters, we need to be careful not to 
think that moral disillusion entails moral goodness. I show that moral disillusion 
generates increased moral responsibility, not moral goodness.   
 Finally, a word of warning. I will focus on some of the main themes found 
in approaching Kierkegaard’s authorship in its entirety. But giving an account of 
Kierkegaard’s entire philosophy would be a monumental task. He is intentionally 
indirect and seems to enjoy presenting the reader with apparent inconsistencies 
and contradictions. However, this indirect presentation of apparent contradictions 
plays an important role in the message he communicates. I will explain this 
methodology as I explain his philosophical themes. However, it is both 
impossible and unnecessary to include in this chapter every philosophical theme 
deemed significant by Kierkegaard. It is impossible because one could write an 
entire dissertation on each of Kierkegaard’s works. It is unnecessary because the 
absence of some of his philosophical themes in the present discussion will not 
unfairly skew the conclusions I draw.  In this chapter I will explain Kierkegaard’s 
theory of moral disillusion, relate it to Frankfurt’s cares, explain how we can 
affect our cares, and explain why moral disillusion does not entail moral 
goodness.  
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2. Kierkegaard’s Methodology 
 Before I give an overview of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self and how 
it gives us an account of moral disillusion, I need to say a few words about the 
methodology he uses to present his philosophy. Understanding the manner in 
which he does so is essential to understanding how and why the reader should 
analyze his authorship in its entirety in order to correctly uncover the message he 
communicates. That is, one cannot understand the philosophy without 
understanding the methodology. 
 It is well-known that Kierkegaard uses pseudonyms for many of his 
works. Understanding why he does so gives us a clue to understanding his 
philosophy of moral disillusion. The point of view espoused by each pseudonym 
should not always be considered to be Kierkegaard’s complete view. That is, each 
pseudonym is like a character in a play. Only by seeing the play in its entirety can 
one see how the story ends. It follows that it is premature to take, for example, 
what Judge Wilhelm in Either/Or says about the ethical stage as Kierkegaard’s 
final statement of the ethical. Judge Wilhelm is only one character and, therefore, 
one point of view. For this reason, one cannot identify Kierkegaard’s point of 
view until one considers the themes that continue throughout his various works. 
His authorship as a whole represents his point of view. Each single work is only 
one component of the entire philosophy.  
The presentation of his philosophy through pseudonyms is not arbitrary. It 
is quite significant that he presents his views in this way. As I will show below, 
shattering moral illusions is an undertaking that each individual must do on her 
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own. Shattering moral illusions requires self-reflection.  One must realize that 
one’s own agency is often responsible for wrongdoing or evil in the world. This 
realization cannot be acquired passively. That is, one cannot be taught this fact of 
moral life; as we saw with the morally innocent, the agent must confront moral 
facts on her own. “Kierkegaard is not a didactic author, he offers no catechisms, 
he never speaks ex cathedra or with an imprimatur. He teaches by setting the 
individual free.”213 Kierkegaard employs indirect communication to teach us 
about shattering moral illusions. He does not explicitly tell us what one needs to 
do. Rather, he uses pseudonyms and indirect communication to provoke the 
reader into self-reflection. The reader must come to an understanding about moral 
disillusion on her own. Thus, reading Kierkegaard’s works reflects the process of 
moral disillusion itself. He presents his philosophy indirectly, requiring an 
interpretation of his authorship in its entirety because one cannot shatter moral 
illusions by being explicitly told about individual responsibility. One of the 
illusions one shatters is that moral responsibility is something abstract and 
impersonal.  
Now I turn to examine his philosophy of moral disillusion. In order to do 
so, I will explain Kierkegaard’s analysis of social ethics that stands in opposition 
to individual responsibility, the roles of both Socrates and Abraham as 
exemplifying the shattering of moral illusions, and the meaning of despair. These 
elements come together to establish that what is important for a person is to be 
passionate about reflecting upon one’s individuality and responsibilities. As I 
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mentioned above, I do not claim to give an exhaustive account of Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy; rather, I present here significant elements of his view of moral 
disillusion. After presenting Kierkegaard’s account, I will show that the 
passionate inwardness he describes (and prescribes) corresponds to Frankfurt’s 
description of caring about what we care about and affecting our cares. Finally, 
from this discussion it will become apparent that moral disillusion does not entail 
moral goodness.  
3. Kierkegaard’s Conception of the Self 
 To best understand Kierkegaard’s view of individual responsibility and 
moral disillusion it is helpful to situate his philosophy in its historical context. To 
do so, however, is not to claim that his philosophy has only historical 
significance. As I will show in this chapter, his thought has contemporary import. 
The reason it is helpful to situate him historically is because doing so confronts 
and resolves a widespread misunderstanding about Kierkegaard’s views of ethics. 
Many philosophers believe that Kierkegaard presents his view of ethics in 
Either/Or and then argues in Fear and Trembling that ethics should be 
“suspended” and transcended in favor of religious life. However, interpreting 
Kierkegaard in such a way ignores that both of these works are written by 
pseudonyms. As I previously mentioned, the use of pseudonyms is Kierkegaard’s 
subtle way of telling the reader that the view presented in each pseudonymous 
work is not the final word on the matter at hand. Again, the pseudonym is only a 
single character in a larger and more complicated play.  
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The kind of ethics described by Judge Wilhelm in Either/Or represents a 
social ethic that Kierkegaard will later contrast with individual responsibility.
214
 
At the time that Kierkegaard was writing, academic philosophy was dominated by 
Hegelian thought. Many people agreed with Hegel that Reason had realized itself 
through his writing and their reading Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel had resolved 
the most pressing issues of philosophy. Hence, for many, studying philosophy had 
become studying Hegelian philosophy. But Kierkegaard rejected Hegel’s 
endorsement of social ethics, i.e. the ethics of the state, because it subsumed 
individual responsibility to an abstract universal. The ethics that is suspended by 
Abraham in Fear and Trembling is not ethics per se, but Hegelian social ethics.  
 Hegel claimed that the world-historical idea had resulted in the ethics of 
the state. This ethics was the result of a divine rational process. Because of its 
divinity and rationality, one must accept the social ethic and act according to its 
precepts. Hegel claimed that rejecting the social ethic and relying upon individual 
conscience allowed for the possibility of doing evil. Following one’s own 
conscience could not guarantee ethical behavior, but following the social ethic 
could. For this reason Hegel rejected Kantian morality as too general and lacking 
concrete guidelines by which one could act. If one followed, however, the ethics 
that have come to be as a result of the world-historical idea, one could act 
ethically. Only by acting in this way does the individual recognize herself as a 
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subject among other subjects and acquire freedom. It is through the social order 
that subjects can relate to each other harmoniously under the law.   
But the subjective will also has a substantial life—a reality—in 
which it moves in the region of essential being, and has the 
essential itself as the object of its existence. This essential being is 
the union of the subjective with the rational Will: it is the moral 
Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the 
individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his 
recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the 
Whole…. The laws of morality are not accidental, but are 
essentially Rational. It is the very object of the State that what is 
essential in the practical activity of men, and in their dispositions, 
should be duly recognized…. It must further be understood that all 
the worth which the human being possesses—all spiritual reality, 
he possesses only through the State.
215
 
For Hegel, the individual realizes her individuality only through being with others 
in the community of the state. It follows that following the social ethic of the state 
was moral since it allowed each individual to fully actualize her worth as a 
human. Because the existing state was a result of divine Reason realizing itself, 
then “[i]t is certainly the case that the individual person is a subordinate entity 
who must dedicate himself to the ethical whole.”216  
 Judge Wilhelm in Either/Or presents a congruent view of ethics. He 
presents this view in one of his letters to the aesthete. He attempts to convince the 
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aesthete that choosing to live out one’s social role is the ethical way to live. By 
living out one’s social role, one becomes a concrete, stable individual.  
The self that is the objective is not only a personal self but a social, 
a civic self…. He transfers himself from personal life to civic life, 
from this to personal life. Personal life as such was an isolation and 
therefore imperfect, but when he turns back into his personality 
through civic life, the personal life appears in a higher form.
217
 
For this reason the Judge recommends marriage to the aesthete. Marriage 
represents the stable social life that is characteristic of the social ethic. The 
aesthetic way of life cannot provide stability to the self. One ought to choose the 
ethical way of life. The way to do so is to choose to live out one’s role in society.  
 But Kierkegaard realizes that simple rule following does not make one 
morally responsible. “He takes Hegel’s well socialized citizen of the nation-state 
and argues that to become ethical, it is insufficient to join a membership in a 
conventional community.”218 Rule following gives us no insight into an 
individual’s motives or intentions. Perhaps it serves as a good training device, but 
it does not make for a fully responsible individual. Under this model people only 
relate to each other in a herd-like manner. They do not individually reflect upon 
what it means to be a responsible individual. The people only want to adhere to 
the demands of the law. They fail to consider whether observing these demands is 
sufficient for taking responsibility. As I will continue to show, Kierkegaard calls 
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for the individual to question this rule-following social ethic. This questioning is a 
shattering of moral illusions. 
Kierkegaard suggests that one way of responding to the dilemmas 
of the age is to cultivate “passionate inwardness”….  This 
disposition requires that the individual not assume that what the 
established order promulgates in the law is the best way to live a 
life, but rather adopt a critical posture in order to verify and 
legitimate the methods of justification the state appropriates to 
sustain itself.
219
  
The process by which one questions the social ethic is difficult. One must 
cultivate a passionate inwardness that allows one to separate the internal and the 
external so as not to be completely defined by the external, i.e. society. 
Kierkegaard indicates that when the state and one’s social role in the state define 
who one is, then one is not yet a “self.” In my terms, one holds fast to moral 
illusions. One must become a self, or shatter moral illusions, through the difficult 
process of self-reflection. 
 This passionate inwardness requires a detachment from one’s social role 
and the social ethic which defines it. This detachment requires “sacrificing,” or 
questioning, even those relationships which have the greatest significance. It is 
only by questioning these relationships that one can relate to them in a personal or 
subjective way. Hence the ethics that is suspended in Fear and Trembling is not 
ethics wholesale. Rather, Abraham suspends the social ethic in order to cultivate a 
                                                 
219
 Mark Dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001), 45.  
  217 
more personal responsibility devoid of illusions. To better understand this 
questioning of the social ethic, I now turn to Kierkegaard’s treatment of Socrates.  
 To help illustrate what is involved in this process of self-reflection and 
questioning the status quo, Kierkegaard, through his pseudonyms, describes 
Socrates as a paradigm of how to first react to the social ethic. Socrates 
questioned the social ethic of his time. He devoted, and lost, his life to this 
endeavor. He asked his interlocutors to think about whether the “truths” they had 
been taught were coherent. Socrates forced his interlocutors to question what is 
good and what is just, without relying on the social ethic. He encouraged his 
listeners to suspend belief in the established laws and codes of ethics.  
Socrates had the courage and self-collectedness to be sufficient 
unto himself, but in his relations to others he also had the courage 
and self-collectedness to be merely an occasion even for the most 
stupid person. What rare magnanimity—rare in our day, when the 
pastor is little more than the deacon, when every second person is 
an authority, while all these distinctions and all this considerable 
authority are mediated in common lunacy and in a commune 
naufragium [common shipwreck], because since no human being 
has ever truly been an authority…it never fails that one fool going 
his own way takes several others along with him.
220
  
Socrates did not trust the social ethic to define moral responsibility. However, he 
did not reject society; that is, he did not question the social ethic in isolation. He 
detached himself from the society in which he lived in order to carry out the 
difficult process of self-reflection and questioning. This is not a total alienation or 
withdrawal from the cultural context, but the adoption of a critical stance towards 
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the given socio-political structure. His goal was not necessarily to reject the social 
ethic, but to put it to question.
221
 Most importantly, it was essential that each 
individual interlocutor raised his own questions concerning the status quo. 
Socrates accomplished this task by employing a very specific method: the use of 
irony. 
 Irony gives one the detachment necessary to question the status quo. As a 
device it gives one the conceptual space needed to reflect upon one’s own 
responsibilities and the roles given to one by society. Furthermore, the Socratic 
Method does not give the interlocutors any determinate answer. Socrates only 
questions. The individual must come to her own conclusions regarding what is 
good, pious, right, and true. If Socrates were to give his interlocutors the answers, 
then his answers would have served the same role as the social ethic. The 
individual would not reflect and come to her own conclusions. She would take the 
easy route of relying upon what is given to her, rather than the difficult route of 
self-reflection and self-becoming (i.e. becoming a self, or morally disillusioned).  
 Socrates, through irony, serves as a gadfly. He provokes reflection among 
his interlocutors without giving them answers.
222
 Kierkegaard, through his 
pseudonymous authors, also serves as a gadfly. He wants to tease the unreflective 
out of their complacency. He wants to provoke the aesthete and the ethical person 
(i.e. the person like Judge William in Either/Or who wholly subscribes to the 
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social ethic) to reflect upon themselves as individuals. If Kierkegaard would have 
told us directly what was required to shatter moral illusions, his guidelines would 
have served the same role as the social ethic. Each individual must undergo the 
process of questioning and self-reflection. The ironist does not reject the existing 
order, she rejects its deification. She raises the question what is ethical. The 
shattering of moral illusions gives one the ability to raise ethical questions. The 
aim is not to reject social responsibility, but to raise the level of reflection upon it.  
 But Kierkegaard is not satisfied with the Socratic paradigm. He thinks 
there is still more to say about moral disillusion. The figure who represents a 
further step in the process of shattering moral illusions is Abraham. Fear and 
Trembling is often misinterpreted as a call to abandon ethics for faith in God.  
But, as I mentioned above, the fact that some works are by pseudonyms is telling. 
Fear and Trembling is authored by Johannes de Silentio rather than Kierkegaard. 
Silentio gives us important information about moral disillusion, but he does not 
give us the full picture. We can interpret Silentio’s interpretation based on how he 
relates to Abraham. Silentio describes Abraham as the knight of faith, but tells the 
reader that he himself is not the knight of faith.  
I cannot make the movement of faith. I cannot shut my eyes and 
plunge confidently into the absurd; it is for me an impossibility, 
but I do not praise myself for that…. [F]or the marvelous I cannot 
do—I can only be amazed at it.223 
Silentio is not the knight of faith, but describes the knight of faith as someone he 
admires yet cannot emulate. In the “Exordium”, Silentio presents different 
                                                 
223
 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983), 34-37.  
  220 
versions of the story to see which way coheres with his admiration of Abraham. 
Kierkegaard is trying to show the reader through Silentio’s admiration of 
Abraham and his various interpretations that the story need not be understood 
literally. Rather than taking the story literally, it serves as an allegory describing 
the process of shattering moral illusions.  
In Fear and Trembling we become acquainted with two kinds of knights: 
the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith. We can think of each 
knight as a stage in the process of moral disillusion. Before one can become the 
knight of faith one must become the knight of infinite resignation.
224
 This 
resignation is the teleological suspension of the ethical. By “ethical” Silentio 
means the social ethic. It is symbolized by Abraham’s attempted sacrifice of 
Isaac. The resignation then is the questioning (or sacrifice) of everything one has 
been told or taught is good and right. For example, one might question the ethical 
validity of the golden rule, the categorical imperative, or the greatest happiness 
principle and realize that such abstract universal principles do not adequately 
cover the nuances of moral life. One must question everything. But this process is 
not easy. As Silentio says, “Only the one who works gets bread.”225 This old 
adage is supposed to reflect the notion that shattering long-held moral illusions is 
quite difficult work. After one questions the social ethic in its entirety, one 
experiences “fear and trembling” due to the realization that the grounds for one’s 
moral responsibility are now in one’s own hands. The individual can no longer 
rely on the social ethic to define moral responsibility. The peace and security of 
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the social ethic has been shattered and one finds oneself utterly alone in defining 
responsibility. One shatters one’s moral illusions. This shattering through self-
reflection is the teleological suspension of the ethical.  
 The taking of Isaac to Mount Moriah to sacrifice him is a metaphor that 
shows one must be willing to question or “suspend” all aspects of the social ethic 
even something as basic as a father’s love for his son. The story is not intended to 
support actually killing one’s son, but to symbolize the thoroughness with which 
one must question the social ethic. “Faith” does not mean simple obedience to 
God. In three of the “Exordium” in Fear and Trembling, Silentio has Abraham 
obey the command to kill Isaac, but then mocks these tellings as false. He also 
rejects the person who takes Isaac too hastily to Mount Moriah. Recommending 
obedience in itself is not the point of Silentio’s version of the story. If Abraham is 
the knight of faith, and his faith is not exemplified by obedience, then “faith” 
means something different than simple obedience for Kierkegaard. “Faith is not a 
doctrine but awakening…. [F]aith…means moving over the abyss without 
attachment to what I know or will as good.”226 The focus of Silentio’s telling of 
the story is not only what Abraham does or does not do, but the quality of his will. 
Abraham turns inward to reflect upon what responsibility means to him. He raises 
the knife to Isaac’s throat with the “faith” that he will get him back. This part of 
the story relates metaphorically to the notion of questioning one’s inherited sense 
of responsibility, not with the hope of losing all responsibility, but with the 
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intention of deepening it and understanding it more fully; that is, with the hope of 
getting it back.  
To become a self and to become individually responsible, Abraham must 
relate on a personal level to what is morally required of him. By suspending the 
ethical and defining responsibility through one’s personal commitments, one 
becomes a responsible individual rather than a simple rule-follower. “Johannes de 
silentio shakes us from the idea that the key to moral or religious earnestness is in 
the public sphere where we discover and can then conform to a lucid list of 
rules.”227 Abraham has responsibilities to his son, not because the role of father 
has been defined for him by society, but because he questioned this definition and 
“returned” with Isaac. The father/son relationship has not been destroyed. The 
message of the allegory is that the relationship has been redefined.  
 One might think that if the allegory encourages a suspension of the social 
ethic, then it also encourages its rejection. But suspension and rejection are 
distinct. The suspension of the ethical (i.e. of the social ethic) is not undertaken 
with the goal of being a hermit outside of society. Through resignation one always 
has the intention of further existing in society, but with a renewed sense of self. 
Socrates did not leave Athens, but remained there to serve as a gadfly to his 
fellow citizens. Abraham returned with Isaac from Mount Moriah. As Johannes 
Climacus tells us: 
The [ironic/negatively free] individual does not cease to be a 
human being…. His life, like that of another, has the diverse 
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predicates of a human existence, but he is within them like the 
person who walks in a stranger’s borrowed clothes. He is a 
stranger in the world of finitude, but he does not define his 
difference from worldliness by foreign dress (this is a 
contradiction, since with that he defines himself in a worldly way); 
he is incognito, but his incognito consists in looking just like 
everyone else.
228
 
For Kierkegaard it is important that the person who shatters moral illusions does 
not leave society to live as a hermit, either literally or metaphorically. Some 
interpreters have accused him of arguing as much. But this is a misunderstanding. 
Socrates and Abraham look like everyone else, but they are inwardly different 
because they have defined responsibility in terms of their own agency, rather than 
in terms of an abstract moral law or the social ethic. The story of Abraham does 
not, therefore, support religious fanaticism. To dress in monastic robes or to 
become a religious fanatic is to further rely on external doctrine to define one’s 
understanding of morality and responsibility. The morally disillusioned individual 
takes on a personal and passionate approach to responsibility.  
 This return to society is why Silentio says that the knight of faith resigns 
everything with the knowledge he will get it back. The goal of the knight of faith 
is not solitude but a more harmonious and more reflective society.  
[F]or Kierkegaard, inwardness requires that the individual become 
more passionately engaged with others…. [W]ith this greater level 
of self-awareness the subject does not see his or her objectives 
only in terms of one’s social or state role.229  
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The knight of faith does not resign, or suspend, the ethical with the goal of 
isolated individualism. His goal is heightened sense of self and a more passionate 
and responsible point of view.  
 This personal understanding of one’s responsibilities leads Johannes 
Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to say that “truth is 
subjectivity.”230 But this claim should not be interpreted as espousing some sort of 
relativism. What Climacus means is that what is important is not only what is 
true, but also how one relates to what is true. It might be true that a father should 
love his son, but if the father has not reflected upon this role, questioned it, and 
then accepted it personally as a responsibility, then the fact itself is not important. 
The responsibilities one has must be significant to the individual. In this way what 
would otherwise be disinterested objective truth has become interested subjective 
truth. I will show below that Kierkegaard’s description of being interested in 
ourselves and his prescription that we ought to be interested in our responsibilities 
to others coincide with Frankfurt’s description of second-order cares and his 
prescription that we ought to care about some things and not others.  
 By seeing the Abraham story as an allegory, we do not have to make the 
absurd conclusion that Kierkegaard advocated following a simple divine 
command ethics. The “faith” that characterizes the knight of faith need not be 
religious faith as we ordinarily understand it. By “faith” Kierkegaard means the 
process I have here described. “Faith” is reflecting upon oneself, questioning the 
social ethic, and coming back to the society not as an isolated individual, but one 
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who has more passionate, reflective relationships with others. To define faith as 
belief in a specific doctrine would contradict the need for each individual to 
undergo the ordeal of self-reflection. Getting ethical answers from religious 
doctrine is similar to getting them from the state or social ethic. Therefore, when 
Silentio speaks of the knight of faith, he refers to the individual who has risked 
the social ethic for a more complete, personal, and individual moral responsibility.  
 Kierkegaard’s theory of selfhood requires the individual to question or 
suspend the social ethic in which she lives, accept the fear and trembling that this 
suspension entails, and reflect upon how one should relate to others in society. 
One must shatter the illusion that moral responsibility is something given rather 
than taken. His is not a theory of irrational subjectivism as some have accused 
him of, but rather one of radical individual responsibility. Understood within the 
context of his entire authorship we can understand Kierkegaard’s philosophy as 
one which hopes to motivate the reader to reflect upon what is involved with 
being a self devoid of moral illusions. 
 So far I have shown that Kierkegaard urges us to develop a passionate 
inwardness through self-reflection. One essential component of this reflection is 
despair. Despair not only plays a central role in his explanation of moral 
disillusion, it connects up with my argument in chapter 4 that the morally 
disillusioned agent recognize that she can be a source of unchosen evil.  
 In The Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus tells us that the self is the 
relation of itself to itself.  “The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the 
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relation relating itself to itself in the relation”.231 Although this sentence seems at 
first glance to be nonsense, Anti-Climacus is trying to tell the reader that a self, 
that is, one who shatters moral illusions, is one who becomes a self through self-
reflection. The individual relates itself to itself, or, in other words, engages in self-
reflection.  A “human” is not yet a “self.” The use of these terms is Kierkegaard’s 
way of saying that an agent can hold fast to moral illusions or shatter them. When 
a human shatters her moral illusions, she becomes a self.  It follows that moral 
disillusion is not a primary state of existence. It must be realized by striving and 
transcending one’s context. The individual must relate itself to itself. One must 
become self-reflective. In the previous chapters I have also argued that one 
shatters moral illusions by reflecting upon oneself and one’s relationships with 
others.   
 But just because one begins the process of reflecting upon one’s moral 
responsibilities, it does not follow that one completes the process fully or that one 
actually becomes more responsible. For example, one might suspend the social 
ethic only to seek answers in religious fanaticism. Or one might suspend the 
social ethic and not return to take up one’s responsibility in a more dedicated 
fashion. Or one might accept that performing evil is often unchosen and 
inescapable, and thus conclude that there is no use fighting against it; we should 
embrace our tendencies to do evil. That is, one might become demonic by 
shattering moral illusions.
232
 Finally, one might realize that the universe does not 
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reward moral merit or have an underlying rational harmony and collapse in 
despair.  
 Kierkegaard, through Anti-Climacus, gives us a way of understanding 
one’s radical responsibility and dealing with the despair that may accompany the 
understanding. It involves some reflection upon the nature of the fallibility of 
one’s will. This reflection matches up with my comments in chapters 4 and 5 on 
the recognition of one’s agency as a source of unchosen evil and moral tragedy. 
Understanding these moral facts in terms of one’s own agency can lead to despair. 
The one way of rooting out despair is to accept the fact that one’s will creates 
obstacles to one’s willing. That is, the only cure for despair is to learn to despair 
properly. “To despair soberly is to know oneself as despairing not over my failed 
body or mind or over this or another loss of things and persons but as despairing 
of myself.”233 To despair in this way means to become fully aware of one’s 
potential for self-destruction. One of the reasons that Oedipus blinds himself is 
because he is surprised by the realization that he was the cause of his own 
downfall. However, if the morally disillusioned individual understands that the 
capacity for this destruction resides within oneself, then the experience of it is less 
tragic. I will discuss below that Kekes makes a similar argument in Facing Evil. 
When one understands that one is a source of unchosen evil, one is less likely to 
experience unchosen evil as a tragedy. Similarly for Kierkegaard, when one 
acknowledges that the capacity to cause evil to others and to oneself lies within 
one’s own will, then one has shattered illusions and despairs correctly. 
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4. The Importance of What We Care About 
 In the previous section I presented Kierkegaard’s philosophy of moral 
disillusion. Along the way I mentioned some of the ways in which his conception 
of moral disillusion is consistent with mine. But Kierkegaard’s philosophy of 
moral disillusion is not merely descriptive. It also prescribes that one ought to 
undergo the steps to shatter moral illusions, or in his words to become a self, and 
to take responsibility for who one is. Kierkegaard tells us that this process 
involves a passionate inwardness. Becoming a self involves being interested in 
who one is. “When I care for myself not just aesthetically, as if from a poetic 
distance or through an idea of myself, but consider the entirety of my life, then I 
am transformed by existential pathos.”234 Again, this is why Climacus says that 
truth is subjective. What is important is how one relates to the truth and what facts 
mean to the individual. In the present section I show that his account of passionate 
inwardness is congruent with Frankfurt’s account of caring about what we care 
about. Kierkegaard argues that we ought to develop passionate inwardness and 
Frankfurt argues that we ought to care about some things instead of others. 
Throughout the previous chapters I have argued that what we care about is not 
always entirely under our control. This raises the question of how we can affect 
our cares if they are not entirely within our control. The answer to this question 
lies in the increased understanding of moral life that constitutes moral disillusion. 
Finally, out of this discussion will reemerge the claim that moral disillusion does 
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not entail moral goodness. However, it does entail an increased moral 
responsibility.  
 Frankfurt says that the formation of a person’s will is primarily a matter of 
her coming to care about things and of her coming to care about certain things 
more than others. These processes may not be entirely under one’s control. 
Although they may not be entirely under one’s control, Frankfurt claims that it is 
often possible to affect them. Further, we can distinguish between things that are 
worth caring about and those that are not. However, in his early work, he is 
unclear about how to go about affecting one’s cares. If we can discern the kinds of 
things a person ought to care about, but it remains unclear how a person ought to 
affect her cares, then it follows that it is difficult to prescribe practically that one 
ought to care about certain things.  
 First, we need to establish that it is logically coherent to claim both that 
one’s cares are not entirely within one’s control and also that one ought to care 
about certain things. Although one’s cares are partially constituted by external 
circumstances one cannot control such as place of birth, upbringing, social milieu, 
etc., it does not follow that anything goes.  
It may still be possible to distinguish between things that are worth 
caring about to one degree or another and things that are not. 
Accordingly, it may be  useful to inquire into what makes 
something worth caring about – that is, what conditions must be 
satisfied if something is to be suitable or worthy as an ideal or as 
an object of love – and into how a person is to decide, from among 
the various things worth caring about, which to care about. 
Although people may justifiably care about different things, or care 
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differently about the same things, this surely does not mean that 
their loves and their ideals are entirely unsusceptible to significant 
criticism of any sort or that no general analytical principles of 
discrimination can be found.
235
 
I am in complete agreement with Frankfurt here. We should be able to evaluate 
the content of a person’s cares. The normative evaluation of what a person cares 
about is especially important. Kierkegaard likewise holds the position that one 
ought to cultivate passionate inwardness; that is, one ought to care about 
reflecting on one’s responsibilities to others. But how can we prescribe what one 
ought to care about, if one’s cares are not entirely under one’s control?  
 Frankfurt makes a distinction that can provide grounds for evaluating the 
worthiness of a person’s cares. He notes that it is important to the person what she 
cares about, and there are two distinct ways in which something may be important 
to a person. First, its importance may be due to considerations that are 
independent of whether or not she cares about the thing in question. Second, the 
thing may become important to the person because she cares about it. 
Correspondingly, there are two distinct sorts of ground on which a 
person who thinks it worthwhile to care about a certain thing might 
attempt to justify his view. He might claim that the thing is 
independently important to him and that it is worth caring about 
for this reason. Or he might maintain without supposing that the 
thing is antecedently important to him at all, that he is justified in 
caring about it because caring about it is itself something that is 
important to him.
236
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A person can reflect upon things that affect her and care about them because of 
the thing’s capacity to affect her. She may also cease caring about those things 
that do not have this capacity. But this reflection and beginning or ceasing to care 
relates only to the first way of caring. The person recognizes the thing as 
independently important (or not important) and changes her cares accordingly. 
However, if the thing is important to the person because she cares about it, one 
can only justify the caring in terms of the activity of caring as such. Caring about 
what one cares about is important.  
 The different ways of caring are important to us. They are important to us 
because these serve “to connect us actively to our lives in ways which are creative 
of ourselves and which expose us to distinctive possibilities necessary for 
freedom”237. We are devoted to what we care about. The cares we have provide 
constraints on our choices. These constraints are liberating because they guide our 
action and establish our identity. Without these constraints (or necessities) we 
would have too many choices all of which would be meaningless. There would be 
no order or cohesion to our lives. Such chaos is detrimental to autonomy. Hence, 
caring about things is constitutive of autonomy.  
 In “The Importance of What We Care About” Frankfurt argues that 
because the act of caring is valuable in itself, it follows that even if what one cares 
about cannot be justified, the very act of caring is justified. Yet, we also want to 
be able to criticize someone for caring about the wrong sort of thing. He says we 
want to be able to criticize someone for caring about something that is not worth 
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caring about. I would add that we want to able to criticize someone for caring 
about the morally wrong thing.  
Suppose, for example, that what a person cares about is avoiding 
stepping on the cracks in a sidewalk. No doubt he is committing an 
error of some kind in caring about this. But his error is not that he 
cares about something which is not really important to him. Rather, 
his error consists in caring about, and thereby imbuing with 
genuine importance, something which is not worth caring about. 
The reason it is not worth caring about seems clear: it is not 
important to the person to make avoiding cracks in the sidewalk 
important to himself. But we need to understand better than we do 
just why this is so…238 
Frankfurt ends the essay with some vague and unsatisfying comments about 
divine love. The question still remains what criteria we have for criticizing 
someone’s cares. What principles do we have for saying that what someone cares 
about is not worth caring about? If the reason were clear, then we would not need 
to understand better than we do.  
 As I will now make clear, Frankfurt readdresses this issue in some of his 
later work, and helps orient our thinking in terms of how we are justified in 
criticizing what one cares about. He argues that a person should try to know as 
much as possible about the things she cares about. Knowing about what one cares 
about is motivated by caring about what one cares about.  
Once we have learned as much as possible about the natural 
characteristics of the things we care about, and as much as possible 
about ourselves, there are no further substantive corrections that 
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can be made. There is really nothing else to look for so far as the 
normativity of final ends is concerned. There is nothing else to get 
right.
239
 
Because [p]eople naturally want the things they care about to coincide,”240 if they 
learn as much as possible about them and themselves, then they can affect their 
cares. They might decide that they actually do not care about something as much 
as they thought they did. Or they might realize that something they cared about is 
not important to them after all. The things one cares about should coincide up to a 
point. By caring about what one cares about, and subsequently learning as much 
as possible about what one cares about and about oneself, one can sometimes 
affect one’s cares. This ability to affect our cares comes from understanding. 
Understanding should influence what we care about. As I discussed in chapter 2, 
this kind of understanding is an ability. Here we see this ability as an ability to 
make-up one’s will by affecting one’s cares. This ability is partially comprised by 
seeing that moral life is richer than the minimum conditions of moral 
responsibility. That is, the understanding I have described throughout the previous 
chapters can affect what one cares about.  
Kekes makes a similar argument as well. He suggests that we ought to 
develop “the reflective temper.” The first step in doing so is epistemic. We must 
understand the essential conditions of life. As I presented in chapter 4, our 
projects are vulnerable to evil regardless of our personal moral merit. 
Understanding this vulnerability is not merely descriptive; we also care about our 
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lives. This understanding is the ground of true hope. Kekes illustrates his point 
that we need to cultivate a deeper understanding about life by noting that what is 
tragic about Oedipus, Lear, and Kurtz is the expectation that morally praiseworthy 
actions will succeed and not come into conflict with the essential conditions of 
life. We expect that contingency, indifference, and destructiveness will be 
overcome by reason and decency. But the intrusion of evil will not come as so 
devastating if we expand our understanding and realize that evil is often 
inevitable.
241
 This depth of understanding improves our lives because we will not 
collapse under the grief of tragedy. If we can cultivate this understanding before 
tragedy occurs in our lives, then we need not undergo immense anguish in the 
face of tragedy.  
We cannot control the contingent, indifferent, and destructive nature of the 
universe and of humans. We can, however, control our response to these 
factors.
242
 By understanding that evil is inevitable we abandon the unrealistic 
expectation that our lives will not conflict with the essential conditions of life. 
This understanding has emotional and motivational effects. By acquiring depth, 
we gain more control over our own reactions to calamity.  
This understanding has both an individual and a general 
dimension. Individually, it is understanding that our personal 
aspirations are subject to the vicissitudes of contingency, 
indifference, and destructiveness, quite independently of our merits 
as agents or of the merits of our projects. Generally, it is 
understanding that what is true of ourselves is also true of 
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humanity, that all human projects are in jeopardy because of the 
existence of evil.
243
  
Once we have deepened our understanding of evil, we are prepared to respond 
appropriately to it. Kekes calls this response the “reflective temper.” Enlarged 
understanding gives us the truth, but the reflective temper gives us the response. 
Through reflection we can become aware of when and how the essential 
conditions of life express themselves through our various psychological states and 
try to diminish their expression when possible. The act of reflection alters the 
psychological states by reflecting on them. That is, self-reflection alters the self 
that is reflected upon because the self has become reflective. This reflection and 
understanding do not free us from the essential conditions of life, but increase 
control. By understanding how we bring about unchosen evil, we may be able to 
minimize it. Increased control expands the area in which we can make choices. 
Thus we have some control (it may be quite minimal in certain people) over how 
much evil we cause in the world. We can never eradicate evil in the world, but we 
can minimize it. 
However, there is no guarantee that the person who cares about what they 
care about, who cultivates passionate inwardness, who reflects upon her own 
character, will care about moral goodness or be morally good. Caring, 
understanding, and reflection do not entail moral goodness. Becoming a self or 
shattering illusions of moral purity do not always bring about a morally good 
individual or morally good acts. What do we say about the person who 
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understands (i.e. has shattered moral illusions) and does not care that she is an 
agent of unchosen evil or that she may be in situations of inescapable evildoing?  
 All we can do is urge people to understand what they care about, to reflect 
upon their responsibilities to others, and to understand the richness of moral life. 
One can be urged to do so by reasoned argument, as Frankfurt, Kekes, and 
Kierkegaard have done. We have seen that there are good reasons to understand 
what you care about or to reflect upon your life. But what one ends up caring 
about cannot always be affected by reasons. If it could be, then we would have far 
less evildoing in the world. We could simply present an evildoer with reasons 
why she should not do evil, and she would be persuaded.  However, people do not 
act solely based on reasons. An individual might be rational, but still 
unreasonable. Because the root of this unreasonableness is the will, Frankfurt 
calls it “volitional irrationality”. 
What is at stake here is not a matter of avoiding mistakes and 
getting things right. The volitionally irrational lover of death or 
disability or suffering has not overlooked something, or 
misunderstood something, miscalculated, or committed any sort of 
error. From our point of view, his will is not so much in error as it 
is deformed. His attitudes do not depend upon beliefs that might be 
demonstrated by cogent evidence or argument to be false. It is 
impossible to reason with him meaningfully concerning his ends, 
any more than we could reason with someone who refuses to 
accept any proposition unless it is self-contradictory. Many 
philosophers believe that an act is right only if it can be justified to 
other rational beings. For this to be plausible, it is not enough that 
the rationality of the others be merely of the formal variety. Those 
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whom we seek to convince must be volitionally rational as well. If 
they are not, then their practical reasoning—however firmly 
correct it may be—builds upon a foundation that is radically 
opposed to ours…. We can therefore do no more with them than to 
express the bewilderment and revulsion that are inspired by us by 
the grotesque ends and ideals that they love. 
244
 
Understanding the things we care about may reveal conflicts among them. Our 
carings may be shown to be misguided. In this way our cares may need 
correction. Furthermore, people are often wrong about what they care about. 
Understanding themselves can correct misguided cares. Sometimes what one 
person cares about conflicts with what another person cares about and reason 
cannot resolve the conflict. This is sad, but true. Although sometimes cares can be 
affected by reasons, at some point an appeal to reasons fails to affect what one 
cares about because one cares about it. If conclusions about moral behavior could 
be agreed upon solely through formal cognitive rational grounds, then many 
ethical debates could be resolved. We would no longer need to debate, for 
example, whether abortion is morally justified because everyone would be 
convinced by reasons for or against it. The reason that many disagreements exist 
is due to people’s differing volitional commitments. People who are pro-life 
usually cannot be persuaded that abortion is morally justified because they are 
volitionally opposed to accepting the rational reasons supporting the practice. 
More generally, it is not that we should not use reasons to try and convince others 
to be morally good; it is that reasons are not always sufficient to convince others 
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to be morally good. The person must also care about being morally good. Hence, 
we must shatter the illusion that everyone has the ability to be good.  
 For these reasons, moral disillusion does not entail moral goodness. An 
individual can understand the nuances of moral life, but either not care about 
performing morally good acts, or care about performing evil ones. There is no 
guarantee that the morally disillusioned individual will be morally good in deed or 
character. Moreover, as I discussed in chapter 4, a person can even hold the belief 
that one ought to be morally good, but still not care about being so. That is, one 
can acquire the understanding without having the corresponding care. As I 
concluded in chapter 4, because actions are often more powerfully motivated by 
aliefs and cares than beliefs, we ought to track moral responsibility based on cares 
rather than beliefs.  
 And yet if one is morally disillusioned, one is capable of caring about 
moral goodness in a more realistic manner than those who still retain some 
illusions. The morally disillusioned individual has all of the cognitive tools 
needed to affect her cares. As Frankfurt, Kierkegaard, and Kekes all point out, a 
deeper understanding of moral life can affect what one cares about. Questioning 
the social ethic, or the nature of one’s responsibilities to others, can affect what 
we care about. We can best care about how our actions affect others when we 
understand all of the ways in which they do so. This is one of the reasons that 
moral disillusion is an ability. What should we say about those who possess this 
ability but act immorally? 
  239 
When one understands the richness of moral life but does not care about it, 
then one is more morally blameworthy than someone whose lack of care is based 
on a lack of understanding. The morally disillusioned person who performs evil 
has the ability to minimize evildoing by caring about it. Because the will she 
wants to have is one that does not care about moral goodness, we consider her 
morally worse than someone one does not care because she does not understand. 
We see this difference between those who should have known better (i.e. did not 
understand, but could have), and those who did know better but still brought 
about evil (i.e. those who did understand and did not care). I argued in chapters 3 
and 4 that evil does not require the intention to do evil. One can also do evil 
thoughtlessly, inadvertently, or indirectly. But we consider an agent more morally 
blameworthy for maliciously and intentionally bringing about evil. Similarly, 
moral responsibility does not require moral disillusion. However, a person is more 
blameworthy for performing wrong and evil acts when morally disillusioned. 
Moral disillusion is an understanding that is an ability. Those who have the ability 
to minimize evil, but do not guide themselves in a way to do so are more 
blameworthy than those who lack the ability because they lack the understanding.   
Recall the story of Billy Budd. There are two characters in the story who 
commit immoral acts. Claggart targets Billy for his schemes because he does not 
like Billy’s innocent demeanor. He is morally blameworthy for falsely accusing 
Billy of mutiny. Captain Vere sentences Billy to death. But he does so fully 
aware, not only of Billy’s innocence, but that he is in a situation of inescapable 
wrongdoing. He fully understands that he has sentenced an innocent person to 
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death. Despite understanding his responsibility to Billy, he did not care enough 
about it. The lack of care guides Vere’s actions. If he had cared in a certain way, 
he would not have been able to go through with sentencing Billy to death. He 
would have been strongly motivated to save Billy’s life. Captain Vere is more 
morally blameworthy than Claggart because he was morally disillusioned but still 
brought about evil. Claggart was surely a bad person, but he lacked a nuanced 
understanding of moral life. Vere had this understanding, and thus more ability 
than Claggart to minimize evil. He is morally responsible for not doing so.   
When such a moral belief/behavior mismatch is present in an agent, we 
morally evaluate the agent not just on her behavior, but on the mismatch. This 
framework allows us to see why someone like Thomas Jefferson deserves our 
moral censure. Jefferson wrote the inspiring words in the preamble to the 
Declaration of Independence proclaiming that “all men are created equal.” Yet, he 
owned hundred of slaves, unwilling to free them even upon his death. He is 
considered an American hero, and based upon his beliefs, this status is warranted. 
But based upon his actions, motivated by what he cared about, he deserves our 
moral condemnation. What makes Jefferson’s slave owning so horrible, more 
horrible than merely owning another human being, is that he believed that owning 
slaves was morally wrong. He had the understanding and the ability to behave in a 
morally praiseworthy manner. But he did not care to do so. He is different from 
slave owners who did not hold the belief that all men are created equal. These 
slave owners are certainly morally blameworthy for owning slaves, but Jefferson 
is more blameworthy. It is not merely that he should have known better. Rather, 
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he did know better, but he did not care. If moral evaluation were only to track 
beliefs, then Jefferson does not deserve our criticism. But he does deserve our 
criticism. Therefore, moral evaluation ought to track what a person cares about.  
5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have shown that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is an urging to 
shatter moral illusions. I also argued that the passionate inwardness he describes 
is congruent with Frankfurt’s account of caring about what we care about. Both 
Kierkegaard and Frankfurt endorse deepening our understanding about what is 
important to us. This more nuanced understanding is moral disillusion. Although 
moral disillusion gives one the ability to be morally good, it does not entail it. The 
morally disillusioned can perform evil acts. However, because they have a deeper 
understanding of the nuances of their moral agency and its effects on others, they 
have an ability to take responsibility for, and potentially minimize, evil. When the 
morally disillusioned have this ability, but do not care to exercise it, they are more 
morally blameworthy than those who have yet to shatter their moral illusions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters I have described important phases of moral 
disillusion. I described the loss of moral innocence, the kind of understanding that 
accompanies disillusion, the nature of evil, unchosen evil, inescapable 
wrongdoing, and the importance of our cares and self-reflection. I concluded that 
moral disillusion develops the ability to take a critical stance towards ethics and 
raise questions as to the adequacy and suitability of moral directives. Holding fast 
to moral illusions can lead one to do dreadful things. By acting, not only contrary 
to a moral system, but in accordance with one, an agent can fail to see the evil she 
causes. Hence, following moral directives is only one aspect of moral behavior. 
Putting moral principles to question is equally, if not more, important. When one 
recognizes how evil comes about, one has the possibility of taking responsibility 
for it, and even minimizing it.  
 Moral disillusion is a scalar process. We enter the moral community by 
recognizing that we are capable of wrongdoing and are appropriate candidates of 
the reactive attitudes. We lose moral innocence, but gain the ability to participate 
in the moral community. We see that our actions have upshot and moral 
significance. But there is more to moral life than satisfying the minimum 
conditions of moral responsibility. We can also shatter the illusion that only 
malicious individuals do evil deeds. We see that we can exploit, either directly or 
indirectly, another’s extreme vulnerability. We can be agents of unchosen evil, or 
bring about evil despite pursuing the morally best course of action, and be morally 
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responsible for doing so. Understanding moral responsibility for unchosen evil 
and for inescapable moral wrongdoing is based on understanding the importance 
of what we care about. Our cares are powerful motivators of our action. They can 
motivate us to act with or without our explicit cognitive consent. Moreover, in 
situations where what we care about conflicts with what we believe, the care often 
proves to be the more powerful motivator. We can affect our cares by 
understanding what we care about. Conversely, we can also come to care about 
things because we understand them. Moral disillusion is a shattering of moral 
illusions; an understanding of the nuances of moral interaction and moral 
responsibility. This understanding is an ability to raise questions as to the 
(in)adequacy of moral principles and directives, and to take responsibility for the 
evil one causes.  
 Degrees of this understanding correspond to degrees of moral 
responsibility. What characterizes the morally innocent is a certain kind of 
ignorance, or inability to participate in the moral community. The morally 
innocent cross the threshold into moral responsibility when they understand that 
their actions have moral significance. The more one understands about the moral 
significance of one’s actions, the more morally accountable one is. It is an illusion 
to believe that one can cultivate moral purity by following a moral directive. One 
can be an agent of unchosen evil or transgress a moral value even when pursuing 
the morally best course of action. Reflecting upon oneself and one’s relationships 
with others allows one to see the complexities of moral life. One understands that 
one cannot always avoid wrongdoing or evildoing. Ironically, it is the recognition 
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that evil and tragedy are inevitable that provides the means to minimize them 
both. The morally disillusioned person understands this. Whether she cares about 
it or not is a separate issue. 
 Taking responsibility for the evil one causes is important. If we only take 
responsibility for wrongs that we bring about as a result of deliberate choice, then 
we ignore large portions of what we are morally responsible for. Moreover, 
understanding that one’s actions have upshot in the world and that one is an 
appropriate candidate of the reactive attitudes is a scalar process as we discover 
the many different kinds of upshot, and the varied attitudes that are appropriate in 
different circumstances. Taking responsibility for unchosen evil and inescapable 
wrongdoing, along with questioning moral principles, allows one to respond 
appropriately to the evil one causes. By understanding how one causes evil, one 
can potentially minimize it. We cannot do anything about that of which we are 
ignorant. Hence, shattering the illusion of moral purity is essential to minimizing 
the harm one causes. When the harm one causes is unchosen and inescapable, 
then it cannot always be minimized. In such circumstances the appropriate 
response is regret, remorse, confession, contrition, apology, restitution, or 
reparation. Holding fast to illusions of moral purity keeps one blind to the ways in 
which we cause evil. Hence, we must shatter moral illusions for the sake of taking 
responsibility.    
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